{"title":"保持法律历史的意义","authors":"R. Pildes","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.391520","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This essay in constitutional history further explores the political context of constitutional law's failure to intervene in the massive disfranchisement that occurred in late 19th and early 20th century America. Contrary to deterministic views of the history of race in late 19th century America, the structure of the 20th century Southern racial order - segregation and the virtual elimination of black citizens from democracy - was not locked into place by some essential, fixed, organic structure of a monolithic, unified, \"white South\" the moment Reconstruction ended. This essay argues instead that the racial politics of this era involved deep conflicts among whites, that white supremacy was a political and social construction that had to be self-consciously built and fought for by its proponents, and that the racial politics of the disfranchisement era were more fluid and contingent than is sometimes recognized. The essay shows that constitutional disfranchisement required bypassing popular political processes, such as statewide referendum, that were otherwise used to adopt constitutional amendments. In states like Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina, disfranchisement was strongly resisted by several classes of whites and by blacks; succeeded only with thin, often fraudulent majorities, and was achieved by oligarchic domination of small political bodies, such as state constitutional conventions, rather than by popular support. This context is used to evaluate the Supreme Court's failure, in Giles v. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
这篇关于宪法史的文章进一步探讨了宪法未能干预发生在19世纪末和20世纪初的美国大规模剥夺公民权的政治背景。与19世纪末美国种族历史的决定论观点相反,20世纪南方种族秩序的结构——种族隔离和黑人公民实际上被排除在民主之外——在重建结束的那一刻,并没有被一个统一的“白人南方”的某种基本的、固定的、有机的结构所锁定。相反,这篇文章认为,这个时代的种族政治涉及白人之间的深刻冲突,白人至上是一种政治和社会建构,必须由其支持者自觉地建立和争取,剥夺选举权时代的种族政治比人们有时认识到的更不稳定、更偶然。这篇文章表明,宪法剥夺公民权需要绕过流行的政治程序,如全州公投,否则就会被用来通过宪法修正案。在弗吉尼亚、密西西比、阿拉巴马、北卡罗来纳和南卡罗来纳等州,剥夺选举权遭到了几个阶级的白人和黑人的强烈抵制;只有微弱的,经常是欺骗性的多数才能成功,并且是通过寡头统治小型政治机构,如州宪法会议,而不是通过民众的支持来实现的。这一背景被用来评价最高法院在贾尔斯诉哈里斯案(Giles v. Harris, 1903)中未能发现这一时期的大规模剥夺公民权,从而引发任何可审理的宪法问题。鉴于这个时代党派和种族政治的流动性,这篇文章捍卫了这样一种观点,即贾尔斯案不仅在最高法院的历史上,而且在更广泛的美国种族关系的政治史上都是一个重大事件。这篇文章建立在早期工作的基础上,并回应了其他人提出的问题,即最高法院在容忍这个持续到1965年的时代剥夺公民权方面的作用。
This essay in constitutional history further explores the political context of constitutional law's failure to intervene in the massive disfranchisement that occurred in late 19th and early 20th century America. Contrary to deterministic views of the history of race in late 19th century America, the structure of the 20th century Southern racial order - segregation and the virtual elimination of black citizens from democracy - was not locked into place by some essential, fixed, organic structure of a monolithic, unified, "white South" the moment Reconstruction ended. This essay argues instead that the racial politics of this era involved deep conflicts among whites, that white supremacy was a political and social construction that had to be self-consciously built and fought for by its proponents, and that the racial politics of the disfranchisement era were more fluid and contingent than is sometimes recognized. The essay shows that constitutional disfranchisement required bypassing popular political processes, such as statewide referendum, that were otherwise used to adopt constitutional amendments. In states like Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina, disfranchisement was strongly resisted by several classes of whites and by blacks; succeeded only with thin, often fraudulent majorities, and was achieved by oligarchic domination of small political bodies, such as state constitutional conventions, rather than by popular support. This context is used to evaluate the Supreme Court's failure, in Giles v. Harris (1903), to find the massive disfranchisement of this period to raise any justiciable constitutional questions. In light of the fluidity of partisan and racial politics of this era, the essay defends the view that Giles was a momentous event, not just in Supreme Court history, but in the political history of American race relations more broadly. The essay builds upon earlier work and responds to questions others have raised about the role of the Supreme Court in tolerating the disfranchisement of this era, which lasted until 1965.