迎接哈曼的挑战

IF 0.1 0 PHILOSOPHY Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.5840/studneoar20232012
L. M. Mason
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引用次数: 0

摘要

吉尔伯特·哈曼(Gilbert Harman)在一个著名的思想实验中,唤起了人们的直觉,即道德价值是可以被感知到的。然而,哈曼驳斥了直觉,认为道德概念和判断是主体心理学的产物,并不能映射到独立于思维的对象上。罗伯特·奥迪,试图解释自己的道德感知,未能满足哈曼的挑战,因为他自己的本体论承诺不允许道德概念可以映射到的对象。本文将提供另一种道德知觉理论,将道德概念映射到独立于心智的实体上,从而应对哈曼的挑战。为了实现这一点,我提出道德属性不是监督性的,而是具有自身不可约现象学的关系属性。
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Meeting Harman’s Challenge
Gilbert Harman, in a well-known thought experiment, evokes the intuition that moral value can be perceptually seen. However, Harman dismisses the intuition, contending that moral concepts and judgments are the products of agent psychology and do not map onto mind-independent objects. Robert Audi, attempting to account for moral perception himself, fails to meet Harman’s challenge since his own ontological commitments do not allow for objects that moral concepts can map onto. This paper will offer an alternate theory of moral perception that maps moral concepts onto mind-independent entities, thereby meeting Harman’s challenge. To accomplish this, I offer that moral properties are not supervenient but are relational properties which possess their own non-reducible phenomenology.
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来源期刊
Studia Neoaristotelica
Studia Neoaristotelica Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: Studia Neoaristotelica is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal devoted to the promotion of Aristotelian philosophy broadly conceived, drawing on the rich legacy of the scholastic tradition and contemporary analytical metaphysics. Special emphasis is placed on the most advanced forms of scholastic thought that emerged during the Renaissance and Baroque periods. Our vision is to work toward a philosophical synthesis of analytic and scholastic methods and ideas, providing a contribution to Christian philosophy as well as wider secular thought. The journal is published by Editiones Scholasticae and the University of South Bohemia Faculty of Theology.
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