{"title":"论所谓的形式错误对规范错误理论的反对","authors":"J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.jj","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ON THE ALLEGED ERROR OF FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO NORMATIVE ERROR THEORY\",\"authors\":\"J. J. Joaquin\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.jj\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42903,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manuscrito\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manuscrito\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.jj\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manuscrito","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n2.jj","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
ON THE ALLEGED ERROR OF FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO NORMATIVE ERROR THEORY
: According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.