{"title":"无法控制的冲动和非理性的人","authors":"S. Morse","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.293368","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\"Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People\" addresses the fundamental issue the Supreme Court will decide this term in In re Crane: the constitutionally acceptable standard for indefinite involuntary civil commitment of mentally abnormal sexual predators. It makes four principal arguments. First, it claims that genuine non-responsibility should be a necessary, limiting precondition for indefinite involuntary commitment, and that the \"loss of control\" language in the Court's opinion in Hendricks should be understood as a proxy for non-responsibility generally. Second, it argues that loss of control standards, as criteria for non-responsibility, are unworkable. The essay next turns to \"causal link\" standards of the type Kansas proposes in Crane, which permit a potentially violent predator to be confined if a mental abnormality predisposes the person to commit future acts of violence. It claims that causal link standards are over-inclusive, and, properly understood, are not non-responsibility standards at all. Causal link standards are therefore an unjustifiable threat to liberty. Finally, the essay proposes that a lack of capacity for rationality is a genuine and workable non-responsibility standard that could properly justify and limit indefinite involuntary commitment.","PeriodicalId":47840,"journal":{"name":"Virginia Law Review","volume":"88 1","pages":"1025"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2002-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"44","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People\",\"authors\":\"S. Morse\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.293368\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\\"Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People\\\" addresses the fundamental issue the Supreme Court will decide this term in In re Crane: the constitutionally acceptable standard for indefinite involuntary civil commitment of mentally abnormal sexual predators. It makes four principal arguments. First, it claims that genuine non-responsibility should be a necessary, limiting precondition for indefinite involuntary commitment, and that the \\\"loss of control\\\" language in the Court's opinion in Hendricks should be understood as a proxy for non-responsibility generally. Second, it argues that loss of control standards, as criteria for non-responsibility, are unworkable. The essay next turns to \\\"causal link\\\" standards of the type Kansas proposes in Crane, which permit a potentially violent predator to be confined if a mental abnormality predisposes the person to commit future acts of violence. It claims that causal link standards are over-inclusive, and, properly understood, are not non-responsibility standards at all. Causal link standards are therefore an unjustifiable threat to liberty. Finally, the essay proposes that a lack of capacity for rationality is a genuine and workable non-responsibility standard that could properly justify and limit indefinite involuntary commitment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47840,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Virginia Law Review\",\"volume\":\"88 1\",\"pages\":\"1025\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"44\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Virginia Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.293368\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Virginia Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.293368","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
"Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People" addresses the fundamental issue the Supreme Court will decide this term in In re Crane: the constitutionally acceptable standard for indefinite involuntary civil commitment of mentally abnormal sexual predators. It makes four principal arguments. First, it claims that genuine non-responsibility should be a necessary, limiting precondition for indefinite involuntary commitment, and that the "loss of control" language in the Court's opinion in Hendricks should be understood as a proxy for non-responsibility generally. Second, it argues that loss of control standards, as criteria for non-responsibility, are unworkable. The essay next turns to "causal link" standards of the type Kansas proposes in Crane, which permit a potentially violent predator to be confined if a mental abnormality predisposes the person to commit future acts of violence. It claims that causal link standards are over-inclusive, and, properly understood, are not non-responsibility standards at all. Causal link standards are therefore an unjustifiable threat to liberty. Finally, the essay proposes that a lack of capacity for rationality is a genuine and workable non-responsibility standard that could properly justify and limit indefinite involuntary commitment.
期刊介绍:
The Virginia Law Review is a journal of general legal scholarship published by the students of the University of Virginia School of Law. The continuing objective of the Virginia Law Review is to publish a professional periodical devoted to legal and law-related issues that can be of use to judges, practitioners, teachers, legislators, students, and others interested in the law. First formally organized on April 23, 1913, the Virginia Law Review today remains one of the most respected and influential student legal periodicals in the country.