监管相似性的经济后果

Joseph Kalmenovitz, Jason Chen
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引用次数: 1

摘要

使用新颖的数据,我们开发了一个相似性评分,比较每两家公司的监管风险,例如,如果他们游说反对类似的规则。监管相似性超越了产业、地理和产品市场的界限,但会对外生监管冲击做出反应。与理性学习理论和有效契约理论一致,监管相似性解释了企业关键成果与企业高管相对绩效评估的共同运动。将两两相似性转化为一个监管网络,我们发现网络中心性增加了复杂性,降低了企业特定信息的数量和质量。综上所述,我们的研究结果突出了共同监管风险的重要经济影响。
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The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Similarity
Using novel data, we develop a similarity score which compares the regulatory exposure of each two companies, for example if they lobby against similar rules. Regulatory similarity transcends industrial, geographic, and product market boundaries, but responds to exogenous regulatory shocks. Consistent with rational learning and efficient contract theories, regulatory similarity explains the co-movement of key corporate outcomes and the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Converting the pairwise similarities into a regulatory network, we find that network centrality increases complexity and reduces the quantity and quality of firm-specific information. Combined, our results highlight important economic implications of shared regulatory exposure.
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