{"title":"具有技术溢出的双头垄断中的价格vs数量:福利重新评估","authors":"L. Lambertini, A. Mantovani","doi":"10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/685","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate RD and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.","PeriodicalId":85052,"journal":{"name":"Keio economic studies","volume":"38 1","pages":"41-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"PRICE VS QUANTITY IN A DUOPOLY WITH TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS: A WELFARE RE-APPRAISAL\",\"authors\":\"L. Lambertini, A. Mantovani\",\"doi\":\"10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/685\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate RD and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.\",\"PeriodicalId\":85052,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Keio economic studies\",\"volume\":\"38 1\",\"pages\":\"41-52\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Keio economic studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/685\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Keio economic studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/685","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
PRICE VS QUANTITY IN A DUOPOLY WITH TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS: A WELFARE RE-APPRAISAL
We analyse the problem of the choice of the market variable in a model where firms activate RD and (ii) there exists a set of the relevant parameters where a benevolent social planner prefers quantity setting to price setting. This happens when the marginal cost of R&D activities is relatively low while technological externalities are relatively high. In this situation, the conflict between social and private preferences over the type of market behaviour disappears.
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