规范总统权力

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Cornell Law Review Pub Date : 2005-01-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2857458
S. Prakash
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The result is a Corwinesque book that weaves together arguments about text, structure, history, and doctrine to make claims about the current and proper scope of presidential powers.' For those seeking a survey of the President's constitutional powers, the book amply fits the bill. It thoughtfully considers some classic questions, such as whether the President has a removal power and how the Constitution allocates foreign affairs authority between the President and Congress.After first describing the book's contents, this Review considers a question that permeates Presidential Powers but never receives any systematic treatment: To what extent, and in what way, are presidential powers really the President's? There will always be earnest disputes about whether the Constitution grants the President particular powers. But even as to acknowledged executive authorities, what, if anything, may Congress do to curb controversial exercises of presidential power? 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引用次数: 4

摘要

关于总统的宪法权力范围的问题在今天的新闻中可能是最近记忆中从未有过的。报纸和晚间新闻的头条都是有关行政权力的报道。参议院是否通过允许对提名者进行准阻挠议事,侵犯了总统任命法官的权力?作为总司令,总统是否有权下令严刑拷打敌方囚犯?总统是否可以指示州法院遵守他对一项关于如何对待被逮捕的外国人的条约的解读?院长哈罗德·克伦特(Harold Krent)的书《总统权力》(Presidential Powers)生动活泼,可读性很强,非常合时宜。在200多页的文本中,克伦特审视了总统的宪法权力,重点是法律执行权、外交事务权、紧急权力、特权和豁免,以及赦免权。结果是一本考温式的书,将关于文本、结构、历史和原则的争论编织在一起,对总统权力的当前和适当范围提出了要求。”对于那些想要了解总统的宪法权力的人来说,这本书完全符合要求。它深思熟虑地思考了一些经典问题,比如总统是否有罢免权,以及宪法如何在总统和国会之间分配外交事务权力。在首先描述了这本书的内容之后,这篇评论考虑了一个贯穿于总统权力但从未得到系统处理的问题:总统的权力在多大程度上、以何种方式真正属于总统?关于宪法是否赋予总统特殊权力,总会有激烈的争论。但是,即使是公认的行政权力,如果有的话,国会可以做些什么来遏制有争议的总统权力行使?例如,有些人可能认为,如果国会可以禁止或至少对捐助者、行政人员和私人朋友的赦免进行检查,这是有利的。同样,其他人可能会认为应该剥夺总统提名终身法官的权力。尽管国会对行政权力的监管可能带来好处,但宪法的文本、结构和早期历史表明,国会缺乏重新分配或篡改总统权力的一般权利。首先,总统的绝大多数权力读起来好像是绝对的授权,不受国会的控制或修改。也许更重要的是,宪法从未授予国会将总统权力视为默认权力的一般权力,即只有在国会不加以管制的情况下才能自由行使的权力。很明显,宪法明显缺乏革命时期各州宪法中明确规定部分或全部行政权力服从立法监管的语言。最后,很少有早期断言国会可以监管总统权力。综合考虑,这些因素有助于确定国会缺乏对总统权力进行监管的全面权威。尽管如此,国会可以以有限的方式对总统的某些权力进行修改,这通常是因为宪法明确赋予国会狭隘的监管权力。这些有限例外的存在,当与前一段提到的论点结合起来考虑时,有助于证明国会缺乏管理赋予其他实体的权力的一般权力的规则。虽然国会可以规范商业和硬币的价值,但它通常不能规范总统的宪法权力。
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Regulating Presidential Powers
Questions about the scope of the President's constitutional powers are in the news today like perhaps no time in recent memory. Splashed across the dailies and leading off the evening news are stories about executive power. Has the Senate invaded the President's power to appoint judges by permitting quasi-filibusters of nominees? Does the President have the right, as Commander-in-Chief, to order the torture of enemy prisoners? May the President instruct state courts to adhere to his reading of a treaty concerning the treatment of arrested foreign nationals?Dean Harold Krent's lively and eminently readable book, Presidential Powers, is nothing if not timely. In 200-plus pages of text, Krent canvasses the President's constitutional powers, focusing on law execution authority, foreign affairs powers, emergency powers, privileges and immunities, and the pardon power. The result is a Corwinesque book that weaves together arguments about text, structure, history, and doctrine to make claims about the current and proper scope of presidential powers.' For those seeking a survey of the President's constitutional powers, the book amply fits the bill. It thoughtfully considers some classic questions, such as whether the President has a removal power and how the Constitution allocates foreign affairs authority between the President and Congress.After first describing the book's contents, this Review considers a question that permeates Presidential Powers but never receives any systematic treatment: To what extent, and in what way, are presidential powers really the President's? There will always be earnest disputes about whether the Constitution grants the President particular powers. But even as to acknowledged executive authorities, what, if anything, may Congress do to curb controversial exercises of presidential power? For example, some might think it advantageous if Congress could bar or at least erect a check on pardons of donors, administration personnel, and personal friends. Likewise, others might deem it desirable to deny the President the power to nominate judges with life tenure.Notwithstanding the possible benefits of congressional regulation of executive powers, the Constitution's text, structure, and early history reveal that Congress lacks a generic right to reallocate or tamper with presidential powers. To begin with, the vast majority of presidential powers read as if they are absolute grants not subject to congressional control or modification. Perhaps more importantly, the Constitution never grants Congress the generic authority to treat presidential powers as if they were default power, i.e., powers freely exercisable only so long as Congress does not regulate them. Tellingly, the Constitution conspicuously lacks language found in the revolutionary state constitutions that expressly made some or all executive powers subject to legislative regulation. Finally, there are few early assertions that Congress could regulate presidential powers.Considered together, these factors help establish that Congress lacks a sweeping authority to regulate presidential powers.Nonetheless, Congress can tinker with certain presidential powers, in limited ways, typically because the Constitution expressly grants Congress narrow regulatory authority.The presence of these limited exceptions, when considered in conjunction with the arguments mentioned in the previous paragraph, helps prove the rule that Congress lacks a generic authority to regulate powers vested with other entities. Though Congress can regulate commerce and the value of coins, it generally cannot regulate the President's constitutional powers.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
4.00%
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期刊介绍: Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.
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