执行正当程序的权利:第十四修正案和1866年民权法案之间的原始关系

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Georgetown Law Journal Pub Date : 2016-06-28 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2801688
Kurt T. Lash
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引用次数: 1

摘要

法律学者长期以来一直认为,1866年的《民权法案》保护的是与国家公民身份有关的独特权利。因此,大多数学者认为,第十四修正案基于公民身份的特权或豁免条款为1866年《民权法案》提供了事后授权。然而,仔细研究原始资料就会发现,第39届国会的关键人物将《民权法案》视为保护与第五修正案的正当程序条款相关的权利。第十四修正案第一款的起草者约翰·宾厄姆(John Bingham)明确认为,《民权法案》保护在涉及生命、自由和财产的问题上享有正当程序的自然和平等权利。然而,宾厄姆反对《民权法案》,因为他认为必须首先通过一项修正案,赋予国会权力,以执行正当程序的平等权利。在第十四修正案获得批准之后,国会(现在在宾厄姆的支持下)重新通过了《民权法案》,并将其大部分保护扩大到“所有人”——这是由“所有人”正当程序条款授权的,而不是由“仅限公民”特权或豁免条款授权的。要理解1866年《民权法案》和1868年《正当程序条款》之间最初的联系,就需要重新思考关于第14修正案最初的一些普遍接受的假设。目前最高法院的许多“平等法律”原则可能得到“正当程序条款”原意的支持,而“平等保护条款”本身可能传达了一种完全不同的“平等保护”原则。将特权或豁免条款从《民权法案》中分离出来也支持将特权或豁免条款解读为保护国家列举的公民权利,而不是现在由《正当程序条款》和平等保护条款涵盖的未列举的州级公民权利。
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Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
Legal scholars have long assumed that the 1866 Civil Rights Act protected rights uniquely associated with national citizenship. Accordingly, most scholars assume that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship-based Privileges or Immunities Clause provided after-the-fact authority for the 1866 Civil Rights Act. A close look at the original sources, however, reveals that key players in the Thirty-Ninth Congress viewed the Civil Rights Act as protecting rights associated with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The man who drafted Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, expressly viewed the Civil Rights Act as protecting the natural and equal right to due process in matters relating to life, liberty and property. Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act, however, because he believed an amendment must first be adopted granting Congress power to enforce the equal rights of due process. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress (now with Bingham’s support) repassed the Civil Rights Act and extended the majority of its protections to “all persons” — an extension authorized by the “all persons” Due Process Clause but not by the “citizens only” Privileges or Immunities Clause. Understanding the original link between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1868 Due Process Clause requires rethinking a number of commonly accepted assumptions about the original Fourteenth Amendment. Much of the current Supreme Court’s “equal laws” doctrine may be supported by the original meaning of the Due Process Clause, while the Equal Protection Clause itself may communicate an altogether different principle of “equal protection.” Disentangling the Privileges or Immunities Clause from the Civil Rights Act also supports reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting the nationally enumerated rights of citizenship and not the unenumerated subjects of state-level civil rights now covered by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
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CiteScore
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自引率
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期刊介绍: The Georgetown Law Journal is headquartered at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. and has since its inception published more than 500 issues, as well as the widely-used Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (ARCP). The Journal is currently, and always has been, run by law students.
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