{"title":"美国医疗保健质量低下:医疗事故责任是问题的一部分还是解决方案的一部分?","authors":"D. Hyman, C. Silver","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.526762","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The belief that malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care quality by encouraging providers to hide mistakes is the conventional wisdom among patient safety advocates and scholars. It also provides the normative basis for efforts currently proceeding at the state and federal levels to curtail medical malpractice exposure. Groups pressing for tort reform, including the American Medical Association, contend that when doctors and other providers are insulated from liability, patients will be better protected from harm. This article canvasses the evidence bearing on the connection between malpractice exposure and health care quality. Some of this evidence, such as the Harvard Medical Practice Study, shows that the quality of health care improves as the risk of being sued rises; none of it shows that malpractice lawsuits cause the quality of health care to decline. The widely held belief that fear of malpractice liability impedes efforts to improve the reliability of health care delivery systems is unfounded. The central causes of the high error rates that persist in the health care sector appear to be providers' defective incentives and professional norms. Providers lose money when quality improves, and their norms discourage the creation of non-punitive working environments in which efforts to improve quality can flourish. The business case for quality is missing, and providers' attitudes are antithetical to quality improvement. The tort system's major deficiency is its failure to subject providers to sufficient economic pressure to overcome these impediments. 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引用次数: 42
摘要
医疗事故诉讼鼓励提供者隐瞒错误,从而阻碍了提高医疗质量的努力,这是患者安全倡导者和学者们的传统观点。它还为目前在州和联邦一级进行的减少医疗事故暴露的努力提供了规范基础。包括美国医学会(American Medical Association)在内的团体迫切要求进行侵权改革,他们认为,当医生和其他医疗服务提供者免于承担责任时,患者将得到更好的保护,免受伤害。本文对医疗事故暴露与医疗质量之间的关系进行了实证研究。其中一些证据,如哈佛医学实践研究(Harvard Medical Practice Study)表明,随着被起诉的风险上升,医疗保健质量也会提高;没有一项研究表明,医疗事故诉讼会导致医疗保健质量下降。人们普遍认为,对医疗事故责任的恐惧阻碍了提高卫生保健服务系统可靠性的努力,这是没有根据的。医疗保健部门持续存在高错误率的主要原因似乎是提供者的激励机制和专业规范存在缺陷。当质量提高时,供应商就会赔钱,而且他们的规范阻碍了非惩罚性工作环境的创造,而在这种环境中,提高质量的努力可能会蓬勃发展。缺少质量的商业案例,提供者的态度与质量改进是对立的。侵权制度的主要缺陷在于未能使提供者承受足够的经济压力以克服这些障碍。造成这一缺陷的原因是很少有受伤的病人提出法律要求。
The poor state of health care quality in the U.S.: is malpractice liability part of the problem or part of the solution?
The belief that malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care quality by encouraging providers to hide mistakes is the conventional wisdom among patient safety advocates and scholars. It also provides the normative basis for efforts currently proceeding at the state and federal levels to curtail medical malpractice exposure. Groups pressing for tort reform, including the American Medical Association, contend that when doctors and other providers are insulated from liability, patients will be better protected from harm. This article canvasses the evidence bearing on the connection between malpractice exposure and health care quality. Some of this evidence, such as the Harvard Medical Practice Study, shows that the quality of health care improves as the risk of being sued rises; none of it shows that malpractice lawsuits cause the quality of health care to decline. The widely held belief that fear of malpractice liability impedes efforts to improve the reliability of health care delivery systems is unfounded. The central causes of the high error rates that persist in the health care sector appear to be providers' defective incentives and professional norms. Providers lose money when quality improves, and their norms discourage the creation of non-punitive working environments in which efforts to improve quality can flourish. The business case for quality is missing, and providers' attitudes are antithetical to quality improvement. The tort system's major deficiency is its failure to subject providers to sufficient economic pressure to overcome these impediments. The cause of this shortcoming is the rarity with which injured patients assert legal claims.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.