{"title":"基于区块链的学术期刊","authors":"Kyoung Jin Choi, Jaevin Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730355","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the economic implications of blockchain-based academic journals, proposed by the recent computer science literature, in which authors and referees are individually incentivized. We construct a model in which the journal publishes qualified papers under two types of information asymmetry: paper quality and type of referee. We obtain the conditions under which equilibrium in decentralization exists or fails and leads to a better outcome than in centralization. Our research also helps us understand how to design an incentive structure for information providers required for funding decisions, loan inspections, and credit ratings.","PeriodicalId":74863,"journal":{"name":"SSRN","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Blockchain-based Academic Journals\",\"authors\":\"Kyoung Jin Choi, Jaevin Park\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3730355\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study investigates the economic implications of blockchain-based academic journals, proposed by the recent computer science literature, in which authors and referees are individually incentivized. We construct a model in which the journal publishes qualified papers under two types of information asymmetry: paper quality and type of referee. We obtain the conditions under which equilibrium in decentralization exists or fails and leads to a better outcome than in centralization. Our research also helps us understand how to design an incentive structure for information providers required for funding decisions, loan inspections, and credit ratings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":74863,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SSRN\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SSRN\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730355\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SSRN","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730355","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the economic implications of blockchain-based academic journals, proposed by the recent computer science literature, in which authors and referees are individually incentivized. We construct a model in which the journal publishes qualified papers under two types of information asymmetry: paper quality and type of referee. We obtain the conditions under which equilibrium in decentralization exists or fails and leads to a better outcome than in centralization. Our research also helps us understand how to design an incentive structure for information providers required for funding decisions, loan inspections, and credit ratings.
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