{"title":"少知的好处:证明隐私保护不被披露的合理性","authors":"Daniel J. Solove","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.440200","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article develops justifications for protections against the disclosure of private information. An extensive body of scholarship has attacked such protections as anathema to the Information Age, where the free flow of information is championed as a fundamental value. This Article responds to two general critiques of disclosure protections: (1) that they inhibit freedom of speech, and (2) that they restrict information useful for judging others. Regarding the free speech critique, the Article argues that not all speech is of equal value; speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern. The difficulty, however, is distinguishing between public and private concerns. Traditional approaches include deferring to the media, distinguishing between public and private figures, and looking to the nature of the information disclosed. However, these approaches are flawed. Instead, we should focus on the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to which information is put. The propriety of disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on the type of information disclosed. The Article analogizes to the law of evidence, in which certain information is admissible for some purposes but not others and then examines the values of free speech and argues that privacy often furthers the same ends, demonstrating that free speech should not always prevail in the balance. Next, the Article tackles the judgment and trust critique, which views personal information as essential for making judgments about whether to trust people with whom one associates. Although personal information can help facilitate judgments about other people, the Article contends that these judgments are often made quickly and out of context. In short, more information does not necessarily lead to more accurate judgments. The Article also contends that privacy protects against certain rational judgments that society may want to prohibit (such as employment decisions based on genetic information). The Article then responds to commentators who argue that gossip is valuable because it helps educate us about human nature and argues that the value of concealing one's past can, in many circumstances, outweigh the benefits of disclosure.","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"53 1","pages":"967-1065"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2003-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.440200","citationCount":"28","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure\",\"authors\":\"Daniel J. Solove\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.440200\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This Article develops justifications for protections against the disclosure of private information. An extensive body of scholarship has attacked such protections as anathema to the Information Age, where the free flow of information is championed as a fundamental value. This Article responds to two general critiques of disclosure protections: (1) that they inhibit freedom of speech, and (2) that they restrict information useful for judging others. Regarding the free speech critique, the Article argues that not all speech is of equal value; speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern. The difficulty, however, is distinguishing between public and private concerns. Traditional approaches include deferring to the media, distinguishing between public and private figures, and looking to the nature of the information disclosed. However, these approaches are flawed. Instead, we should focus on the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to which information is put. The propriety of disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on the type of information disclosed. The Article analogizes to the law of evidence, in which certain information is admissible for some purposes but not others and then examines the values of free speech and argues that privacy often furthers the same ends, demonstrating that free speech should not always prevail in the balance. Next, the Article tackles the judgment and trust critique, which views personal information as essential for making judgments about whether to trust people with whom one associates. Although personal information can help facilitate judgments about other people, the Article contends that these judgments are often made quickly and out of context. In short, more information does not necessarily lead to more accurate judgments. The Article also contends that privacy protects against certain rational judgments that society may want to prohibit (such as employment decisions based on genetic information). The Article then responds to commentators who argue that gossip is valuable because it helps educate us about human nature and argues that the value of concealing one's past can, in many circumstances, outweigh the benefits of disclosure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"53 1\",\"pages\":\"967-1065\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-10-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.440200\",\"citationCount\":\"28\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.440200\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.440200","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure
This Article develops justifications for protections against the disclosure of private information. An extensive body of scholarship has attacked such protections as anathema to the Information Age, where the free flow of information is championed as a fundamental value. This Article responds to two general critiques of disclosure protections: (1) that they inhibit freedom of speech, and (2) that they restrict information useful for judging others. Regarding the free speech critique, the Article argues that not all speech is of equal value; speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern. The difficulty, however, is distinguishing between public and private concerns. Traditional approaches include deferring to the media, distinguishing between public and private figures, and looking to the nature of the information disclosed. However, these approaches are flawed. Instead, we should focus on the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to which information is put. The propriety of disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on the type of information disclosed. The Article analogizes to the law of evidence, in which certain information is admissible for some purposes but not others and then examines the values of free speech and argues that privacy often furthers the same ends, demonstrating that free speech should not always prevail in the balance. Next, the Article tackles the judgment and trust critique, which views personal information as essential for making judgments about whether to trust people with whom one associates. Although personal information can help facilitate judgments about other people, the Article contends that these judgments are often made quickly and out of context. In short, more information does not necessarily lead to more accurate judgments. The Article also contends that privacy protects against certain rational judgments that society may want to prohibit (such as employment decisions based on genetic information). The Article then responds to commentators who argue that gossip is valuable because it helps educate us about human nature and argues that the value of concealing one's past can, in many circumstances, outweigh the benefits of disclosure.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.