国会宪法

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2011-08-14 DOI:10.12987/9780300227642
Josh Chafetz
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引用次数: 9

摘要

国会拥有比我们习惯看到的多得多的宪法权力。由于未能有效利用其权力,国会邀请其他部门填补真空,导致宪法不平衡。本文考虑了一些宪法工具,这些工具是国会各议院——甚至个别议员——单独行动时可以在部门间冲突中使用的。尽管本条所讨论的国会权力在宪法文本、历史和结构中都得到了明确的考虑,但其中许多权力在单独的情况下却很少得到处理。更重要的是,它们以前从未被认为是正在进行的分支间权力斗争中的一套工具。这种整体的观点是必要的,因为这些力量结合起来远远大于它们各部分的总和。本文借用国际关系学者的术语,将所讨论的国会权力分为“硬”和“软”两类。国会的硬权力是有形的和强制性的;本文讨论的硬权力是钱袋权力和蔑视权力。国会的软实力是无形的、有说服力的;本条所考虑的软权力包括国会的言论和辩论自由,两院对其成员的纪律处分权,以及确定其议事规则的权力。这些权力中的每一项都为国会提供了机会,以提高其在公众中的地位,从而增强其权力。本文旨在展示这些权力相互支持和加强的方式,以及国会未充分利用这些权力的方式。在此过程中,本文考察了国会使用和未能使用这些权力的一些例子,包括五角大楼文件的发布、1995-1996年政府关闭和2011年接近关闭、2007-2009年对白宫官员的藐视国会诉讼,以及使用阻挠议事等。文章的结论是,国会应该更有力地使用这些权力,并更广泛地考虑它们对三权分立的影响。
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Congress's Constitution
Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed to seeing it exercise. By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional imbalance. This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individual houses - and even individual members - of Congress, acting alone, can deploy in interbranch conflicts. Although the congressional powers discussed in this Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation. More importantly, they have never before been considered in concert as a set of tools in an ongoing interbranch power struggle. This holistic perspective is necessary because these powers in combination are much greater than the sum of their parts.Borrowing terminology from international relations scholarship, this Article groups the congressional powers under discussion into "hard" and "soft" varieties. Congressional hard powers are tangible and coercive; the hard powers discussed in this Article are the power of the purse and the contempt power. Congressional soft powers are intangible and persuasive; soft powers considered by this Article include Congress's freedom of speech and debate, the houses' disciplinary power over their own members, and their power to determine the rules of their proceedings. Each of these powers presents opportunities for Congress to enhance its standing with the public, and thereby enhance its power. This Article aims to demonstrate both the ways in which these powers are mutually supporting and reinforcing and the ways in which Congress underutilizes them. In doing so, the Article examines a number of examples of congressional use of, and failure to use, these powers, including the release of the Pentagon Papers, the 1995–1996 government shutdowns and 2011 near-shutdown, the 2007–2009 contempt-of-Congress proceedings against White House officials, and the use of the filibuster, among others.The Article concludes by arguing that Congress should make a more vigorous use of these powers and by considering their implications for the separation of powers more generally.
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CiteScore
2.90
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0.00%
发文量
1
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