千变万化的小心条款

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences University of Pennsylvania Law Review Pub Date : 2016-10-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2852106
J. Goldsmith, J. Manning
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引用次数: 2

摘要

最高法院经常为许多目的援引第二条的注意条款。首先,最高法院依靠总统“注意法律得到忠实执行”的义务,确立了罢免不服从总统指示的官员的权力。其次,最高法院使用“注意条款”来界定第三条效力的限制,认为宪法对损害、因果关系和可补救性的要求有助于确保总统而不是联邦司法机构对行政决定的合法性负有主要责任。第三,最高法院将“注意条款”视为总统检控自由裁量权的来源,这种权力可能会给总统重塑国会制定的法律的有效范围的空间。第四,法院认定“注意条款”是总统尊重立法至上的宪法义务的直接来源。事实上,最高法院将这一条款解读为对总统废除或暂停联邦法律的任何权力的否定。第五,最高法院将“注意条款”解读为总统采取必要行动以保护联邦政府运作的固有权力的来源,即使在没有法律规定明确授权这样做的情况下也是如此。最高法院依靠“注意条款”来同时满足如此多的目的,这令人震惊。最高法院的判决在很大程度上依赖于“注意条款”,但几乎从不解释它,至少不是以人们认为最高法院解释宪法的传统方式。除了极少数例外,最高法院没有解析该条款的文本或审查其历史来源(除非该条款在第一届国会中被援引以证明其撤销权力的合理性)。此外,法院使用这一条款的至少一些方式是相互矛盾的。例如,强烈的检察官自由裁量权的实例可能会遇到法院也归因于该条款的对豁免的顾虑。此外,这种紧张关系需要划清界限,这引发了关于司法上可管理的标准的可用性的未被承认的问题。本文不试图解决“注意条款”的含义,而是考察其在判例法中的许多用途,并询问法院是否合法地将该条款视为独立的三权分立原则的代表。
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The Protean Take Care Clause
The Supreme Court invokes Article II’s Take Care Clause often and for many purposes. First, the Court has relied on the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” to establish the power to remove officers who do not follow the President’s directives. Second, the Court has used the Take Care Clause to define the limits of Article III standing, holding that the constitutional requirements of injury, causation, and redressability help to ensure that the President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the legality of executive decisions. Third, the Court has treated the Take Care Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion — a power that may give the President room to reshape the effective reach of laws enacted by Congress. Fourth, the Court has identified the Take Care Clause as the direct source of the President’s constitutional obligation to respect legislative supremacy. Indeed, the Court has read the clause as a negation of any presidential power to dispense with or suspend federal law. Fifth, the Court has read the Take Care Clause as the source of inherent presidential authority to take acts necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, even in cases in which no statute provides explicit authority to do so. The Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause to serve so many ends simultaneously is striking. The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never interpret it, at least not in the conventional way one thinks of the Court’s interpreting the Constitution. With rare exception, the Court has not parsed the text of the clause or examined its historical provenance (except insofar as the clause was invoked in the First Congress to justify the removal power). In addition, at least some of the ways in which the Court has used the clause are in tension with one another. The instantiation of strong prosecutorial discretion, for example, may run into the scruple against dispensation that the Court also ascribes to the clause. Such tensions, moreover, require line-drawing that raises unacknowledged questions about the availability of judicially manageable standards. Without attempting to resolve the meaning of the Take Care Clause, this Article examines its many uses in the case law and asks whether the Court has legitimately treated the clause as a proxy a freestanding separation-of-powers principles.
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