股息税会影响自愿披露吗?国际证据

Mark (Shuai) Ma, Hanlin Zhong
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摘要

本研究探讨股息税如何影响公司自愿披露。使用2001年至2017年32个经合组织国家的公司样本,我们的差异回归发现,较高的股息税率降低了管理层预测的发布和频率。当治理较弱或代理问题可能更严重时,这种减少更为明显。此外,股息税率对管理层预测的影响是不对称的。也就是说,减税会提高经营预测,但增税不会降低经营预测。此外,股息税变动后管理层预测行为的变化显著影响公司的股权成本和股票市场流动性。总体而言,我们的研究结果与代理理论框架的预测一致,即股息税对公司自愿披露行为产生负向影响。
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Does Dividend Taxation Affect Voluntary Disclosure? International Evidence
This study examines how dividend taxation affects corporate voluntary disclosure. Using a sample of firms in 32 OECD countries from 2001 to 2017, our difference-in-differences regressions find that higher dividend tax rates reduce both the issuance and the frequency of management forecasts. The decreases are more pronounced when governance is weaker or agency problems are potentially more severe. Also, the effect of dividend tax rates on management forecasts is asymmetric. That is, tax cuts increase management forecasts, but tax hikes do not decrease management forecasts. In addition, the change in management forecasting behavior following dividend tax changes significantly affects firms’ cost of equity and stock market liquidity. Overall, our findings are consistent with the prediction of the agency theory framework that dividend taxation negatively affects corporate voluntary disclosure behavior.
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