{"title":"国外和国内的宪政:美国参议院和进步联盟,1961-1967","authors":"R. Johnson","doi":"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs in John F. Kennedy's administration, Edwin Martin, testified on 3 October 1963 before a closed session of the senate's Foreign Relations Committee to defend the administration's handling of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. While the administration privately conceded the coup to be a grave setback, committee Republicans generally supported the restrained welcome given to the military regime which had replaced Juan Bosch's democratically elected government, whereas most committee Democrats were sharply critical. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) attributed the disagreement to Kennedy's failure elsewhere in the Americas to promote 'constitutionalism' with enough vigour.1 Morse's testiness was more remarkable given that, three years earlier, both the executive and legislative branches had thought generous economic aid combined with rhetorical support for democracy the best way to wage the cold war in Latin America. But they soon parted company. Support for the Alliance for Progress waned not only because the administration rarely achieved its stated goals in Latin America; it also fell victim to ideological differences between the president and various senate factions which coloured other disputes over how much freedom of action the executive branch should be allowed in its conduct of foreign affairs. In this sense, the fate of the Alliance illustrates not only the difficulty of promoting democracy during the cold war, but also how differently the executive and legislative branches approach foreign affairs. Latin America provides some of the earliest evidence of the emergence of an empowered congressional perspective on US foreign policy, fuelled by the reaction against executive power caused by the war in Vietnam.","PeriodicalId":46534,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","volume":"21 1","pages":"414-442"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"1999-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Constitutionalism Abroad and At Home: The United States Senate and the Alliance for Progress, 1961–1967\",\"authors\":\"R. Johnson\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs in John F. Kennedy's administration, Edwin Martin, testified on 3 October 1963 before a closed session of the senate's Foreign Relations Committee to defend the administration's handling of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. While the administration privately conceded the coup to be a grave setback, committee Republicans generally supported the restrained welcome given to the military regime which had replaced Juan Bosch's democratically elected government, whereas most committee Democrats were sharply critical. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) attributed the disagreement to Kennedy's failure elsewhere in the Americas to promote 'constitutionalism' with enough vigour.1 Morse's testiness was more remarkable given that, three years earlier, both the executive and legislative branches had thought generous economic aid combined with rhetorical support for democracy the best way to wage the cold war in Latin America. But they soon parted company. Support for the Alliance for Progress waned not only because the administration rarely achieved its stated goals in Latin America; it also fell victim to ideological differences between the president and various senate factions which coloured other disputes over how much freedom of action the executive branch should be allowed in its conduct of foreign affairs. In this sense, the fate of the Alliance illustrates not only the difficulty of promoting democracy during the cold war, but also how differently the executive and legislative branches approach foreign affairs. Latin America provides some of the earliest evidence of the emergence of an empowered congressional perspective on US foreign policy, fuelled by the reaction against executive power caused by the war in Vietnam.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46534,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"414-442\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"1999-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640865","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Constitutionalism Abroad and At Home: The United States Senate and the Alliance for Progress, 1961–1967
assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs in John F. Kennedy's administration, Edwin Martin, testified on 3 October 1963 before a closed session of the senate's Foreign Relations Committee to defend the administration's handling of a military coup in the Dominican Republic. While the administration privately conceded the coup to be a grave setback, committee Republicans generally supported the restrained welcome given to the military regime which had replaced Juan Bosch's democratically elected government, whereas most committee Democrats were sharply critical. Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) attributed the disagreement to Kennedy's failure elsewhere in the Americas to promote 'constitutionalism' with enough vigour.1 Morse's testiness was more remarkable given that, three years earlier, both the executive and legislative branches had thought generous economic aid combined with rhetorical support for democracy the best way to wage the cold war in Latin America. But they soon parted company. Support for the Alliance for Progress waned not only because the administration rarely achieved its stated goals in Latin America; it also fell victim to ideological differences between the president and various senate factions which coloured other disputes over how much freedom of action the executive branch should be allowed in its conduct of foreign affairs. In this sense, the fate of the Alliance illustrates not only the difficulty of promoting democracy during the cold war, but also how differently the executive and legislative branches approach foreign affairs. Latin America provides some of the earliest evidence of the emergence of an empowered congressional perspective on US foreign policy, fuelled by the reaction against executive power caused by the war in Vietnam.
期刊介绍:
The International History Review is the only English-language quarterly devoted entirely to the history of international relations and the history of international thought. Since 1979 the Review has established itself as one of the premier History journals in the world, read and regularly cited by both political scientists and historians. The Review serves as a bridge between historical research and the study of international relations. The Review publishes articles exploring the history of international relations and the history of international thought. The editors particularly welcome submissions that explore the history of current conflicts and conflicts of current interest; the development of international thought; diplomatic history.