新的小企业破产游戏:小企业重组法案下债权人的策略

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2020-05-18 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3594656
Christopher G. Bradley
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2019年底,国会颁布了《小企业重组法》。该法案的时机很偶然:在2020年2月生效几周后,Covid-19大流行损害了无数小企业,而该法案可能为这些企业提供拯救的机会。该法案为企业提供了强大的选择,可以根据《破产法》第11章新的“第五分章”进行重组。第五章简化了对债权人不同意的计划的确认要求,简单地要求债务人预测其“可支配收入”并向债权人支付三至五年;激励当事人就重整计划达成协议;降低债务人的披露义务;取消定期任命正式的债权人委员会;规定委任受托人协助计划谈判;并允许修改以债务人的主要住所为抵押的贷款。债权人将不得不为第五分章案件制定新的剧本。大多数学者都强调债务人的新选择,但本文从债权人的角度进行分析。当然,债权人并非生来平等;策略只会对债权人有用,因为他们的债权足够大,足以证明投入时间和金钱是合理的。处于有利地位的债权人将以牺牲债务人和较不享有特权的债权人的利益为代价,攫取他们所能获得的一切战略利益。这场游戏是多边的,而不仅仅是债权人对债务人。本文提出了不同地位债权人保护自身利益的策略。该条提出了七个主要策略:1)债权人应寻求影响或控制债务人进入第五分章,方法是与债务人就选举达成协议,利用财务手段绕过第五分章的债务限额,或质疑债务人进入第五分章的资格。2)债权人应根据情况监督和利用受托人,无论是通过培养受托人并与他们密切合作,通过尽量减少他们的作用并节省开支,或者,在极端情况下,反对他们并寻求将他们撤职。3)为了打击债务人拖延的倾向,债权人应通过强调法定对速度的强调,审查债务人所要求的披露,并在可能的情况下争取受托人和法院的支持,向债务人施加压力。(4)债权人应避免持有一般无担保债权,如符合条件,应依照本法第1111(b)条的规定进行选择。(5)第五分章对债权人批准的计划规定了溢价,因此需要其投票确认的债权人应以其投票换取让步。对于那些享有特权的债权人来说,这应该是一个重要的杠杆点。6)债权人应寻求利用一切机会获取信息,包括在案件早期所需的债权人会议和地位会议上,在债务人的披露和文件中,以及通过正式的发现。7)债权人提供以住宅为担保的信贷,应设计贷款做法,以确保破产债务人不会对其进行“修改”。上述许多策略将引起有担保债权人和其他特权债权人的浓厚兴趣。文章预测,有了这些和其他策略在手,这些债权人不会在第五分章中失去太多的基础,但法律降低了对一般无担保债权人的保护,特别是那些仍然被动的债权人。本文中提出的一些战略工具也可以帮助不受欢迎的一般无担保债权人,但通常情况下,他们的风险太小,不值得把精力投入到新的小企业破产游戏中。
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The New Small Business Bankruptcy Game: Strategies for Creditors Under the Small Business Reorganization Act
In late 2019, Congress enacted the Small Business Reorganizations Act. The Act’s timing is fortuitous: Weeks after it went into force in February, 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic damaged countless small businesses—enterprises that the Act may provide an opportunity to save. The Act provides businesses with powerful options to reorganize under a new “subchapter V” of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Subchapter V eases the requirements for confirmation of plans that creditors don’t approve by simply requiring debtors to project their “disposable income” and pay it to creditors for three to five years; provides incentives for the parties to reach agreement on reorganization plans; lowers the debtor’s disclosure obligations; eliminates the regular appointment of an official committee of creditors; requires the appointment of a trustee to aid in plan negotiations; and permits modification of loans secured by a mortgage on a debtor’s primary residence. Creditors will have to develop a new playbook for subchapter V cases. Most scholarship has emphasized debtors’ new options, but this Article presents an analysis from the perspective of creditors. Of course, creditors are not created equal; strategies will only be useful to creditors with claims substantial enough to justify the investment of time and money. Well-positioned creditors will extract whatever strategic gains they can at the expense of the debtor and of less privileged creditors. The game is multilateral, not simply creditor vs. debtor. The Article suggests strategies for variously positioned creditors to protect their interests. The Article suggests seven major strategies: 1) Creditors should seek influence or control a debtor’s entry into subchapter V by making agreements with debtors concerning the election, using financial maneuvers to work around subchapter V’s debt limits, or challenging the debtor’s eligibility for entry. 2) Creditors should monitor and make use of trustees as circumstances warrant, whether by cultivating and working closely with them, by seeking to minimize their role and save expenses, or, at the extreme, by opposing them and seeking their removal. 3) To combat debtors’ tendency to delay, creditors should apply pressure on the debtor by emphasizing the statutory emphasis on speed, scrutinizing the debtor’s required disclosures, and enlisting the trustee and court where possible. 4) Creditors should avoid holding general unsecured claims, and, if eligible, should take the election offered by §1111(b) of the Code. 5) Subchapter V places a premium on plans being approved by creditors, so those whose votes are needed for confirmation should extract concessions in exchange for their vote. For those privileged creditors, this should be a major point of leverage. 6) Creditors should look to obtain information at every opportunity, including at the required meeting of creditors and status conference early in the case, in the disclosures and filings made by the debtor, and through formal discovery. 7) Creditors extending credit secured by a residence should designing lending practices to ensure that they cannot be “modified” by debtors in bankruptcy. Many of the strategies above will be of keen interest to secured and other privileged classes of creditors. The Article predicts that with these and other strategies in hand, such creditors will not lose much ground under subchapter V. But the law lowers protections for general unsecured creditors, particularly those who remain passive. A number of the strategic tools presented in this Article can aid disfavored general unsecured creditors as well—but frequently, they will have too little at stake to make it worth putting their energy into the new small business bankruptcy game.
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