{"title":"倾向与可能性","authors":"D. Mellor","doi":"10.1515/mp-2019-2002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.","PeriodicalId":43147,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-2002","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Propensities and Possibilities\",\"authors\":\"D. Mellor\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/mp-2019-2002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43147,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/mp-2019-2002\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Metaphysica-International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.
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