我知道你上个周期做了什么:提高对州竞选财务违规行为的检测

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW Election Law Journal Pub Date : 2016-09-01 DOI:10.1089/ELJ.2015.0348
C. SeljanEllen, LochnerTodd, GoldMaya, DavisWalker
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文探讨了州竞选财务监管机构可以做些什么来提高被监管者(特别是州立法者)对违规行为将被成功发现的认识。我们测试了这样的假设:随机审计和提高透明度的政策将促进人们对竞选财务违规行为的认识。通过对州议员的原始调查,我们发现这两种策略都是有效的。当监管机构的监管人员受到随机审计时,它们会更容易发现违规行为。此外,各机构可以通过透明的披露实践增加第三方监督者可获得的信息,从而加强对第三方监督的认识。
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I Know What You Did Last Cycle: Improving the Detection of State Campaign Finance Violations
Abstract This article investigates what state campaign finance regulatory agencies can do to increase perceptions among regulatees, specifically state legislators, that violations will be successfully detected. We test hypotheses that random audits and transparency-enhancing policies will promote perceptions that campaign finance violations are identified. With the use of an original survey of state legislators, we found that both strategies are effective. Agencies increase perceptions that they detect violations when their regulatees are subject to random audit. Additionally, agencies can bolster perceptions of third-party monitoring by increasing the information available to third-party monitors through transparent disclosure practices.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
13
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