Xiangrui Xu, Peng Liu, Wei Wang, Hongliang Ma, Bin Wang, Zhen Han, Yufei Han
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CGIR: Conditional Generative Instance Reconstruction Attacks against Federated Learning
Data reconstruction attack has become an emerging privacy threat to Federal Learning (FL), inspiring a rethinking of FL's ability to protect privacy. While existing data reconstruction attacks have shown some effective performance, prior arts rely on different strong assumptions to guide the reconstruction process. In this work, we propose a novel Conditional Generative Instance Reconstruction Attack (CGIR attack) that drops all these assumptions. Specifically, we propose a batch label inference attack in non-IID FL scenarios, where multiple images can share the same labels. Based on the inferred labels, we conduct a “coarse-to-fine” image reconstruction process that provides a stable and effective data reconstruction. In addition, we equip the generator with a label condition restriction so that the contents and the labels of the reconstructed images are consistent. Our extensive evaluation results on two model architectures and five image datasets show that without the auxiliary assumptions, the CGIR attack outperforms the prior arts, even for complex datasets, deep models, and large batch sizes. Furthermore, we evaluate several existing defense methods. The experimental results suggest that pruning gradients can be used as a strategy to mitigate privacy risks in FL if a model tolerates a slight accuracy loss.
期刊介绍:
The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance.
The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability.
By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.