{"title":"《领导力修订版:乌克兰危机和吞并克里米亚如何确认德国在欧盟外交政策中的主导地位?》","authors":"Wolfgang Koeth","doi":"10.1515/lasr-2016-0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The recent string of existential crises in Europe - the Euro crisis, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the refugee crisis of 2015 - have resulted in new dynamics within the European Union. In Brussels, Germany has emerged as the hardly contested nexus of decision making. It was in particular through the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that Germany found itself assuming a leadership role also in the EU’s foreign policy, a role it has shunned in the past. However, for Berlin this new role is far from obvious - it is only gradually that Germany grew comfortable with its enhanced role, which is due more to external circumstances than by its own design. Conscious of its own image abroad and, due to the still prevalent feeling of historical guilt, the fear of being perceived as a dominating power has so far prevented Germany from occupying the forefront of the stage, preferring to pulling strings from behind and presenting itself as the EU’s “Chief Facilitation Officer”. This article analyses how Germany, in particular through the Ukraine crisis starting in 2014, affirmed itself - albeit reluctantly - as a nexus of decision making in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and became the de facto leading nation for defining the EU’s response towards Russia. The article points out the internal and external consequences of this new role and, in particular, its impact on the Baltic States.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":"101 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/lasr-2016-0004","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Leadership Revised: How Did the Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea Affirm Germany’s Leading Role in EU Foreign Policy?\",\"authors\":\"Wolfgang Koeth\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/lasr-2016-0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The recent string of existential crises in Europe - the Euro crisis, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the refugee crisis of 2015 - have resulted in new dynamics within the European Union. In Brussels, Germany has emerged as the hardly contested nexus of decision making. It was in particular through the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that Germany found itself assuming a leadership role also in the EU’s foreign policy, a role it has shunned in the past. However, for Berlin this new role is far from obvious - it is only gradually that Germany grew comfortable with its enhanced role, which is due more to external circumstances than by its own design. Conscious of its own image abroad and, due to the still prevalent feeling of historical guilt, the fear of being perceived as a dominating power has so far prevented Germany from occupying the forefront of the stage, preferring to pulling strings from behind and presenting itself as the EU’s “Chief Facilitation Officer”. This article analyses how Germany, in particular through the Ukraine crisis starting in 2014, affirmed itself - albeit reluctantly - as a nexus of decision making in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and became the de facto leading nation for defining the EU’s response towards Russia. The article points out the internal and external consequences of this new role and, in particular, its impact on the Baltic States.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37780,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"101 - 116\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/lasr-2016-0004\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/lasr-2016-0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/lasr-2016-0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
Leadership Revised: How Did the Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea Affirm Germany’s Leading Role in EU Foreign Policy?
Abstract The recent string of existential crises in Europe - the Euro crisis, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the refugee crisis of 2015 - have resulted in new dynamics within the European Union. In Brussels, Germany has emerged as the hardly contested nexus of decision making. It was in particular through the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that Germany found itself assuming a leadership role also in the EU’s foreign policy, a role it has shunned in the past. However, for Berlin this new role is far from obvious - it is only gradually that Germany grew comfortable with its enhanced role, which is due more to external circumstances than by its own design. Conscious of its own image abroad and, due to the still prevalent feeling of historical guilt, the fear of being perceived as a dominating power has so far prevented Germany from occupying the forefront of the stage, preferring to pulling strings from behind and presenting itself as the EU’s “Chief Facilitation Officer”. This article analyses how Germany, in particular through the Ukraine crisis starting in 2014, affirmed itself - albeit reluctantly - as a nexus of decision making in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and became the de facto leading nation for defining the EU’s response towards Russia. The article points out the internal and external consequences of this new role and, in particular, its impact on the Baltic States.
期刊介绍:
Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review is a bilingual (Lithuanian and English), peer reviewed scholarly magazine that is published once per year by the Strategic Research Center of the Military Academy of Lithuania in cooperation with Vilnius University (Institute of International Relations and Political Science) and Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas (Political Science and Diplomacy Department). The journal focuses on the global, regional and national security problematique which directly or indirectly influence security and defense issues of Lithuania, the Baltic states and region around. The Review aims to sustain high profile scientific publications delivering rigorous analytical insights into security and defence problematique ofn the region and to be ranked as a regular and high-quality academic periodical. The Review reaches out for academic community and political practitioners and offer ample opportunities for scholarly visibility and potential impact.