对朝金融制裁的演变

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.9.2.69
D. Wertz
{"title":"对朝金融制裁的演变","authors":"D. Wertz","doi":"10.3172/NKR.9.2.69","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with \"bad actors\" such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker willing to stomach the risks (perhaps in return for receiving premium rates), but a hardpressed entity may have to resort to more costly measures such as bartering, laundering money through front companies, or using bulk cash. When such an affected entity is a vital node in a country's economy, such as a major bank, the disruptive effects can spread far, complicating commercial activities and creating inflationary pressures. Both legitimate and illicit commerce may therefore be affected by financial sanctions, creating an incentive for legitimate businesses to step into the financial netherworld, and for illicit ones to delve further underground.3From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, financial sanctions are a significant addition to the more traditional sanctions toolbox of trade embargos, interdictions, and targeted \"smart\" sanctions. These measures fit well within the context of the overlapping objectives of why states implement sanctions: to coerce a target regime to change its behavior; to undermine its leadership; to deter it from future actions; to degrade its capabilities; to warn international audiences against undertaking similar behavior; and to satisfy domestic audiences demanding that something be done. …","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Evolution of Financial Sanctions on North Korea\",\"authors\":\"D. Wertz\",\"doi\":\"10.3172/NKR.9.2.69\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with \\\"bad actors\\\" such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker willing to stomach the risks (perhaps in return for receiving premium rates), but a hardpressed entity may have to resort to more costly measures such as bartering, laundering money through front companies, or using bulk cash. When such an affected entity is a vital node in a country's economy, such as a major bank, the disruptive effects can spread far, complicating commercial activities and creating inflationary pressures. Both legitimate and illicit commerce may therefore be affected by financial sanctions, creating an incentive for legitimate businesses to step into the financial netherworld, and for illicit ones to delve further underground.3From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, financial sanctions are a significant addition to the more traditional sanctions toolbox of trade embargos, interdictions, and targeted \\\"smart\\\" sanctions. These measures fit well within the context of the overlapping objectives of why states implement sanctions: to coerce a target regime to change its behavior; to undermine its leadership; to deter it from future actions; to degrade its capabilities; to warn international audiences against undertaking similar behavior; and to satisfy domestic audiences demanding that something be done. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":40013,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"North Korean Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"North Korean Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.69\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"North Korean Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.69","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

摘要

近年来,金融制裁已成为美国外交政策中越来越重要的工具,在防止或打击核扩散以及洗钱或恐怖主义融资等其他非法国际活动方面发挥着核心作用。就朝鲜而言,实施金融制裁一直是乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)和巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)政府向朝鲜施压、迫使其放弃发展大规模杀伤性武器、遵守国际准则的战略的关键部分。这些制裁阻碍了朝鲜进入国际金融体系,对其合法和非法的国际商业活动产生了破坏性影响。如果朝鲜的扩散活动保持在目前的轨道上,进一步实施此类制裁可能会继续成为削弱朝鲜大规模杀伤性武器项目并迫使其以美国可接受的条件重返谈判桌的努力的重要组成部分。金融制裁是一种相当新颖的工具,其目的是阻止目标实体(如与扩散有关的银行或企业)进入国际金融体系,它既依赖于政府的直接行动,也依赖于私人金融机构的风险计算。由于美元在国际金融体系中的重要性,美国政策制定者一直能够向与朝鲜等“不良行为者”有业务往来的第三国银行施压,要求它们对交易进行更严格的审查,或者完全切断与朝鲜的关系。这种动态使美国能够在与制裁目标的直接贸易或金融联系微乎其微的情况下施加经济压力。对许多全球金融机构来说,与可能与扩散、恐怖主义或其他非法活动有关的实体做生意所带来的潜在利润相比,负面宣传、增加监管成本或罚款、或失去进入美国金融体系的可能性所带来的风险更大。如果为非法交易提供便利的风险,或实施尽职调查框架以确保所有交易合法的成本超过可能获得的利润,一些金融机构可能不仅会避开与此类活动有特别关联的实体,还会完全避免与朝鲜等国家开展业务。虽然与朝鲜而不是美国进行贸易的第三国企业可能能够摆脱二级制裁的威胁,例如失去进入美国市场的机会,但随时进入美国金融体系是大多数全球金融机构的命脉。因此,受金融制裁影响的实体由于无法方便地使用外国银行账户,可能难以进行国际交易或汇出硬通货。解决这个问题可能很简单,只要找到一个愿意承担风险的新银行家(也许是为了获得溢价),但一个陷入困境的实体可能不得不采取更昂贵的措施,如物物交换、通过幌子公司洗钱或使用大量现金。当这种受影响的实体是一个国家经济的重要节点时,例如一家大银行,破坏性影响可能会蔓延很远,使商业活动复杂化并造成通货膨胀压力。因此,合法和非法商业都可能受到金融制裁的影响,促使合法企业进入地下金融世界,而非法企业则进一步深入地下。从美国决策者的角度来看,金融制裁是对贸易禁运、封锁和有针对性的“聪明”制裁等更传统制裁工具箱的重要补充。这些措施完全符合各国实施制裁的多重目标:迫使目标政权改变其行为;破坏其领导地位;阻止它将来采取行动;降低其能力;警告国际观众不要采取类似行为;并满足国内观众的要求。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Evolution of Financial Sanctions on North Korea
IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with "bad actors" such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker willing to stomach the risks (perhaps in return for receiving premium rates), but a hardpressed entity may have to resort to more costly measures such as bartering, laundering money through front companies, or using bulk cash. When such an affected entity is a vital node in a country's economy, such as a major bank, the disruptive effects can spread far, complicating commercial activities and creating inflationary pressures. Both legitimate and illicit commerce may therefore be affected by financial sanctions, creating an incentive for legitimate businesses to step into the financial netherworld, and for illicit ones to delve further underground.3From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, financial sanctions are a significant addition to the more traditional sanctions toolbox of trade embargos, interdictions, and targeted "smart" sanctions. These measures fit well within the context of the overlapping objectives of why states implement sanctions: to coerce a target regime to change its behavior; to undermine its leadership; to deter it from future actions; to degrade its capabilities; to warn international audiences against undertaking similar behavior; and to satisfy domestic audiences demanding that something be done. …
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1