私人债务市场的财务和法律顾问认证

IF 2.6 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE FINANCIAL REVIEW Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI:10.1111/fire.12322
Gabriel J. Power, Issouf Soumaré, Djerry C. Tandja M.
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引用次数: 0

摘要

理论预测,有声望的金融中介机构的认证标志着投资质量。我们使用大型项目的数据对财务和法律顾问的认证进行了直接的实证检验。我们发现顾问效应是互补的:财务顾问允许公司获得更长的贷款期限,而法律顾问(只有在有声望的情况下)帮助公司获得更大的杠杆和更低的贷款利差。我们还记录了可观察性的异质性:顾问的影响在不同的项目中根据可观察因素而变化。我们的研究结果与公司雇佣顾问通过传达没有利益冲突来帮助他们谈判更好的贷款协议是一致的。
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Certification by financial and legal advisors in private debt markets

Theory predicts that certification by prestigious financial intermediaries signals investment quality. We provide a direct empirical test of certification by financial and legal advisors using data on large-scale projects. We find that advisor effects are complementary: financial advisors allow firms to obtain longer loan maturities, while legal advisors (only if prestigious) help firms obtain greater leverage and lower loan spreads. We also document heterogeneity in observables: advisor effects vary across projects based on observable factors. Our results are consistent with firms hiring advisors to help them negotiate better loan agreements by conveying an absence of conflicts of interest.

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来源期刊
FINANCIAL REVIEW
FINANCIAL REVIEW BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
28.10%
发文量
39
期刊最新文献
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