{"title":"露丝·布莱恩·欧文之谜","authors":"Daniel B. Rice","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2628790","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article recovers a lost chapter of constitutional history — the ill-fated challenge to Ruth Bryan Owen’s congressional eligibility. Owen was the brilliant (and American-born) daughter of famed politician William Jennings Bryan, and a pioneering figure in her own right. But the Expatriation Act of 1907 stripped Owen of her American citizenship when she took a British husband. Congress swiftly repealed this loathsome feature after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Yet Owen’s defeated opponent claimed that she hadn’t “been seven Years a Citizen of the United States” as the Constitution requires. Because Owen had been a naturalized citizen for only three years at the time of her 1928 election, the House faced an unenviable adjudicative dilemma: does “seven Years” mean the immediately preceding seven years, or any seven years cumulatively?Owen’s case demonstrates that the perceived clarity of even “mathematical” constitutional provisions can be shaped by purposive and pragmatic considerations extraneous to the text, considerations that often change in light of freshly received facts. This Article also presents powerful new evidence that women came to be seen as improper objects of state-sanctioned discrimination soon after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Owen’s triumph marks an important turning point in American women’s effort to achieve full constitutional equality. Because scholars have forgotten her story, they have overlooked crucial sources that might have helped provide a historically firmer basis for modern sex-discrimination doctrine. And as Owen’s case shows, historical practices repugnant to the modern constitutional order should never be accorded residual legal effect. This Article accordingly criticizes the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din (2015) for citing the Expatriation Act to downplay an asserted liberty interest’s historical pedigree under the Due Process Clause.","PeriodicalId":90770,"journal":{"name":"Yale journal of law & the humanities","volume":"29 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Riddle of Ruth Bryan Owen\",\"authors\":\"Daniel B. Rice\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2628790\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This Article recovers a lost chapter of constitutional history — the ill-fated challenge to Ruth Bryan Owen’s congressional eligibility. Owen was the brilliant (and American-born) daughter of famed politician William Jennings Bryan, and a pioneering figure in her own right. But the Expatriation Act of 1907 stripped Owen of her American citizenship when she took a British husband. Congress swiftly repealed this loathsome feature after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Yet Owen’s defeated opponent claimed that she hadn’t “been seven Years a Citizen of the United States” as the Constitution requires. Because Owen had been a naturalized citizen for only three years at the time of her 1928 election, the House faced an unenviable adjudicative dilemma: does “seven Years” mean the immediately preceding seven years, or any seven years cumulatively?Owen’s case demonstrates that the perceived clarity of even “mathematical” constitutional provisions can be shaped by purposive and pragmatic considerations extraneous to the text, considerations that often change in light of freshly received facts. This Article also presents powerful new evidence that women came to be seen as improper objects of state-sanctioned discrimination soon after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Owen’s triumph marks an important turning point in American women’s effort to achieve full constitutional equality. Because scholars have forgotten her story, they have overlooked crucial sources that might have helped provide a historically firmer basis for modern sex-discrimination doctrine. And as Owen’s case shows, historical practices repugnant to the modern constitutional order should never be accorded residual legal effect. This Article accordingly criticizes the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Kerry v. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
这篇文章恢复了宪法历史上丢失的一章——露丝·布莱恩·欧文(Ruth Bryan Owen)的国会资格面临的命运多舛的挑战。欧文是著名政治家威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩(William Jennings Bryan)的女儿,才华横溢(出生于美国),她自己也是一位先锋人物。但1907年的《移民法案》剥夺了欧文的美国国籍,因为她嫁给了一位英国丈夫。在第十九修正案获得批准后,国会迅速废除了这一令人厌恶的特征。然而,欧文被击败的对手声称,她没有按照宪法的要求“成为美国公民七年”。由于欧文在1928年当选时才入籍三年,众议院面临着一个不令人羡慕的裁决困境:“七年”是指之前的七年,还是指任何七年的累积?欧文的案例表明,即使是“数学式”宪法条款的清晰性,也可能受到与文本无关的有目的和实用主义考虑因素的影响,而这些考虑因素往往会根据新获得的事实而改变。本文还提供了有力的新证据,表明在第19条修正案获得批准后不久,妇女就被视为国家批准歧视的不适当对象。欧文的胜利标志着美国妇女争取宪法规定的完全平等的一个重要转折点。因为学者们已经忘记了她的故事,他们忽略了一些关键的来源,这些来源可能有助于为现代性别歧视学说提供更坚实的历史基础。正如欧文的案例所表明的那样,与现代宪法秩序相抵触的历史实践永远不应被赋予剩余的法律效力。因此,本文批评了最高法院在Kerry v. Din(2015)案中引用《驱逐法案》来淡化正当程序条款下主张的自由利益的历史渊源的多数意见。
This Article recovers a lost chapter of constitutional history — the ill-fated challenge to Ruth Bryan Owen’s congressional eligibility. Owen was the brilliant (and American-born) daughter of famed politician William Jennings Bryan, and a pioneering figure in her own right. But the Expatriation Act of 1907 stripped Owen of her American citizenship when she took a British husband. Congress swiftly repealed this loathsome feature after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Yet Owen’s defeated opponent claimed that she hadn’t “been seven Years a Citizen of the United States” as the Constitution requires. Because Owen had been a naturalized citizen for only three years at the time of her 1928 election, the House faced an unenviable adjudicative dilemma: does “seven Years” mean the immediately preceding seven years, or any seven years cumulatively?Owen’s case demonstrates that the perceived clarity of even “mathematical” constitutional provisions can be shaped by purposive and pragmatic considerations extraneous to the text, considerations that often change in light of freshly received facts. This Article also presents powerful new evidence that women came to be seen as improper objects of state-sanctioned discrimination soon after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification. Owen’s triumph marks an important turning point in American women’s effort to achieve full constitutional equality. Because scholars have forgotten her story, they have overlooked crucial sources that might have helped provide a historically firmer basis for modern sex-discrimination doctrine. And as Owen’s case shows, historical practices repugnant to the modern constitutional order should never be accorded residual legal effect. This Article accordingly criticizes the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din (2015) for citing the Expatriation Act to downplay an asserted liberty interest’s historical pedigree under the Due Process Clause.