F. Kaiser, Uriel Dardik, Aviad Elitzur, Polina Zilberman, Nir Daniel, M. Wiens, F. Schultmann, Y. Elovici, Rami Puzis
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Attack Hypotheses Generation Based on Threat Intelligence Knowledge Graph
Cyber threat intelligence on past attacks may help with attack reconstruction and the prediction of the course of an ongoing attack by providing deeper understanding of the tools and attack patterns used by attackers. Therefore, cyber security analysts employ threat intelligence, alert correlations, machine learning, and advanced visualizations in order to produce sound attack hypotheses. In this article, we present AttackDB, a multi-level threat knowledge base that combines data from multiple threat intelligence sources to associate high-level ATT&CK techniques with low-level telemetry found in behavioral malware reports. We also present the Attack Hypothesis Generator which relies on knowledge graph traversal algorithms and a variety of link prediction methods to automatically infer ATT&CK techniques from a set of observable artifacts. Results of experiments performed with 53K VirusTotal reports indicate that the proposed algorithms employed by the Attack Hypothesis Generator are able to produce accurate adversarial technique hypotheses with a mean average precision greater than 0.5 and area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of over 0.8 when it is implemented on the basis of AttackDB. The presented toolkit will help analysts to improve the accuracy of attack hypotheses and to automate the attack hypothesis generation process.
期刊介绍:
The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance.
The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability.
By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.