联合公民之后的工会、公司和政治选择退出权

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Columbia Law Review Pub Date : 2011-08-15 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1924916
B. Sachs
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引用次数: 13

摘要

联合公民颠覆了竞选财务法的大部分内容,但它至少保持了该法律制度的一个特征:对企业和工会的平等对待。也就是说,在联合公民之前,企业和工会在联邦选举政治上使用一般国库资金的能力同样受到限制。在这一决定之后,竞选财务法允许两党同样不受限制地自由使用他们的国库来资助政治支出。但是,“联合公民”所保留的对称待遇掩盖了一个不太明显、但同样重要的问题,即法律对工会和企业政治支出的区别对待。也就是说,联邦法律禁止工会在个别雇员反对的情况下将其一般财政资金用于政治活动——简而言之,雇员享有联邦保护的选择不资助工会政治活动的权利。相比之下,即使个别股东反对,企业也可以自由地将其国库用于政治——股东没有选择不为企业政治活动提供资金的权利。本文评估了政治选择退出权的不对称规则是否合理。这篇文章首先提供了一个对称的肯定案例,其基础是不应利用控制获得经济机会(无论是就业机会还是投资机会)的权力来确保经济行动者的政治议程得到遵守或支持。然后,它提出了支持不对称的三个论点。考虑到这些论点的相对薄弱,这篇文章表明,当前选择退出规则的不对称可能是不合理的。文章最后指出了这种不对称引发的宪法问题,并认为立法者有理由纠正这种不对称。
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Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United
Citizens United upends much of campaign finance law, but it maintains at least one feature of that legal regime: the equal treatment of corporations and unions. Prior to Citizens United, that is, corporations and unions were equally constrained in their ability to spend general treasury funds on federal electoral politics. After the decision, campaign finance law leaves both equally unconstrained and free to use their general treasuries to finance political spending. But the symmetrical treatment that Citizens United leaves in place masks a less visible, but equally significant, way in which the law treats union and corporate political spending differently. Namely, federal law prohibits a union from spending its general treasury funds on politics if individual employees object to such use - employees, in short, enjoy a federally protected right to opt out of funding union political activity. In contrast, corporations are free to spend their general treasuries on politics even if individual shareholders object - shareholders enjoy no right to opt out of financing corporate political activity. This article assesses whether the asymmetric rule of political opt-out rights is justified. The article first offers an affirmative case for symmetry grounded in the principle that the power to control access to economic opportunities - whether employment or investment-based - should not be used to secure compliance with or support for the economic actor’s political agenda. It then addresses three arguments in favor of asymmetry. Given the relative weakness of these arguments, the article suggests that the current asymmetry in opt-out rules may be unjustified. The article concludes by pointing to constitutional questions raised by this asymmetry, and by arguing that lawmakers would be justified in correcting it.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
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期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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