{"title":"十字路口的共识惩罚理论","authors":"Matías Parmigiani","doi":"10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.69502","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolTanto el concepto tipicamente utilitarista de proteccion social como el concepto tipicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institucion del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentare demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoria etica del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelacion al segundo concepto, una interpretacion alternativa del primer concepto tampoco nos situaria ante un mejor panorama filosofico. EnglishIn the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept (social protection), as well as the Kantian concept (consent) becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems.","PeriodicalId":43349,"journal":{"name":"Ideas y Valores","volume":"39 1","pages":"95-115"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"La teoría consensual de la pena en la encrucijada\",\"authors\":\"Matías Parmigiani\",\"doi\":\"10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.69502\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"espanolTanto el concepto tipicamente utilitarista de proteccion social como el concepto tipicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institucion del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentare demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoria etica del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelacion al segundo concepto, una interpretacion alternativa del primer concepto tampoco nos situaria ante un mejor panorama filosofico. EnglishIn the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept (social protection), as well as the Kantian concept (consent) becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43349,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ideas y Valores\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"95-115\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ideas y Valores\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.69502\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ideas y Valores","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.69502","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
espanolTanto el concepto tipicamente utilitarista de proteccion social como el concepto tipicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institucion del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentare demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoria etica del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelacion al segundo concepto, una interpretacion alternativa del primer concepto tampoco nos situaria ante un mejor panorama filosofico. EnglishIn the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept (social protection), as well as the Kantian concept (consent) becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems.
期刊介绍:
Ideas y Valores is a four-monthly publication (April, August and December) of the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, founded in 1951, which welcomes national and international contributions. Throughout its more than sixty years of existence, the journal''s objective has been to provide a space for the publication and dissemination of philosophical work carried out in Colombia. However, Ideas y Valores has always been in close contact with the philosophical work carried out in Latin America and the world. It currently publishes articles and reviews on all philosophical areas in Spanish, Portuguese and, occasionally, English. The journal also receives translations to Spanish of texts which have lost their copyrights or whose copyrights have been bought by or given to the translator and, by extension, to Ideas y Valores.