Dysfunctional design of campaign finance regulatory and post-election corruption

This study begins with the condition that almost every election held in Indonesia lacks accountability and transparency in campaign finance report cases. Matched to Mietzner’s (2015) and Briffault’s (2010) reports, there are always problems with the non-functioning of campaign finance arrangements in upholding the principles of transparency and accountability. As a result, the lack of accountability and transparency in implementing campaign finance arrangements often results in conflicts of interest that lead to post-election corruption. This article aims to discover the factors that hinder the functioning of campaign finance regulations that can encourage enforcement transparency and accountability. This research uses normative juridical methods with a comparative law approach. The object of this research is the election campaign funding regulation, especially local elections in Indonesia and focuses on the dysfunctional design of campaign finance regulations on local head elections. We found that the candidates often violate existing campaign finance regulations, with election administrators, law enforcement and the public openly tolerating such violations. Campaign finance regulations continue to develop, but they only prioritize administrative aspects in their implementation. In conclusion, changes needed to optimize fund management are funds obtained from campaigns owned by individuals and then have a reasonable candidate wealth ratio.