有四个因素在起作用,流行病联合机构将启动从乌克兰的非法双重用途技术转让

I. Kartuzov
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摘要

这项工作的一个目标是快速回顾评估乌克兰在获得独立后出现的技术转让的基本障碍和今天发展的障碍,并强调和评估影响科学的政治、历史、精神和其他因素的影响,以及技术向国外泄漏的后果。另外一个重要的问题是,如果当前的COVID-19大流行引发像1990年代那样从乌克兰非法转让双重用途技术,是否会加入这些因素,以及它如何影响技术转让过程的有效和适当运作和优化,这是当今的一个相当大的挑战。调查的问题。技术转让的过程,特别是整个贫铀转让的过程既不简单也不系统,远非那么完美,特别是当它涉及双重用途技术时,目前只沦为供应方/接受方之间的短暂关系。经验和实践表明,这是一个相当复杂的、多层次的、多方参与的过程,它受几个因素和条件的影响,最终决定了它的成功和/或失败。主要科学成果。双重用途技术的发展继续陷入利益冲突和技术转让、出口管制理由的泥潭。一个国家发展武器系统或相关应用的决定不仅可以作为对其安全威胁程度的函数来评估,还可以作为对潜在技术创新作出反应和/或向前迈进的需要,这包括历史、心理和政治军事方面的考虑;第二,各国在理解为防御或进攻目的而拥有不同先进武器系统的权利方面存在根本的概念差异。这一努力的结果为在政治科学、出口管制条例和影响敏感技术转让的因素方面的进一步辩论奠定了坚实的基础。
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Four Factors are in Force Pandemic Joints to Initiate an Illicit Dual Use Technologies Transfer from Ukraine
An objective of this effort is a quick recap to assess the underpin barriers of transfer of technologies appeared in Ukraine after acquiring the Independence and those developed of today and to highlight and evaluate an impact of political, historical, mental and other factors affecting the science and as a consequence leakage of technologies abroad. Of importance is also a question if a current COVID-19 pandemic will join these factors if it initiates an illicit transfer of dual use (DU) technologies from Ukraine as it was in 1990s and how it affects an efficient and proper functioning and optimization of transfer of technologies process, and that is quite a challenge nowadays. Investigated problem. The process of technology transfer and specifically that one of DU as a whole is neither simple nor systematic and far from being that perfect, especially when it deals with dual-use technologies and at present reduced to a short relationship between supplier/recipient only. The experience and practice show that it is a rather complicated, multi-leveled and multi-players process which is impacted and follows several factors and conditions that determine its success and/or failure at the end. The main scientific results. The development of dual use technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests and technology transfer export control rationales. There are historical, mental and political-military considerations where a state’s decision to develop weapon systems or related applications can be assessed not only as a function of perceived levels of threat to its security, but also as a need to respond and/or step forward to potential technological innovations; and second, the fundamental conceptual differences in appreciation among countries of the right to possess different advanced weapons systems for defensive or offensive purposes. The result of this endeavor makes a solid ground floor for further debates in terms of political science, export control regulations and factors affecting transfer of sensitive technologies.
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