阿根廷主权债务诉讼:同等权益违约的影响

IF 2 Q1 LAW Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2015-03-01 DOI:10.1093/JFR/FJU006
Julian Schumacher
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引用次数: 5

摘要

2014年7月31日,阿根廷发生了21世纪以来的第二次主权债券违约。这也是该国独立以来第八次违约;在这样的频率下,这可能不是一个特别值得注意的事件。之所以如此不同寻常,并不是因为另一场国内金融危机引发了支付违约,而是纽约一家联邦地区法院发布的禁令。然而,尽管公众愤怒,这一决定的广泛影响可能是有限的。如果已经开始的改革继续实施,情况更是如此。这个案子要追溯到2001年的平安夜,当时南非临时政府宣布暂停支付外债受这一决定影响的第一批定期付款应于2002年1月到期。仅仅几周后,也就是3月份,美国投资者针对阿根廷政府的第一起诉讼在美国法院提起(见图1)。但是,从2003年9月开始,当拟进行债务重组的第一批细节公布后,真正涌向法院的情况才开始出现。投资者的现值损失(“减记”)约为90%,这比上世纪90年代以来的大多数债券交换要约都要严厉得多,上世纪90年代以来的债券交换要约的平均减记幅度为35%。3 2005年6月,债务交换最终达成,减记幅度约为77%。约76%的债权人接受了这一要约,后来在2010年以相同条款重新开放后,这一比例略高于90%。之后,阿根廷恢复向新“交换”债券的参与投资者支付款项,但拒绝向持有原始债券的“拒绝”债权人支付任何款项。图1所示。诉讼从2002年就开始了。针对阿根廷共和国、……省的诉讼中累积的名义索赔
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Sovereign Debt Litigation in Argentina: Implications of the Pari Passu Default
On 31 July 2014, Argentina defaulted on its sovereign bonds for the second time in the 21st century. It was also its eighth default since independence1; at such frequency, this was perhaps not an especially noteworthy event. What made it so extraordinary was not that another domestic financial crisis triggered the payment default, but rather an injunction handed down by a federal district court in New York. However, despite public outrage, the wider impact of this decision is likely to be limited. That is even more so if reforms that have already started continue to be implemented. The case dates back to Christmas Eve 2001, when the interim Saa administration declared a payment suspension on foreign debt.2 The first scheduled payments affected by this decision were due in January 2002. Only weeks later, in March, the first lawsuits by American investors against the Argentine government were filed in US courts (see Figure 1). But a real rush to the courthouse took place from September 2003 onwards, when the first details of the intended debt restructuring were published. With a present value loss (‘haircut’) for investors of approximately 90 per cent, they were considerably harsher than most bond exchange offers since the 1990s, which saw average haircuts of 35 per cent.3 A debt exchange finally took place in June 2005 with a haircut of approximately 77 per cent. About 76 per cent of creditors accepted the offer, later increased to slightly more than 90 per cent after a reopening at identical terms in 2010. Afterwards, Argentina resumed payments to participating investors on the new ‘exchange’ bonds, but refused to make any payments to the ‘holdout’ creditors who kept the original bonds. Figure 1. Lawsuits filed since 2002. Cumulative nominal claims in litigation against the Republic of Argentina, Provinces of …
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CiteScore
5.60
自引率
3.80%
发文量
12
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