少知的好处:证明隐私保护不被披露的合理性

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Duke Law Journal Pub Date : 2003-10-03 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.440200
Daniel J. Solove
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引用次数: 28

摘要

本文阐述了防止私人信息泄露的保护理由。大量学者抨击这些保护措施是对信息时代的诅咒,在这个时代,信息的自由流动被视为一种基本价值。本文回应了对信息披露保护的两种普遍批评:(1)它们抑制了言论自由,(2)它们限制了对判断他人有用的信息。对于言论自由的批判,本文认为并非所有言论都具有同等价值;涉及私人利益的言论不如涉及公众利益的言论有价值。然而,困难在于区分公共和私人关切。传统的方法包括尊重媒体,区分公众人物和私人人物,以及关注所披露信息的性质。然而,这些方法是有缺陷的。相反,我们应该关注信息传递的关系以及信息的用途。披露的适当性取决于披露的目的,而不仅仅取决于披露的信息类型。该条与证据法类比,在证据法中,某些信息可用于某些目的,但不能用于其他目的。该条随后审查了言论自由的价值,并认为隐私通常会促进相同的目的,表明言论自由不应总是在平衡中占上风。接下来,文章处理了判断和信任批评,它认为个人信息对于判断是否信任一个人的同事是必不可少的。尽管个人信息有助于促进对他人的判断,但文章认为,这些判断往往是快速和脱离背景的。简而言之,更多的信息并不一定导致更准确的判断。该条还主张,隐私保护人们免受社会可能想要禁止的某些理性判断(如基于遗传信息的就业决定)的侵害。文章随后回应了一些评论员的观点,他们认为八卦是有价值的,因为它有助于我们了解人性,并认为在许多情况下,隐瞒一个人的过去的价值可能超过披露的好处。
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The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure
This Article develops justifications for protections against the disclosure of private information. An extensive body of scholarship has attacked such protections as anathema to the Information Age, where the free flow of information is championed as a fundamental value. This Article responds to two general critiques of disclosure protections: (1) that they inhibit freedom of speech, and (2) that they restrict information useful for judging others. Regarding the free speech critique, the Article argues that not all speech is of equal value; speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern. The difficulty, however, is distinguishing between public and private concerns. Traditional approaches include deferring to the media, distinguishing between public and private figures, and looking to the nature of the information disclosed. However, these approaches are flawed. Instead, we should focus on the relationships in which information is transferred and the uses to which information is put. The propriety of disclosures depends upon their purpose, not merely on the type of information disclosed. The Article analogizes to the law of evidence, in which certain information is admissible for some purposes but not others and then examines the values of free speech and argues that privacy often furthers the same ends, demonstrating that free speech should not always prevail in the balance. Next, the Article tackles the judgment and trust critique, which views personal information as essential for making judgments about whether to trust people with whom one associates. Although personal information can help facilitate judgments about other people, the Article contends that these judgments are often made quickly and out of context. In short, more information does not necessarily lead to more accurate judgments. The Article also contends that privacy protects against certain rational judgments that society may want to prohibit (such as employment decisions based on genetic information). The Article then responds to commentators who argue that gossip is valuable because it helps educate us about human nature and argues that the value of concealing one's past can, in many circumstances, outweigh the benefits of disclosure.
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CiteScore
1.90
自引率
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期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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