Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002
Oleksandra Keudel, Oksana Huss
Public choice scholars have long argued that the decentralisation of governance has substantial benefits, though the specific context is necessary to understand why and how it works well. This article provides an Ostromian analysis of decentralised governance in Ukraine based on a wartime survey of 204 Ukrainian local authorities (LAs), in-depth interviews and focus groups with LA representatives. The article identifies empirical evidence of three mechanisms of polycentricity at play locally in Ukraine: the facilitation of local knowledge; resource mobilisation; and the enablement of experimentation and innovation. One year into the full-scale Russian invasion, empirical insights from Ukraine demonstrate how a polycentric governance system can contribute to resilience in a protracted and extreme crisis. The research findings also highlight the critical role of personal communication and technology in enabling social innovation that supports resilience.
{"title":"Polycentric governance in practice: the case of Ukraine’s decentralised crisis response during the Russo-Ukrainian war","authors":"Oleksandra Keudel, Oksana Huss","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002","url":null,"abstract":"Public choice scholars have long argued that the decentralisation of governance has substantial benefits, though the specific context is necessary to understand why and how it works well. This article provides an Ostromian analysis of decentralised governance in Ukraine based on a wartime survey of 204 Ukrainian local authorities (LAs), in-depth interviews and focus groups with LA representatives. The article identifies empirical evidence of three mechanisms of polycentricity at play locally in Ukraine: the facilitation of local knowledge; resource mobilisation; and the enablement of experimentation and innovation. One year into the full-scale Russian invasion, empirical insights from Ukraine demonstrate how a polycentric governance system can contribute to resilience in a protracted and extreme crisis. The research findings also highlight the critical role of personal communication and technology in enabling social innovation that supports resilience.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135825487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study is to investigate transformation processes in the field of public administration in Ukraine and the possibility of implementing change management. This article uses a case-study methodology, with both primary source statistics and archival materials, to evaluate the extent of decentralisation reforms in Ukraine. We demonstrate that reforms have been partial, which we attribute to an inefficient and opaque system that frustrates reform efforts. The main gaps of the Ukrainian authorities are observed in the inability to effectively influence the distribution of resources, in particular, to ensure the functioning of newly created territorial units. The article provides evidence that the existing problems that are the result of inefficient public administration in Ukraine, regarding poverty, inflation, the growing gap between rural and urban population, and the growth of unemployment, can be solved by implementing change management. The decentralisation reforms initiated in Ukraine have often been extolled in various quarters for their potential to enhance administrative and governance efficiency. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and empirical assessment detailing the full extent and depth of these reforms remains conspicuously absent. Such a gap in the literature underscores the need for a rigorous examination to ascertain the real magnitude of changes and their tangible impacts on the ground. The novelty of the study consists in the focus on the approach of the three-dimensional design of public administration proposed by Ukrainian researchers in the context of ‘management–administration–management’.
{"title":"Strategic changes in the public sphere: modern prerequisites for effective management","authors":"Tetiana Kozachenko, Nataliia Aliushyna, Olena Boiko, Viacheslav Grabovskiy, Nataliia Statsenko","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to investigate transformation processes in the field of public administration in Ukraine and the possibility of implementing change management. This article uses a case-study methodology, with both primary source statistics and archival materials, to evaluate the extent of decentralisation reforms in Ukraine. We demonstrate that reforms have been partial, which we attribute to an inefficient and opaque system that frustrates reform efforts. The main gaps of the Ukrainian authorities are observed in the inability to effectively influence the distribution of resources, in particular, to ensure the functioning of newly created territorial units. The article provides evidence that the existing problems that are the result of inefficient public administration in Ukraine, regarding poverty, inflation, the growing gap between rural and urban population, and the growth of unemployment, can be solved by implementing change management. The decentralisation reforms initiated in Ukraine have often been extolled in various quarters for their potential to enhance administrative and governance efficiency. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and empirical assessment detailing the full extent and depth of these reforms remains conspicuously absent. Such a gap in the literature underscores the need for a rigorous examination to ascertain the real magnitude of changes and their tangible impacts on the ground. The novelty of the study consists in the focus on the approach of the three-dimensional design of public administration proposed by Ukrainian researchers in the context of ‘management–administration–management’.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003
Mohamed Mansour, Eric Kamwa
The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.
{"title":"Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries","authors":"Mohamed Mansour, Eric Kamwa","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to study empirically the relationship between political governance and public debt by testing a number of hypotheses. We examine the effects of the dispersion of power on public debt with an econometric study carried out on a sample of 13 developed countries using macroeconomic and political data covering the period 1996–2012. It is found that the lack of consensus between political parties in a government coalition and the dispersion of power within the government are factors explaining the increase in public debt.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001
Jonathan W. Plante
In his recent book Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates , Olivier Blanchard argues that when interest rates are low, policymakers can use public debt finance to increase the welfare of a nation. I argue that Blanchard’s model suffers from the “organismic theory of the State” and, as such, reaches dubious conclusions. At its core, an organismic model presumes that politicians can and do make transfers that maximize the welfare of all individuals. While this is, of course, plausible, an individualistic view states that whether government transfers increase welfare for all individuals depends on the political decision-making process of time and place. While some political processes redistribute funds equally, others redistribute unequally—that is, they increase welfare for some but decrease the welfare of others. Blanchard’s organismic model takes this fact for granted. I use the individualistic view to argue that even if interest rates are low, if a political process is one that redistributes unequally, transfers under public debt financing can result in or exacerbate income inequality. To illustrate this point, I show that in the US, increases in public debt financing have increased welfare for some individuals—the low- and upper-income quintiles—but have decreased it for others—the middle-income quintiles.
奥利维尔•布兰查德(Olivier Blanchard)在他的新书《低利率下的财政政策》(Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates)中指出，当利率处于低位时，政策制定者可以利用公共债务融资来增加一个国家的福利。我认为，布兰查德的模型受到了“国家有机体理论”的影响，因此得出了可疑的结论。有机模型的核心假设是，政治家能够而且确实进行了使所有个人福利最大化的转移支付。虽然这当然是合理的，但个人主义的观点认为，政府转移支付是否会增加所有人的福利，取决于时间和地点的政治决策过程。虽然有些政治过程对资金的再分配是平等的，但有些则是不平等的——也就是说，它们增加了一些人的福利，但减少了另一些人的福利。布兰查德的有机体模型将这一事实视为理所当然。我用个人主义的观点认为，即使利率很低，如果一个政治过程是一个再分配不平等的过程，公共债务融资下的转移支付也会导致或加剧收入不平等。为了说明这一点，我展示了在美国，公共债务融资的增加增加了一些人(低收入和高收入的五分之一)的福利，但却减少了另一些人(中等收入的五分之一)的福利。
{"title":"Public debt financing through political processes: a review essay of Olivier Blanchard’s Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates","authors":"Jonathan W. Plante","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","url":null,"abstract":"In his recent book Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates , Olivier Blanchard argues that when interest rates are low, policymakers can use public debt finance to increase the welfare of a nation. I argue that Blanchard’s model suffers from the “organismic theory of the State” and, as such, reaches dubious conclusions. At its core, an organismic model presumes that politicians can and do make transfers that maximize the welfare of all individuals. While this is, of course, plausible, an individualistic view states that whether government transfers increase welfare for all individuals depends on the political decision-making process of time and place. While some political processes redistribute funds equally, others redistribute unequally—that is, they increase welfare for some but decrease the welfare of others. Blanchard’s organismic model takes this fact for granted. I use the individualistic view to argue that even if interest rates are low, if a political process is one that redistributes unequally, transfers under public debt financing can result in or exacerbate income inequality. To illustrate this point, I show that in the US, increases in public debt financing have increased welfare for some individuals—the low- and upper-income quintiles—but have decreased it for others—the middle-income quintiles.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135482955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-28DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16902649893380
D. Hebert, Leonid Krasnozhon
We use public choice theory to examine the calculus of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We hypothesize that Putin’s regime acts as a tinpot dictatorship, using political loyalty and repression to stay in office. During Putin’s first two-term presidency, an improvement in Russia’s economic performance increased the supply of political loyalty and resulted in a slow fall in political repression. The global financial crisis deteriorated Russians’ living standards between Putin’s second and third terms in office. The deterioration in the country’s economic performance unambiguously resulted in a fall in the supply of loyalty and increased repression. Consistent with our hypothesis, we argue that Putin’s regime pursued military conquest to increase the aggregate supply of political loyalty.
{"title":"Public choice economics of the Ukraine crisis","authors":"D. Hebert, Leonid Krasnozhon","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16902649893380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16902649893380","url":null,"abstract":"We use public choice theory to examine the calculus of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We hypothesize that Putin’s regime acts as a tinpot dictatorship, using political loyalty and repression to stay in office. During Putin’s first two-term presidency, an improvement in Russia’s economic performance increased the supply of political loyalty and resulted in a slow fall in political repression. The global financial crisis deteriorated Russians’ living standards between Putin’s second and third terms in office. The deterioration in the country’s economic performance unambiguously resulted in a fall in the supply of loyalty and increased repression. Consistent with our hypothesis, we argue that Putin’s regime pursued military conquest to increase the aggregate supply of political loyalty.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48321387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-31DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16872942837731
Aris Trantidis
With this article, I present a public choice perspective on Russia’s war on Ukraine. I criticise the realist view according to which Russia’s security concerns, defined by President Putin, prompted the conflict. I argue that realism offers a deficient analytic framework to the extent that it disregards the political and economic structure of Russia and, generally speaking, how the political economy of each case study shapes preferences, strategies and intra-elite relations, which feed into foreign policy formation. Russia is a government-controlled economy and society; a key property of Russia’s political economy is the dependency of key socio-economic actors and groups on the regime’s survival. This landscape pre-empts the expression of genuine feedback and dissent from society, and explains why Putin’s decision has faced very little disagreement and resistance. Given the previously close economic ties between Russia and Ukraine, this article also challenges capitalist peace theory for its blanket assertion that dense economic relations would provide a strong disincentive for countries to resort to war. Instead of talking about capitalism generically, we can discern varieties of capitalism, as they condition state–society relations differently. In Russia, the value that key socio-economic elites assign to their relationship with Putin outweighs the costs they are experiencing from the conflict and the external sanctions. Developing a public choice perspective in the study of international relations focuses on the preferences and strategies of the leadership and of domestic elite-level actors within the aggressor state, and invites attention to the power asymmetries that characterise their relationship.
{"title":"Introducing public choice in international relations: the Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Aris Trantidis","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16872942837731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16872942837731","url":null,"abstract":"With this article, I present a public choice perspective on Russia’s war on Ukraine. I criticise the realist view according to which Russia’s security concerns, defined by President Putin, prompted the conflict. I argue that realism offers a deficient analytic framework to the extent that it disregards the political and economic structure of Russia and, generally speaking, how the political economy of each case study shapes preferences, strategies and intra-elite relations, which feed into foreign policy formation. Russia is a government-controlled economy and society; a key property of Russia’s political economy is the dependency of key socio-economic actors and groups on the regime’s survival. This landscape pre-empts the expression of genuine feedback and dissent from society, and explains why Putin’s decision has faced very little disagreement and resistance. Given the previously close economic ties between Russia and Ukraine, this article also challenges capitalist peace theory for its blanket assertion that dense economic relations would provide a strong disincentive for countries to resort to war. Instead of talking about capitalism generically, we can discern varieties of capitalism, as they condition state–society relations differently. In Russia, the value that key socio-economic elites assign to their relationship with Putin outweighs the costs they are experiencing from the conflict and the external sanctions. Developing a public choice perspective in the study of international relations focuses on the preferences and strategies of the leadership and of domestic elite-level actors within the aggressor state, and invites attention to the power asymmetries that characterise their relationship.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49528581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-12DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16827529522153
G. Dempster, R. Ekelund, M. Thornton
The October Revolution in Russia is better understood in light of Gordon Tullock’s by-product theory of revolution. This approach entails a focus on private costs and benefits rather than on public goods. It is shown that in terms of economic development, fiscal stability, and income distribution, that is, public goods, conditions in late-tsarist Russia were improving, not deteriorating, as the revolution approached. We reinterpret the impact of the many political concessions that followed the earlier Russian Revolution of 1905 and conclude that they had ultimately increased, rather than decreased, the probability of revolution. Finally, we show that various forms of foreign intervention (financial, military, and philosophical) made the unlikely Lenin the ultimate victor in the outcome of the Russian Revolution.
{"title":"Understanding the timing and outcome of the Russian Revolution: a public choice approach","authors":"G. Dempster, R. Ekelund, M. Thornton","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16827529522153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16827529522153","url":null,"abstract":"The October Revolution in Russia is better understood in light of Gordon Tullock’s by-product theory of revolution. This approach entails a focus on private costs and benefits rather than on public goods. It is shown that in terms of economic development, fiscal stability, and income distribution, that is, public goods, conditions in late-tsarist Russia were improving, not deteriorating, as the revolution approached. We reinterpret the impact of the many political concessions that followed the earlier Russian Revolution of 1905 and conclude that they had ultimately increased, rather than decreased, the probability of revolution. Finally, we show that various forms of foreign intervention (financial, military, and philosophical) made the unlikely Lenin the ultimate victor in the outcome of the Russian Revolution.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41501291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-07DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16830188499713
Vincent Geloso, Marcus Shera
Buchanan and Wagner pointed to an asymmetry in the political rewards of deficits and surpluses, with the former being preferable to the latter. They assigned the rise of this asymmetry to the popularization of Keynesian ideas. We test both claims by relying on the historical reputation surveys of US presidents since 1948. Historical reputations have long been something presidents have cared about, and they constitute a reliable way to assess whether their reputations suffer or gain from having run deficits. We find evidence that the size of deficits tends to be associated with greater presidential scores and that this effect is stronger in more recent surveys, when Keynesian ideas were more popular.
{"title":"Presidents in deficit: are there historical rewards to deficits?","authors":"Vincent Geloso, Marcus Shera","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16830188499713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16830188499713","url":null,"abstract":"Buchanan and Wagner pointed to an asymmetry in the political rewards of deficits and surpluses, with the former being preferable to the latter. They assigned the rise of this asymmetry to the popularization of Keynesian ideas. We test both claims by relying on the historical reputation surveys of US presidents since 1948. Historical reputations have long been something presidents have cared about, and they constitute a reliable way to assess whether their reputations suffer or gain from having run deficits. We find evidence that the size of deficits tends to be associated with greater presidential scores and that this effect is stronger in more recent surveys, when Keynesian ideas were more popular.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135363576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16817386486785
Oumarou Zallé
Addressing growth challenges in developing countries requires mobilising domestic resources in the face of declining external financing. This paper explores the effects of financial inclusion on tax efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, conditioned by institutional quality. To do this, a finite mixture model that takes into account the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity was estimated based on a sample taken from 43 countries over the 1996 -2019 period. Tax effort scores were constructed using several stochastic frontier models. The results show that the impact of financial inclusion on tax efforts differs across country groups. For example, financial inclusion stimulates tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa in 93.8 per cent of cases and inhibits tax effort in only 6.2 per cent of cases. These results are robust to several sensitivity tests. This paper highlights the need for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to improve access to financial systems by increasing mobile banking coverage and accessibility and reducing financial services costs. These countries should also look to capitalise on the benefits of financial inclusion by protecting political rights and fighting corruption.
{"title":"Financial inclusion and tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa: the role of institutional quality","authors":"Oumarou Zallé","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16817386486785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16817386486785","url":null,"abstract":"Addressing growth challenges in developing countries requires mobilising domestic resources in the face of declining external financing. This paper explores the effects of financial inclusion on tax efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, conditioned by institutional quality. To do this, a finite mixture model that takes into account the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity was estimated based on a sample taken from 43 countries over the 1996 -2019 period. Tax effort scores were constructed using several stochastic frontier models. The results show that the impact of financial inclusion on tax efforts differs across country groups. For example, financial inclusion stimulates tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa in 93.8 per cent of cases and inhibits tax effort in only 6.2 per cent of cases. These results are robust to several sensitivity tests. This paper highlights the need for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to improve access to financial systems by increasing mobile banking coverage and accessibility and reducing financial services costs. These countries should also look to capitalise on the benefits of financial inclusion by protecting political rights and fighting corruption.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46832772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1332/251569121x16801683769931
I. Bischoff, Aleksandra Wimberger
We link the literature on social media adoption among local governments to the literature on local public finance. We argue that the demand for social media adoption is higher the more citizens knowingly contribute to the local budget through local salient taxes. We test this hypothesis using panel data on municipalities in the German state of Hesse and their adoption of Facebook between 2009 and 2019. We show that social media adoption among local governments in Germany is driven by citizens’ demand for transparency, accountability and political participation. This demand increases the more citizens knowingly contribute to the local budget through salient local taxes. This article shows that exploring the link between issues of local public finance and political communication via social media can deepen our understanding of local public affairs.
{"title":"Local land taxes and social media adoption in local governments: evidence from the German state of Hesse","authors":"I. Bischoff, Aleksandra Wimberger","doi":"10.1332/251569121x16801683769931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569121x16801683769931","url":null,"abstract":"We link the literature on social media adoption among local governments to the literature on local public finance. We argue that the demand for social media adoption is higher the more citizens knowingly contribute to the local budget through local salient taxes. We test this hypothesis using panel data on municipalities in the German state of Hesse and their adoption of Facebook between 2009 and 2019. We show that social media adoption among local governments in Germany is driven by citizens’ demand for transparency, accountability and political participation. This demand increases the more citizens knowingly contribute to the local budget through salient local taxes. This article shows that exploring the link between issues of local public finance and political communication via social media can deepen our understanding of local public affairs.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41692544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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