{"title":"隐私权:道德和法律基础","authors":"T. Lipinski","doi":"10.5860/choice.48-4145","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal FoundationsAdam D. Moore. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 248 pp. $65.00.Moore has written extensively on the topic of privacy from its moral and legal underpinnings to its value both inherent and in practice. This body of work is reflected in this offering. The book is not a mere recounting of the threat to privacy in present society. Rather, the author presents a series of arguments in favor of privacy protection (\"my goal is to provide a philosophically rigorous defense of privacy rights\" p. 4), its moral foundation, and its legal shortcomings as well as possibilities. Thus a normative approach is his goal; i.e., one based upon \"moral claims\" (p. 16) as opposed to one based on the condition of privacy, tending to be descriptive. Elements from many chapters have appeared in Moore's previous writings and presentations. True to the philosopher in Moore, there are numerous and variable cases or thought-exercises (most involving two actors, Fred and Ginger) and prove to be to some the most useful content presented. Moore knows his law too, a feature missing in many works on this and inter-related topics such as free speech and copyright. Discussion of these legal concepts is both fluid and informed.After a short introductory chapter, the author spends some time attempting to define privacy and its value. The remaining seven chapters develop the argument for privacy rights in bodies (self ) and locations (space), information (about self and space, including decisional privacy), legal privacy rights, conflicts between speech and privacy, workplace privacy, the conflict between intellectual property and privacy rights, and state (security) versus the individual (and his or her privacy).In chapter 2 Moore argues for a normative view in defense of privacy with the benefit that his conception is broad enough to encompass more singular conceptualizations, those based on personality (\"grow personally\") or autonomy, for example (p. 17). Control rather than liberty is key to Moore's conception, with \"access to\" and \"use of\" distinguishable. In addition, the privacy right extends to \"use of bodies, locations, and personal information\" (p. 25).Chapter 3 (The Value of Privacy), the most philosophically oriented of the book, discusses Rawls, Hume, et al., and while recognizing privacy as culturally variable also argues that privacy is somewhat inherent or universal in all but a few cases. Of course, exceptions are the bane of the philosopher and Moore's argument is no exception. While the chapter presents a number of important considerations, it remains in the reviewer's mind a less convincing articulation of the value of privacy.Chapter 4 and those that follow proceed quickly into specifics. Here Moore argues for privacy rights in bodies and more important, locations. This is one clear example where Moore and much legal thinking part company. He introduces a basic rule for evaluating privacy claims: A so-called \"no harm, no foul\" rule (p. 62), somewhat related to economic Pareto optimum efficiency that he believes may be a \"foundational moral principle\" (p. 79) and he also discusses positions forwarded by others such as Gauthier and Nozick, then applies his concepts to the various case studies or scenarios posted earlier.Chapter 5 tackles informational privacy in our technological age and argues for differences in invasions of privacy not just in degree but in kind. Moore discusses use and possession claims, access control rights, physical and intellectual property and freedom of contract; these \"rights, claims, and liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy\" (p. 95).Chapter 6 discusses the legal foundations of privacy protection (the approach is decidedly based on U.S. law), its gaps, and its potential. The chapter is mostly descriptive of common law privacy torts, constitutional protections and statutory approaches and does a fine job of discussing the relevant case law in terms a non-legal audience would appreciate. …","PeriodicalId":39913,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Information Ethics","volume":"9 1","pages":"83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations\",\"authors\":\"T. Lipinski\",\"doi\":\"10.5860/choice.48-4145\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal FoundationsAdam D. Moore. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 248 pp. $65.00.Moore has written extensively on the topic of privacy from its moral and legal underpinnings to its value both inherent and in practice. This body of work is reflected in this offering. The book is not a mere recounting of the threat to privacy in present society. Rather, the author presents a series of arguments in favor of privacy protection (\\\"my goal is to provide a philosophically rigorous defense of privacy rights\\\" p. 4), its moral foundation, and its legal shortcomings as well as possibilities. Thus a normative approach is his goal; i.e., one based upon \\\"moral claims\\\" (p. 16) as opposed to one based on the condition of privacy, tending to be descriptive. Elements from many chapters have appeared in Moore's previous writings and presentations. True to the philosopher in Moore, there are numerous and variable cases or thought-exercises (most involving two actors, Fred and Ginger) and prove to be to some the most useful content presented. Moore knows his law too, a feature missing in many works on this and inter-related topics such as free speech and copyright. Discussion of these legal concepts is both fluid and informed.After a short introductory chapter, the author spends some time attempting to define privacy and its value. The remaining seven chapters develop the argument for privacy rights in bodies (self ) and locations (space), information (about self and space, including decisional privacy), legal privacy rights, conflicts between speech and privacy, workplace privacy, the conflict between intellectual property and privacy rights, and state (security) versus the individual (and his or her privacy).In chapter 2 Moore argues for a normative view in defense of privacy with the benefit that his conception is broad enough to encompass more singular conceptualizations, those based on personality (\\\"grow personally\\\") or autonomy, for example (p. 17). Control rather than liberty is key to Moore's conception, with \\\"access to\\\" and \\\"use of\\\" distinguishable. In addition, the privacy right extends to \\\"use of bodies, locations, and personal information\\\" (p. 25).Chapter 3 (The Value of Privacy), the most philosophically oriented of the book, discusses Rawls, Hume, et al., and while recognizing privacy as culturally variable also argues that privacy is somewhat inherent or universal in all but a few cases. Of course, exceptions are the bane of the philosopher and Moore's argument is no exception. While the chapter presents a number of important considerations, it remains in the reviewer's mind a less convincing articulation of the value of privacy.Chapter 4 and those that follow proceed quickly into specifics. Here Moore argues for privacy rights in bodies and more important, locations. This is one clear example where Moore and much legal thinking part company. He introduces a basic rule for evaluating privacy claims: A so-called \\\"no harm, no foul\\\" rule (p. 62), somewhat related to economic Pareto optimum efficiency that he believes may be a \\\"foundational moral principle\\\" (p. 79) and he also discusses positions forwarded by others such as Gauthier and Nozick, then applies his concepts to the various case studies or scenarios posted earlier.Chapter 5 tackles informational privacy in our technological age and argues for differences in invasions of privacy not just in degree but in kind. Moore discusses use and possession claims, access control rights, physical and intellectual property and freedom of contract; these \\\"rights, claims, and liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy\\\" (p. 95).Chapter 6 discusses the legal foundations of privacy protection (the approach is decidedly based on U.S. law), its gaps, and its potential. The chapter is mostly descriptive of common law privacy torts, constitutional protections and statutory approaches and does a fine job of discussing the relevant case law in terms a non-legal audience would appreciate. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":39913,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Information Ethics\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"83\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Information Ethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.48-4145\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Information Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.48-4145","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal FoundationsAdam D. Moore. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 248 pp. $65.00.Moore has written extensively on the topic of privacy from its moral and legal underpinnings to its value both inherent and in practice. This body of work is reflected in this offering. The book is not a mere recounting of the threat to privacy in present society. Rather, the author presents a series of arguments in favor of privacy protection ("my goal is to provide a philosophically rigorous defense of privacy rights" p. 4), its moral foundation, and its legal shortcomings as well as possibilities. Thus a normative approach is his goal; i.e., one based upon "moral claims" (p. 16) as opposed to one based on the condition of privacy, tending to be descriptive. Elements from many chapters have appeared in Moore's previous writings and presentations. True to the philosopher in Moore, there are numerous and variable cases or thought-exercises (most involving two actors, Fred and Ginger) and prove to be to some the most useful content presented. Moore knows his law too, a feature missing in many works on this and inter-related topics such as free speech and copyright. Discussion of these legal concepts is both fluid and informed.After a short introductory chapter, the author spends some time attempting to define privacy and its value. The remaining seven chapters develop the argument for privacy rights in bodies (self ) and locations (space), information (about self and space, including decisional privacy), legal privacy rights, conflicts between speech and privacy, workplace privacy, the conflict between intellectual property and privacy rights, and state (security) versus the individual (and his or her privacy).In chapter 2 Moore argues for a normative view in defense of privacy with the benefit that his conception is broad enough to encompass more singular conceptualizations, those based on personality ("grow personally") or autonomy, for example (p. 17). Control rather than liberty is key to Moore's conception, with "access to" and "use of" distinguishable. In addition, the privacy right extends to "use of bodies, locations, and personal information" (p. 25).Chapter 3 (The Value of Privacy), the most philosophically oriented of the book, discusses Rawls, Hume, et al., and while recognizing privacy as culturally variable also argues that privacy is somewhat inherent or universal in all but a few cases. Of course, exceptions are the bane of the philosopher and Moore's argument is no exception. While the chapter presents a number of important considerations, it remains in the reviewer's mind a less convincing articulation of the value of privacy.Chapter 4 and those that follow proceed quickly into specifics. Here Moore argues for privacy rights in bodies and more important, locations. This is one clear example where Moore and much legal thinking part company. He introduces a basic rule for evaluating privacy claims: A so-called "no harm, no foul" rule (p. 62), somewhat related to economic Pareto optimum efficiency that he believes may be a "foundational moral principle" (p. 79) and he also discusses positions forwarded by others such as Gauthier and Nozick, then applies his concepts to the various case studies or scenarios posted earlier.Chapter 5 tackles informational privacy in our technological age and argues for differences in invasions of privacy not just in degree but in kind. Moore discusses use and possession claims, access control rights, physical and intellectual property and freedom of contract; these "rights, claims, and liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy" (p. 95).Chapter 6 discusses the legal foundations of privacy protection (the approach is decidedly based on U.S. law), its gaps, and its potential. The chapter is mostly descriptive of common law privacy torts, constitutional protections and statutory approaches and does a fine job of discussing the relevant case law in terms a non-legal audience would appreciate. …