顿巴斯处于不确定状态:战争期间的自封共和国(2014-2021)

A. Matveeva
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引用次数: 1

摘要

为了更好地了解从2022年2月开始的顿巴斯及其周边战争的新阶段,文章建议回顾该地区的“两次世界大战之间”时期。这一时期是通过对冲突的三种解释的棱镜来分析的——作为一场加入该地区“分离”的“历史家园”的民族统一运动,作为一个不同的(多民族,多语言,更分散的)乌克兰的内部冲突,更好地处理顿巴斯人民的愿望,以及俄罗斯与西方之间的国际地缘政治对抗。这三种解释都被认为是有效的。2014-2022年,自封的共和国(DNR和LNR)经历了在历史灾难背景下的形成阶段,冲突后经济和社会生活仍以乌克兰为导向的早期发展阶段,基辅严格经济封锁导致的切断阶段,以及缓慢融入俄罗斯的最后阶段。这篇文章特别提到了从2016年到2022年初的不确定阶段。虽然这一阶段带来了更高水平的安全性,使DNR和LNR的生活得以继续,但安全性是脆弱的,容易受到重大破坏。然而,从安全和社会政治的角度来看,最糟糕的是这些实体的未来缺乏明确性,政治家们同时流传着三种情况:根据明斯克协议返回乌克兰,加入俄罗斯,建立自己的“国家地位”。《明斯克协议》最初被认为是积极的,因为它降低了敌对行动的水平,但逐渐失去了价值。特殊地位并不是这场战争的目的,它仍然是一个无定形和抽象的概念,从那以后的岁月里,它没有充满实际的内容。在敌对状态重新爆发的边缘保持平衡,需要两个共和国所没有的资源,这使得它们不得不依赖俄罗斯政府。虽然这些共和国作为自治实体幸存下来,在政治和文化上接近俄罗斯,并建立了原始国家机构,但它们也经历了治理赤字和经济衰退。到本世纪20年代初,对这两个共和国独立机构的任何幻想都烟消云散了。一开始是一场人民的叛乱,当时该地区声称有权做出选择并据此采取行动,但后来却演变成他们的未来由其他地方决定的局面。自俄罗斯正式承认DNR和LNR以及俄罗斯于2022年在乌克兰开始军事行动以来,这一未来似乎变得明朗起来,但其轮廓超出了本文的范围。
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Donbass at limbo: self-proclaimed republics in the inter-war period (2014–2021)
In order to better understand the new phase of the war in and around Donbass that started in February 2022, the article suggests looking back at the “interwar” period in the region. This period is analyzed through the prism of a combination of three interpretations of the conflict – as an irredentist movement to join the “historical homeland” which the region had been “separated from”, as a civil conflict for a different (multiethnic, multilingual, more decentralized) Ukraine, better disposed towards the aspirations of the people of Donbass, and as an international geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. All three interpretations are seen as valid. In 2014–2022, self-proclaimed republics (the DNR and the LNR) went through the stages of their formation in the context of a historical cataclysm, early postconflict development when their economic and social life was still oriented towards Ukraine, the cut-off stage resulting from a strict economic blockade by Kiev, and the concluding period of creeping integration into Russia. The article specifically addresses the limbo phase that lasted from 2016 to early 2022. While this phase brought a greater level of security that allowed life in the DNR and the LNR to go on, security was brittle and prone to significant disruption. However, in both security and socio-political terms, the worst was the sense of a lack of clarity about the entities’ future, with three scenarios circulated by politicians at once: return to Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk agreements, joining Russia, and building up their own “statehood”. The Minsk Agreements that were initially viewed positively, as they reduced the level of hostilities, progressively lost their value. Special status was not what the war had been fought for and it remained an amorphous and abstract idea, which the years that passed since failed to fill with practical content. Balancing on the verge of renewal of hostilities necessitated the resources that the two republics did not have, which locked them into dependency on the Russian government. While the republics survived as self-governing entities with a political and cultural proximity to Russia and established proto-state institutions, they also experienced governance deficit and economic decline. By the early 2020s, any illusions of the two republics’ independent agency evaporated. What started as a people’s rebellion, when the region asserted its right to make choices and act upon them, came to the situation that their future was to be determined elsewhere. This future seemed to clear up since Russia’s formal recognition of the DNR and the LNR and the start of Russian military operation in Ukraine in 2022, but its contours lie beyond the article’s scope.
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