2004年第二次平壤首脑会谈后的日朝关系

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2008-03-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.4.1.74
H. N. Kim, Jack L. Hammersmith
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引用次数: 2

摘要

▽第二次平壤首脑会谈:2002年9月17日,日本首相小泉纯一郎和北韩国防委员长金正日在平壤举行了第一次北-日首脑会谈,就阻碍两国关系正常化的诸多棘手问题达成了协议。就日本对朝鲜人民遭受的苦难进行赔偿的问题,朝鲜同意接受日本的经济援助,而不是像以前那样坚持要求“赔偿”。从1991年到2000年,日朝关系正常化谈判的另一个主要问题是,20世纪70年代末到80年代初,朝鲜涉嫌绑架了12名日本公民。目的显然是利用他们作为训练朝鲜特工的语言教师。由于日本国家警察收集了至少11起绑架事件的大量证据,东京不仅要求提供有关他们下落的资料,而且要求将他们送回日本。然而,直到2002年夏天,平壤方面一直断然否认对这些绑架事件知情。在平壤首脑会谈上,金正恩改变了平壤方面先前否认的立场,承认朝鲜对绑架13名日本公民负有责任,并表示道歉,保证不会再犯这样的错误。据金说,13人中有8人死亡,5人还活着。关于核问题,金正恩承诺遵守所有国际协议。此外,金正日还承诺将平壤自行暂停的导弹试验延长到2003年以后。包括上述内容的《平壤宣言》(由小泉和金槿泰共同签署)发表后,很多人乐观地认为,日本和北韩将很快实现邦交正常化。然而,事实并非如此。相反,由于2002年10月北韩秘密浓缩铀(HEU)计划被公开,以及日本舆论对绑架问题的强烈反对,日朝关系正常化谈判陷入了僵局。小泉一直要求北韩全面遵守包括2002年《平壤宣言》在内的国际协议,放弃其核武器计划,但北韩拒绝接受这一要求。日本人也对金东哲对绑架日本公民的供词感到愤怒,尤其是8名被绑架者在朝鲜拘留期间死亡的令人震惊的消息。由于平壤对这些死亡原因的解释引起了对平壤报告可信度的许多怀疑,许多日本人要求对这些被绑架者死亡的情况作出准确和令人信服的解释。北韩虽然在2002年10月将5名幸存的被北绑架者送回了日本,但直到2004年夏天,北韩才同意将被北绑架者的家属送回日本,以便进行家属团聚。与此同时,强烈反对与北韩邦交正常化的日本右翼势力迅速利用了绑架问题。他们认为,北韩的大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)已经对日本构成了严重的安全威胁。他们看不出日本有什么正当理由通过提供大量经济援助来支持共产主义政权。虽然小泉纯一郎在2006年卸任前曾表示要实现日本与北韩的关系正常化,但由于日本的民族主义势力也认同这一观点,因此小泉纯一郎政府很难就绑架问题达成妥协。2004年5月22日,小泉纯一郎为解决日朝关系的悬案,决定再次访问平壤。…
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Japanese-North Korean Relations after the Second Pyongyang Summit of 2004
The Second Pyongyang SummitAt the first Japanese-North Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il were able to reach agreements on a number of thorny issues which had constituted stumbling blocks in normalizing their relations. Regarding the question of Japan's compensation to North Korea for the suffering inflicted on Koreans during Japan's colonial rule, Pyongyang agreed to accept Tokyo's offer of economic assistance instead of demanding "reparations" as it had insisted previously. Another major issue in Japanese-North Korean normalization talks from 1991 to 2000 was the suspected abduction of a dozen Japanese nationals by North Korea from the late 1970s to the early 1980s; the purpose was apparently to utilize them as language instructors for training North Korean special agents. As the Japanese national police had collected substantial evidence concerning at least 11 such abductions, Tokyo demanded not only information concerning their whereabouts but also their repatriation to Japan. However, Pyongyang flatly denied any knowledge about these abductions until the summer of 2002. At the Pyongyang summit, Kim reversed Pyongyang's previous position of denial and acknowledged North Korea's responsibility for abducting thirteen Japanese nationals and offered an apology, pledging not to repeat such mistakes. According to Kim, out of thirteen, eight had died, while five were still alive. Regarding the nuclear weapons issue, Kim promised to comply with all international agreements. In addition, Kim also promised to extend Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003. When the Pyongyang Declaration (signed jointly by Koizumi and Kim) incorporating these agreements was announced, many reacted with optimism that Japan and North Korea would be able to normalize diplomatic relations quickly. However, such was not to be the case.Rather, Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks were stalemated shortly thereafter, largely due to the revelation of North Korea's secret uranium-based (HEU) nuclear weapons program in October 2002 and the backlash in Japanese public opinion on the abduction issue. North Korea refused to comply with Koizumi's persistent demand to abandon its nuclear weapons program by complying fully with international agreements, including the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. The Japanese were also enraged by Kim's confession on the abduction of Japanese nationals, especially the shocking news of the death of the eight abductees while in North Korea's custody. As Pyongyang's explanations for the causes of these deaths aroused much suspicion about the credibility of Pyongyang's report,2 many Japanese demanded an accurate and convincing explanation for the circumstances surrounding the death of these abductees.Although Pyongyang returned five surviving Japanese abductees to Japan in October 2002, it was not until the summer of 2004 that Pyongyang agreed to send the family members of these repatriated abductees to Japan for a family reunion. In the meantime, the highly emotional abduction issue was quickly seized upon by Japanese right-wing elements which opposed the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea. They maintained that the Pyongyang regime was already posing a serious security threat to Japan with its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They could not see any justifiable reason for Japan to prop up the communist regime by providing massive economic assistance. Since many nationalistic Japanese shared these views, it was difficult for the Koizumi government to compromise on the abduction issue to normalize Japanese-North Korean relations in spite of Koizumi's professed intention to achieve that goal before stepping down from office in 2006.In an attempt to resolve the outstanding issues in Japanese-North Korean relations, Koizumi decided to visit Pyongyang again on May 22, 2004. …
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North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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