{"title":"大脑与经验:对非占有自我模式的辩护","authors":"Angelo Briones Belmar","doi":"10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.68170","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn este articulo se argumenta a favor del modelo no posesivo del Yo. Se presenta la critica de P. Strawson (1967, 1989) a este modelo, para elaborar un defensa que descansa en una tesis de posesion cerebral, la cual supone que las experiencias, en cuanto entidades ontologicamente no-suficientes, dependen para su existencia e identidadde la existencia de un cerebro particular. EnglishIn the present investigation we will present arguments in favor of the no-ownership model of self. We will initially present the criticism that Strawson (1967, 1989) makes to this model, to present a defense that rests on a thesis of cerebral possession, thatassumes that the experiences as non-sufficiency ontological entities depend for their existence and identity on the existence of a particular brain.","PeriodicalId":43349,"journal":{"name":"Ideas y Valores","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cerebros y experiencias: Una defensa del modelo no posesivo del yo\",\"authors\":\"Angelo Briones Belmar\",\"doi\":\"10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.68170\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"espanolEn este articulo se argumenta a favor del modelo no posesivo del Yo. Se presenta la critica de P. Strawson (1967, 1989) a este modelo, para elaborar un defensa que descansa en una tesis de posesion cerebral, la cual supone que las experiencias, en cuanto entidades ontologicamente no-suficientes, dependen para su existencia e identidadde la existencia de un cerebro particular. EnglishIn the present investigation we will present arguments in favor of the no-ownership model of self. We will initially present the criticism that Strawson (1967, 1989) makes to this model, to present a defense that rests on a thesis of cerebral possession, thatassumes that the experiences as non-sufficiency ontological entities depend for their existence and identity on the existence of a particular brain.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43349,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ideas y Valores\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ideas y Valores\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.68170\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ideas y Valores","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15446/IDEASYVALORES.V70N175.68170","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
这篇文章支持自我的非占有模式。提出了批评:Strawson这个模式(1967年,1989年),制定一项国防上脑posesion论文,其中应该经验、实体ontologicamente no-suficientes、依赖的生存和identidadde存在一种特殊的大脑。EnglishIn目前调查we will目前论点in忙of the no-ownership model of self。我们将首先提出Strawson(1967, 1989)对这个模型提出的批评,提出一个关于大脑占有的论点的辩护,它假设经验作为一个不充分的本体论实体依赖于它们的存在和身份依赖于一个特定的大脑的存在。
Cerebros y experiencias: Una defensa del modelo no posesivo del yo
espanolEn este articulo se argumenta a favor del modelo no posesivo del Yo. Se presenta la critica de P. Strawson (1967, 1989) a este modelo, para elaborar un defensa que descansa en una tesis de posesion cerebral, la cual supone que las experiencias, en cuanto entidades ontologicamente no-suficientes, dependen para su existencia e identidadde la existencia de un cerebro particular. EnglishIn the present investigation we will present arguments in favor of the no-ownership model of self. We will initially present the criticism that Strawson (1967, 1989) makes to this model, to present a defense that rests on a thesis of cerebral possession, thatassumes that the experiences as non-sufficiency ontological entities depend for their existence and identity on the existence of a particular brain.
期刊介绍:
Ideas y Valores is a four-monthly publication (April, August and December) of the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, founded in 1951, which welcomes national and international contributions. Throughout its more than sixty years of existence, the journal''s objective has been to provide a space for the publication and dissemination of philosophical work carried out in Colombia. However, Ideas y Valores has always been in close contact with the philosophical work carried out in Latin America and the world. It currently publishes articles and reviews on all philosophical areas in Spanish, Portuguese and, occasionally, English. The journal also receives translations to Spanish of texts which have lost their copyrights or whose copyrights have been bought by or given to the translator and, by extension, to Ideas y Valores.