回顾邓恩-贝尔纳普的逻辑

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Manuscrito Pub Date : 2022-03-17 DOI:10.1590/0100-6045.2017.V40N2.CB
Carolina Blasio
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引用次数: 7

摘要

在目前的工作中,我介绍了一种基于接受和拒绝的认知态度的语义,这种认知态度是由dunn和belnap的第一程度蕴涵(E)启发的逻辑的给定代理社会所接受的。与E最初采用的认知情境相反,认知态度与真值并不一致,它们似乎更适合于那些打算考虑命题“被说为真”和命题“被说为假”的信息内容作为逻辑有效性概念的决定因素的逻辑。在分析了与所提出的语义相关的一些逻辑之后,我们引入了逻辑E,其潜在的蕴涵关系- b蕴涵-能够表达涉及接受和拒绝的认知态度的几种推理。给出了E的一个完备的序贯演算。
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Revisiting the Dunn-Belnap logic
In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acception and rejection entertainedby a given society of agents for logics inspired onDunn andBelnap’s FirstDegreeEntailment (E). In contrast to the epistemic situations originally employed by E, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and they seemmore suitable to logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions “said to be true” as well as of propositions “said to be false” as determinant of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated to the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic E , whose underlying entailment relation—theB-entailment—is able to express several kinds of reasoning involving the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. A sound and complete sequent calculus for E is also presented.
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来源期刊
Manuscrito
Manuscrito PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
32 weeks
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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