逃税模型与纳税人对公共品供给的认知

Elena D’Agostino, Marco Alberto De Benedetto, G. Sobbrio
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们使用一个两期模型来分析公共支出对逃税的影响,在这个模型中,政府和纳税人根据支出的水平和质量以及要支付的税收来做出决定。结果表明,随着政府效率低下,偷税漏税会增加。
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A model of tax evasion and taxpayers' perception about public goods provision
We analyse the impact of public spending on tax evasion using a two-period model in which the government and taxpayers make their decisions in terms of level and quality of expenditures to set and taxes to pay. Results predict that tax evasion increases with government inefficiency.
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1.00
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33.30%
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