描述的中立性和研究者的承诺

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY Cinta de Moebio Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI:10.4067/S0717-554X2019000100099
Juan Jiménez-Albornoz
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引用次数: 1

摘要

事实判断和价值判断的区别是描述的中立性和研究者的内在承诺的基础,同时也不会贬低价值判断的有效性。承认事实判断的依据与价值判断的依据之间的区别是相关的。无效的——无论是事实判断还是价值判断——是试图仅从事实中得出中立的建议,这是一种不涉及承诺的干预的技术官僚思想。没有什么中立的行为,而中立的真实也只能归结为一种描述
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Neutralidad de las descripciones y compromiso del investigador
The distinction between facts judgments and value judgments is the basis, at the same time, of both the neutrality of descriptions and the inherent commitment of the researcher, without devaluing the validity of value judgments. It is relevant to acknowledge the difference between what grounds a fact judgment from what grounds a value judgment. What is invalid -as fact judgment and as value judgment- is the attempt to generate neutral recommendations only from facts, the technocratic idea of an intervention that do not involves commitment. There is no such thing as a neutral action, and the real of neutrality is reduce only to description
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来源期刊
Cinta de Moebio
Cinta de Moebio PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
7
审稿时长
24 weeks
期刊介绍: Cinta de Moebio publishes scientific articles and essays on epistemology of social science. The editorial experience of the magazine indicates that some academics send articles of philosophy, but of issues that are not related to the social sciences, as well as academics who sent the results of their research or projects in the social sciences, but its focus is not epistemology, which also are geared out to the purpose of the journal. The journal, put it in some way, it is in the dialogue of philosophy with social science and, therefore, both domains must be present in the articles.
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