Pub Date : 2024-07-22DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009
Mikayla Novak
Entangled political economy views societal phenomena as featuring substantial interaction between economic and political entities, but questions have been raised about the conceptual properties of entanglement. The political economist Randall Holcombe has raised questions concerning the economic influences affecting uneven patterns of entanglement between entities. Drawing upon his own transaction costs-based framework of political stratification, Holcombe suggests that political elites incur relatively low transaction costs associated with bargaining over policies, whereas non-elites incur relatively high costs. This suggests that elites actively participate in policy design and implementation and can outmaneuver the non-elite public to externalize the costs of political decisions, yielding noticeable clustering effects within entangled network structures. This article seeks to build upon Holcombe’s insights, as well as the transaction cost politics of Charlotte Twight, illustrating how groups engaging in political processes attempt to manipulate transaction costs to secure favorable outcomes. Transaction cost manipulation by elites to secure advantages is commonly studied, but less so is how non-elitists succeed in adjusting the transaction costs of political exchanges to help prevent fiscal exploitation by elitists. The public finance case of Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights is used to illustrate how dynamic entanglements between elites and non-elites delivered institutional change better aligning with non-elite fiscal preferences.
{"title":"Contentious public finance: how entanglement shapes the costs of resisting elitist budgetary preferences","authors":"Mikayla Novak","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009","url":null,"abstract":"Entangled political economy views societal phenomena as featuring substantial interaction between economic and political entities, but questions have been raised about the conceptual properties of entanglement. The political economist Randall Holcombe has raised questions concerning the economic influences affecting uneven patterns of entanglement between entities. Drawing upon his own transaction costs-based framework of political stratification, Holcombe suggests that political elites incur relatively low transaction costs associated with bargaining over policies, whereas non-elites incur relatively high costs. This suggests that elites actively participate in policy design and implementation and can outmaneuver the non-elite public to externalize the costs of political decisions, yielding noticeable clustering effects within entangled network structures. This article seeks to build upon Holcombe’s insights, as well as the transaction cost politics of Charlotte Twight, illustrating how groups engaging in political processes attempt to manipulate transaction costs to secure favorable outcomes. Transaction cost manipulation by elites to secure advantages is commonly studied, but less so is how non-elitists succeed in adjusting the transaction costs of political exchanges to help prevent fiscal exploitation by elitists. The public finance case of Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights is used to illustrate how dynamic entanglements between elites and non-elites delivered institutional change better aligning with non-elite fiscal preferences.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141814629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-12DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000008
Zhiyong An, David Coady
We extend the standard optimal linear income taxation model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences while still maintaining the assumption that individuals are rational. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that when the government places a higher social weight on work than do individuals, the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) becomes lower. This implies lower revenue, income guarantee, and overall progressivity. The case for lower MIT is reinforced when the government places a relatively higher weight on work for low earners. Combining our analysis with that of An and Coady (2022), we, on the one hand, agree with previous studies that the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule would be close to the optimal linear one but, on the other, show that the degree of closeness would depend on preference differences. Our work contributes to the burgeoning field of non-welfarist economics.
我们扩展了标准的最优线性所得税模型，以考虑社会和个人工作偏好的差异，同时仍然维持个人是理性的这一假设。理论和模拟分析表明，当政府对工作的社会权重高于个人时，最优边际所得税率（MIT）就会降低。这意味着收入、收入保障和总体累进性都会降低。当政府对低收入者的工作赋予相对较高的权重时，降低边际所得税率的理由就更加充分。将我们的分析与 An 和 Coady（2022 年）的分析相结合，一方面，我们同意之前研究的观点，即最优非线性所得税表将接近最优线性所得税表，但另一方面，我们表明，接近程度将取决于偏好差异。我们的研究工作为正在蓬勃发展的非福利主义经济学领域做出了贡献。
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Pub Date : 2024-02-15DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006
Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili
{"title":"Introduction: special issue on the political economy of the War in Ukraine","authors":"Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139774772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-15DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006
Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili
{"title":"Introduction: special issue on the political economy of the War in Ukraine","authors":"Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139834202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili
This article links Ukraine’s response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022 to institutional reforms in the decade before the current war. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukrainian civil society, business, and government jointly established an institutional framework to monitor public procurement. The problem of devising institutions to monitor behavior on an ongoing basis is not generally solved through constitutional reforms and revolutions. Public procurement reforms contributed to a culture of coproduction of monitoring that has persisted even when pressure was exerted on open government after Russia’s full-scale invasion. The reforms implemented after the Revolution of Dignity created a robust institutional framework to scale up institutions to monitor public procurement during Ukraine’s ongoing reconstruction effort.
{"title":"The political economy of public procurement in Ukraine","authors":"Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005","url":null,"abstract":"This article links Ukraine’s response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022 to institutional reforms in the decade before the current war. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukrainian civil society, business, and government jointly established an institutional framework to monitor public procurement. The problem of devising institutions to monitor behavior on an ongoing basis is not generally solved through constitutional reforms and revolutions. Public procurement reforms contributed to a culture of coproduction of monitoring that has persisted even when pressure was exerted on open government after Russia’s full-scale invasion. The reforms implemented after the Revolution of Dignity created a robust institutional framework to scale up institutions to monitor public procurement during Ukraine’s ongoing reconstruction effort.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139857989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005
Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili
This article links Ukraine’s response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022 to institutional reforms in the decade before the current war. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukrainian civil society, business, and government jointly established an institutional framework to monitor public procurement. The problem of devising institutions to monitor behavior on an ongoing basis is not generally solved through constitutional reforms and revolutions. Public procurement reforms contributed to a culture of coproduction of monitoring that has persisted even when pressure was exerted on open government after Russia’s full-scale invasion. The reforms implemented after the Revolution of Dignity created a robust institutional framework to scale up institutions to monitor public procurement during Ukraine’s ongoing reconstruction effort.
{"title":"The political economy of public procurement in Ukraine","authors":"Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005","url":null,"abstract":"This article links Ukraine’s response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022 to institutional reforms in the decade before the current war. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukrainian civil society, business, and government jointly established an institutional framework to monitor public procurement. The problem of devising institutions to monitor behavior on an ongoing basis is not generally solved through constitutional reforms and revolutions. Public procurement reforms contributed to a culture of coproduction of monitoring that has persisted even when pressure was exerted on open government after Russia’s full-scale invasion. The reforms implemented after the Revolution of Dignity created a robust institutional framework to scale up institutions to monitor public procurement during Ukraine’s ongoing reconstruction effort.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139798034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002
Oleksandra Keudel, Oksana Huss
Public choice scholars have long argued that the decentralisation of governance has substantial benefits, though the specific context is necessary to understand why and how it works well. This article provides an Ostromian analysis of decentralised governance in Ukraine based on a wartime survey of 204 Ukrainian local authorities (LAs), in-depth interviews and focus groups with LA representatives. The article identifies empirical evidence of three mechanisms of polycentricity at play locally in Ukraine: the facilitation of local knowledge; resource mobilisation; and the enablement of experimentation and innovation. One year into the full-scale Russian invasion, empirical insights from Ukraine demonstrate how a polycentric governance system can contribute to resilience in a protracted and extreme crisis. The research findings also highlight the critical role of personal communication and technology in enabling social innovation that supports resilience.
{"title":"Polycentric governance in practice: the case of Ukraine’s decentralised crisis response during the Russo-Ukrainian war","authors":"Oleksandra Keudel, Oksana Huss","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002","url":null,"abstract":"Public choice scholars have long argued that the decentralisation of governance has substantial benefits, though the specific context is necessary to understand why and how it works well. This article provides an Ostromian analysis of decentralised governance in Ukraine based on a wartime survey of 204 Ukrainian local authorities (LAs), in-depth interviews and focus groups with LA representatives. The article identifies empirical evidence of three mechanisms of polycentricity at play locally in Ukraine: the facilitation of local knowledge; resource mobilisation; and the enablement of experimentation and innovation. One year into the full-scale Russian invasion, empirical insights from Ukraine demonstrate how a polycentric governance system can contribute to resilience in a protracted and extreme crisis. The research findings also highlight the critical role of personal communication and technology in enabling social innovation that supports resilience.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135825487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study is to investigate transformation processes in the field of public administration in Ukraine and the possibility of implementing change management. This article uses a case-study methodology, with both primary source statistics and archival materials, to evaluate the extent of decentralisation reforms in Ukraine. We demonstrate that reforms have been partial, which we attribute to an inefficient and opaque system that frustrates reform efforts. The main gaps of the Ukrainian authorities are observed in the inability to effectively influence the distribution of resources, in particular, to ensure the functioning of newly created territorial units. The article provides evidence that the existing problems that are the result of inefficient public administration in Ukraine, regarding poverty, inflation, the growing gap between rural and urban population, and the growth of unemployment, can be solved by implementing change management. The decentralisation reforms initiated in Ukraine have often been extolled in various quarters for their potential to enhance administrative and governance efficiency. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and empirical assessment detailing the full extent and depth of these reforms remains conspicuously absent. Such a gap in the literature underscores the need for a rigorous examination to ascertain the real magnitude of changes and their tangible impacts on the ground. The novelty of the study consists in the focus on the approach of the three-dimensional design of public administration proposed by Ukrainian researchers in the context of ‘management–administration–management’.
{"title":"Strategic changes in the public sphere: modern prerequisites for effective management","authors":"Tetiana Kozachenko, Nataliia Aliushyna, Olena Boiko, Viacheslav Grabovskiy, Nataliia Statsenko","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to investigate transformation processes in the field of public administration in Ukraine and the possibility of implementing change management. This article uses a case-study methodology, with both primary source statistics and archival materials, to evaluate the extent of decentralisation reforms in Ukraine. We demonstrate that reforms have been partial, which we attribute to an inefficient and opaque system that frustrates reform efforts. The main gaps of the Ukrainian authorities are observed in the inability to effectively influence the distribution of resources, in particular, to ensure the functioning of newly created territorial units. The article provides evidence that the existing problems that are the result of inefficient public administration in Ukraine, regarding poverty, inflation, the growing gap between rural and urban population, and the growth of unemployment, can be solved by implementing change management. The decentralisation reforms initiated in Ukraine have often been extolled in various quarters for their potential to enhance administrative and governance efficiency. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and empirical assessment detailing the full extent and depth of these reforms remains conspicuously absent. Such a gap in the literature underscores the need for a rigorous examination to ascertain the real magnitude of changes and their tangible impacts on the ground. The novelty of the study consists in the focus on the approach of the three-dimensional design of public administration proposed by Ukrainian researchers in the context of ‘management–administration–management’.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003
Mohamed Mansour, Eric Kamwa
The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.
{"title":"Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries","authors":"Mohamed Mansour, Eric Kamwa","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001
Jonathan W. Plante
In his recent book Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates , Olivier Blanchard argues that when interest rates are low, policymakers can use public debt finance to increase the welfare of a nation. I argue that Blanchard’s model suffers from the “organismic theory of the State” and, as such, reaches dubious conclusions. At its core, an organismic model presumes that politicians can and do make transfers that maximize the welfare of all individuals. While this is, of course, plausible, an individualistic view states that whether government transfers increase welfare for all individuals depends on the political decision-making process of time and place. While some political processes redistribute funds equally, others redistribute unequally—that is, they increase welfare for some but decrease the welfare of others. Blanchard’s organismic model takes this fact for granted. I use the individualistic view to argue that even if interest rates are low, if a political process is one that redistributes unequally, transfers under public debt financing can result in or exacerbate income inequality. To illustrate this point, I show that in the US, increases in public debt financing have increased welfare for some individuals—the low- and upper-income quintiles—but have decreased it for others—the middle-income quintiles.
奥利维尔•布兰查德(Olivier Blanchard)在他的新书《低利率下的财政政策》(Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates)中指出，当利率处于低位时，政策制定者可以利用公共债务融资来增加一个国家的福利。我认为，布兰查德的模型受到了“国家有机体理论”的影响，因此得出了可疑的结论。有机模型的核心假设是，政治家能够而且确实进行了使所有个人福利最大化的转移支付。虽然这当然是合理的，但个人主义的观点认为，政府转移支付是否会增加所有人的福利，取决于时间和地点的政治决策过程。虽然有些政治过程对资金的再分配是平等的，但有些则是不平等的——也就是说，它们增加了一些人的福利，但减少了另一些人的福利。布兰查德的有机体模型将这一事实视为理所当然。我用个人主义的观点认为，即使利率很低，如果一个政治过程是一个再分配不平等的过程，公共债务融资下的转移支付也会导致或加剧收入不平等。为了说明这一点，我展示了在美国，公共债务融资的增加增加了一些人(低收入和高收入的五分之一)的福利，但却减少了另一些人(中等收入的五分之一)的福利。
{"title":"Public debt financing through political processes: a review essay of Olivier Blanchard’s Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates","authors":"Jonathan W. Plante","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","url":null,"abstract":"In his recent book Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates , Olivier Blanchard argues that when interest rates are low, policymakers can use public debt finance to increase the welfare of a nation. I argue that Blanchard’s model suffers from the “organismic theory of the State” and, as such, reaches dubious conclusions. At its core, an organismic model presumes that politicians can and do make transfers that maximize the welfare of all individuals. While this is, of course, plausible, an individualistic view states that whether government transfers increase welfare for all individuals depends on the political decision-making process of time and place. While some political processes redistribute funds equally, others redistribute unequally—that is, they increase welfare for some but decrease the welfare of others. Blanchard’s organismic model takes this fact for granted. I use the individualistic view to argue that even if interest rates are low, if a political process is one that redistributes unequally, transfers under public debt financing can result in or exacerbate income inequality. To illustrate this point, I show that in the US, increases in public debt financing have increased welfare for some individuals—the low- and upper-income quintiles—but have decreased it for others—the middle-income quintiles.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135482955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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