The purpose of this investigation was to empirically assess the association between military expenditure and income inequality in the 19 European member states of NATO between 2011 and 2022. To achieve this, the authors carried out multivariate statistical analysis using Kaplan-Meier life tables and survival estimation techniques. The results highlighted a trend in the countries analysed that income inequality tended to decrease when investment in the military increased during the period under consideration. The association manifested itself in the shortest time in the group of countries with the lowest military spending per capita, while emerging in the longer term in the countries with the highest. Furthermore, under high threat of war, the association tends to be shortest in relative terms in countries with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The results also revealed that the association between military spending and income inequality is more pronounced in the smallest countries by population and those with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The authors believe that this investigation will enrich scientific knowledge with new insights.
{"title":"Military expenditure and income inequality in European NATO Member States","authors":"Gitana Dudzevičiūtė, V. Česnuitytė","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2024.22.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2024.22.1","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this investigation was to empirically assess the association between military expenditure and income inequality in the 19 European member states of NATO between 2011 and 2022. To achieve this, the authors carried out multivariate statistical analysis using Kaplan-Meier life tables and survival estimation techniques. The results highlighted a trend in the countries analysed that income inequality tended to decrease when investment in the military increased during the period under consideration. The association manifested itself in the shortest time in the group of countries with the lowest military spending per capita, while emerging in the longer term in the countries with the highest. Furthermore, under high threat of war, the association tends to be shortest in relative terms in countries with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The results also revealed that the association between military spending and income inequality is more pronounced in the smallest countries by population and those with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The authors believe that this investigation will enrich scientific knowledge with new insights.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"21 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141815370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany was not the only one to undergo “Zeitenwende” in Europe. The European Union (EU), as a whole, also witnessed an unprecedented surge in its determination to bolster its security and defence efforts. Using collective funds, EU countries, for instance, have been providing lethal arms to Ukraine and have committed to joint procurement of ammunition and missiles to assist Kyiv. Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market has pro-actively carried to the European capitals the message about the need for the “war economy mode.” To what extent does recent progress in EU defence policy represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s self-perception and its approach to external policy? More concretely, can we realistically describe a stronger and more robust EU defence policy as being firmly rooted in a shared political and strategic vision? The paper examines relevant transformations, including recent developments, and argues that they are closely intertwined with the economic rationale, which is empirically distinct from a politico-strategic vision. This has implications for EU-NATO cooperation.
{"title":"“It’s the Economy, Stupid!” and the Integration of EU Defence Policy","authors":"R. Kuokštytė","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.4","url":null,"abstract":"In the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany was not the only one to undergo “Zeitenwende” in Europe. The European Union (EU), as a whole, also witnessed an unprecedented surge in its determination to bolster its security and defence efforts. Using collective funds, EU countries, for instance, have been providing lethal arms to Ukraine and have committed to joint procurement of ammunition and missiles to assist Kyiv. Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market has pro-actively carried to the European capitals the message about the need for the “war economy mode.” To what extent does recent progress in EU defence policy represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s self-perception and its approach to external policy? More concretely, can we realistically describe a stronger and more robust EU defence policy as being firmly rooted in a shared political and strategic vision? The paper examines relevant transformations, including recent developments, and argues that they are closely intertwined with the economic rationale, which is empirically distinct from a politico-strategic vision. This has implications for EU-NATO cooperation.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"4 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139147281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"China’s Rising Military Threat in the Indo-Pacific Region: Change in Japan’s Defence Policy in 2013–2022","authors":"Jurgis Bekampis","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139144012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debates following the events of February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, a mainstream viewpoint on how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia´s multi-ethnic and multilingual society has emerged. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita in 2022. As for the response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the majority of the Estonian public and elite support significantly more severe sanctions than those that have been enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded the straightforward intervention of NATO in the conflict, the strongest consensus backs the view that the Western world should not become directly involved but should indirectly support Ukraine to a greater degree than it has managed to thus far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite, as well as the Estonian language part of the society remains afraid that Russia will use the same logic and action against the Baltic States. The main question for Estonia is if and when, after the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in the Baltic states.
{"title":"The War in Ukraine: Estonia and European Strategic Autonomy Responding to Russia","authors":"Viljar Veebel","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.5","url":null,"abstract":"Debates following the events of February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, a mainstream viewpoint on how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia´s multi-ethnic and multilingual society has emerged. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita in 2022. As for the response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the majority of the Estonian public and elite support significantly more severe sanctions than those that have been enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded the straightforward intervention of NATO in the conflict, the strongest consensus backs the view that the Western world should not become directly involved but should indirectly support Ukraine to a greater degree than it has managed to thus far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite, as well as the Estonian language part of the society remains afraid that Russia will use the same logic and action against the Baltic States. The main question for Estonia is if and when, after the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in the Baltic states.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"188 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139145575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the key factors that could lead to a potential spillover of the conflict from Ukraine into Moldova. It also proposes strategies for Moldova to mitigate this risk and safeguard its stability against Russian aggression. By utilizing a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews and quantitative analysis of institutional indices, migration and demographic data, also defense budget figures, the article provides a comprehensive evaluation to address the research question. The theoretical framework is based on the cross-border conflict theory, specifically employing the concept of securitization to frame Moldova’s response to security challenges. While the article does not predict outcomes, it highlights Moldova’s options to mitigate vulnerabilities and collaboratively enhance stability. Prioritizing the strengthening of the national security framework and proactive diplomatic initiatives emerges as essential.
{"title":"Moldova on the Brink: Safeguarding Against Russian Aggression","authors":"Arūnas Molis, Irina Jardan","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.6","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the key factors that could lead to a potential spillover of the conflict from Ukraine into Moldova. It also proposes strategies for Moldova to mitigate this risk and safeguard its stability against Russian aggression. By utilizing a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews and quantitative analysis of institutional indices, migration and demographic data, also defense budget figures, the article provides a comprehensive evaluation to address the research question. The theoretical framework is based on the cross-border conflict theory, specifically employing the concept of securitization to frame Moldova’s response to security challenges. While the article does not predict outcomes, it highlights Moldova’s options to mitigate vulnerabilities and collaboratively enhance stability. Prioritizing the strengthening of the national security framework and proactive diplomatic initiatives emerges as essential.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"103 s1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139146823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2009 Boko Haram has been carrying out terrorist attacks in the northeastern part of Nigeria. In 2015 the group was seen as the world‘s deadliest terrorist organization, however, due to internal disagreements in 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions, namely the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (JAS), which is still often referred to by its original name – Boko Haram. While the competition between these factions made way for the Nigerian government to retake formerly lost territories, attacks from Boko Haram continue, and government forces have yet to fully quell the insurgency. This article surveys the protracted survival of Boko Haram through their operating practices by basing itself on the two primary models of revolutionary warfare (people’s war by Mao Zedong and Foquismo by Che Guevara). It takes note of the similarities between traditional revolutionary and contemporary jihadist ways of thought. Despite these similarities, crucial distinctions can also be made between the two factions of Boko Haram in order to explain their comparatively different levels of success. The article is divided into 3 primary bodies, each examining one of the three pillars (ideological, popular-support and military) that are required for a successful revolution. Comparisons between ISWAP and JAS are made in each section. Finally, the addition and comparison of the results stemming from each part are summarized and aid in trying to understand the protracted survival of Boko Haram.
{"title":"The Protracted Survival of Boko Haram From a Revolutionary Warfare Perspective","authors":"Juras Kimbartas","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.3","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2009 Boko Haram has been carrying out terrorist attacks in the northeastern part of Nigeria. In 2015 the group was seen as the world‘s deadliest terrorist organization, however, due to internal disagreements in 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions, namely the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (JAS), which is still often referred to by its original name – Boko Haram. While the competition between these factions made way for the Nigerian government to retake formerly lost territories, attacks from Boko Haram continue, and government forces have yet to fully quell the insurgency. This article surveys the protracted survival of Boko Haram through their operating practices by basing itself on the two primary models of revolutionary warfare (people’s war by Mao Zedong and Foquismo by Che Guevara). It takes note of the similarities between traditional revolutionary and contemporary jihadist ways of thought. Despite these similarities, crucial distinctions can also be made between the two factions of Boko Haram in order to explain their comparatively different levels of success. The article is divided into 3 primary bodies, each examining one of the three pillars (ideological, popular-support and military) that are required for a successful revolution. Comparisons between ISWAP and JAS are made in each section. Finally, the addition and comparison of the results stemming from each part are summarized and aid in trying to understand the protracted survival of Boko Haram.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"151 s620","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139145867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this article is to elucidate the problem of Japan’s nuclear security deterrence strategy dilemma, which is balancing between pursuing nuclear autonomy and remaining under the United States’ (the U.S.) extended nuclear deterrence protection. Through an examination of Japanese official documents, scholars’ relevant literature on both Japanese and U.S. nuclear security and an analysis of Japan’s geopolitical structure, the researchers resolve this dilemma through a nuclear deterrence perspective. Based on the evaluation of how Japan’s nuclear deterrence credibility’s potential is changing when pursuing either of the two options, the researchers conclude that the three geopolitical factors — the proximity to the strong nuclear adversary, the smallness of territory and lack of nuclear armament experience — determine that it is not in Japan’s national interest to leave the U.S. nuclear umbrella and pursue autonomy through independent nuclear capabilities. In addition, given the similarity of three such geopolitical factors shared by them, the majority of small states (e.g. Eastern European countries such as Lithuania), it is reasonable to constitute them into an empirical model and conduct a further deductive study on the cases of other small cases.
{"title":"Between Nuclear Autonomy and Foreign Extended Nuclear Deterrence Protection: the Case of Japan","authors":"Linas Didvalis, Jiabin Song","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.1","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to elucidate the problem of Japan’s nuclear security deterrence strategy dilemma, which is balancing between pursuing nuclear autonomy and remaining under the United States’ (the U.S.) extended nuclear deterrence protection. Through an examination of Japanese official documents, scholars’ relevant literature on both Japanese and U.S. nuclear security and an analysis of Japan’s geopolitical structure, the researchers resolve this dilemma through a nuclear deterrence perspective. Based on the evaluation of how Japan’s nuclear deterrence credibility’s potential is changing when pursuing either of the two options, the researchers conclude that the three geopolitical factors — the proximity to the strong nuclear adversary, the smallness of territory and lack of nuclear armament experience — determine that it is not in Japan’s national interest to leave the U.S. nuclear umbrella and pursue autonomy through independent nuclear capabilities. In addition, given the similarity of three such geopolitical factors shared by them, the majority of small states (e.g. Eastern European countries such as Lithuania), it is reasonable to constitute them into an empirical model and conduct a further deductive study on the cases of other small cases.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"1‐40 S1‐139","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139146051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andris Banka, Christina Stremming, Margit Bussmann
{"title":"Allies That Matter: Elite versus Public Opinion in Latvia","authors":"Andris Banka, Christina Stremming, Margit Bussmann","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.21.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.21.7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139144579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this article is to study the differentiation of CEE countries’ approaches towards Russia’s expansion, and then to identify explanatory variables. CEE policies fit to the balance of power categories, specifically: counterbalancing and accommodation. The method of assessing each CEE country’s policies towards Russia combines gathering information on 2014-2021 activities classified in three groups: bilateral relations with Russia; relations with other NATO countries framed as counterbalancing Russia; relations with Ukraine regarding counterbalancing Russia. The method of explanation for diverse CEE policies consists in assigning quantitative values and applying statistics in order to discover correlations. The result of the first step is placing each CEE country on the axis of relatively pro- (Hungary) and anti-Russian (Lithuania and Poland) policies. The quantitative version of the axis serves as dependent variable in the statistical research which reveals finals results: the strongest correlations are demonstrated by proximity and distance to Russia, which reflects Russia’s closest neighbors’ counterbalancing tendencies. Historical grievances and the size of Russian minorities are second-strongest. However, excluding Hungary, historical grievances become the strongest factor of anti-Russian policies.
{"title":"Counterbalancing And Pragmatic Accommodation: CEE Countries Towards Russia’s Expansion, 2014-2021","authors":"Tomasz Klin","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.4","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to study the differentiation of CEE countries’ approaches towards Russia’s expansion, and then to identify explanatory variables. CEE policies fit to the balance of power categories, specifically: counterbalancing and accommodation. The method of assessing each CEE country’s policies towards Russia combines gathering information on 2014-2021 activities classified in three groups: bilateral relations with Russia; relations with other NATO countries framed as counterbalancing Russia; relations with Ukraine regarding counterbalancing Russia. The method of explanation for diverse CEE policies consists in assigning quantitative values and applying statistics in order to discover correlations. The result of the first step is placing each CEE country on the axis of relatively pro- (Hungary) and anti-Russian (Lithuania and Poland) policies. The quantitative version of the axis serves as dependent variable in the statistical research which reveals finals results: the strongest correlations are demonstrated by proximity and distance to Russia, which reflects Russia’s closest neighbors’ counterbalancing tendencies. Historical grievances and the size of Russian minorities are second-strongest. However, excluding Hungary, historical grievances become the strongest factor of anti-Russian policies.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"37 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138589048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article delves into the willingness of citizens in the Baltic States, particularly Estonia, to fight for their countries in the face of rising threats, notably the Russian threat following the Crimean annexation. With historically weaker NATO defenses and relatively small armed forces, Baltic States like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia rely on allied support and their residents’ determination to defend their homeland. The study explores variables that influence this willingness, focusing on Estonia’s leadership in this aspect. The article consists of three main sections: a literature review, a comparative case analysis, and conclusions. The literature review examines past data from global, regional, and national perspectives, touching upon the theories of renowned researchers like Ronald F. Inglehart. The comparative case analysis delves into new variables—civic engagement, government functionality, and corruption levels—exploring their correlation with citizens’ readiness to fight for their country. The analysis uncovers distinct patterns in Estonia, which consistently outpaces Latvia and Lithuania in civic engagement, efficient governance, and lower corruption levels. Ultimately, the research emphasizes that civic engagement positively associates with willingness to defend one’s country, exemplified by Estonia’s higher voter turnout and volunteering rates. Effective government functioning also contributes to citizens’ willingness to fight, with Estonia’s robust governance over the past decades potentially boosting resilience. Furthermore, low corruption levels appear to enhance citizens’ confidence in their state, potentially encouraging them to defend it. The study concludes that understanding these multifaceted factors can guide policymakers and community leaders in bolstering citizens’ determination to protect their countries, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania.
{"title":"Willingness to Fight for One’s Own Country: New Variables to Look at the Estonian Leadership among the Baltic States","authors":"Dovydas Rogulis","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.5","url":null,"abstract":"The article delves into the willingness of citizens in the Baltic States, particularly Estonia, to fight for their countries in the face of rising threats, notably the Russian threat following the Crimean annexation. With historically weaker NATO defenses and relatively small armed forces, Baltic States like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia rely on allied support and their residents’ determination to defend their homeland. The study explores variables that influence this willingness, focusing on Estonia’s leadership in this aspect. The article consists of three main sections: a literature review, a comparative case analysis, and conclusions. The literature review examines past data from global, regional, and national perspectives, touching upon the theories of renowned researchers like Ronald F. Inglehart. The comparative case analysis delves into new variables—civic engagement, government functionality, and corruption levels—exploring their correlation with citizens’ readiness to fight for their country. The analysis uncovers distinct patterns in Estonia, which consistently outpaces Latvia and Lithuania in civic engagement, efficient governance, and lower corruption levels. Ultimately, the research emphasizes that civic engagement positively associates with willingness to defend one’s country, exemplified by Estonia’s higher voter turnout and volunteering rates. Effective government functioning also contributes to citizens’ willingness to fight, with Estonia’s robust governance over the past decades potentially boosting resilience. Furthermore, low corruption levels appear to enhance citizens’ confidence in their state, potentially encouraging them to defend it. The study concludes that understanding these multifaceted factors can guide policymakers and community leaders in bolstering citizens’ determination to protect their countries, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"92 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138586360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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