{"title":"Al-Ghazālī神名的德性伦理理论:al-Maqṣad al-Asnā中塔哈鲁克教义的神学基础","authors":"Yousef Casewit","doi":"10.1163/24685542-12340042","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nAbū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Maʿānī Asmāʾ Allāh al-Ḥusnā (“The Highest Aim in Explaining the Meanings of God’s Most Beautiful Names”) is more than just a commentary on the ninety-nine names of God. In setting out to expound on a virtue ethical theory of the divine names, the Maqṣad in effect amounts to a sustained theological meditation upon one of the most fundamental paradoxes of monotheism: how to locate and affirm both divine incomparability (tanzīh) and comparability (tashbīh). In order to avoid any semblance of theological immanentism, or “the affirmation of God’s comparability” (tashbīh), al-Ghazālī begins by positing that an unbridgeable chasm, or irreducible “disparity” (tafāwut), separates the Lord from the servant. This chasm accounts for a disconnect not only between God’s unqualified Essence and the human being, but also between the transcendent meanings (maʿānī) that reside in the Essence and our limited apprehension of those transcendent meanings in the mind. At the same time, he insists that this chasm does not annul the ethical relevance and ontological reality of the attributes (taʿṭīl). Rather, the latter are somehow comparable (tashbīh) and do serve as prototype for human ethical conduct. In addressing this apparent paradox, al-Ghazālī’s Maqṣad exudes a palpable theological anxiety. This article explores the ways in which he addresses this theological conundrum by grounding his treatise in Ashʿarī theology and Sufi ethics. It closely analyses his cautious use of diction, hyper-systematised exegetical methodology, and staunch commitment to a set of hermeneutical principles which serve to undergird his virtue ethical theory of the divine names. Later generations of commentators picked up on al-Ghazālī’s theological anxiety, and critiqued the work for excessive immanentism (tashbīh), excessive transcendentalism (tanzīh), or excessive hermeneutical systematisation (takalluf).","PeriodicalId":33481,"journal":{"name":"IJIBE International Journal of Islamic Business Ethics","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Al-Ghazālī’s Virtue Ethical Theory of the Divine Names: The Theological Underpinnings of the Doctrine of Takhalluq in al-Maqṣad al-Asnā\",\"authors\":\"Yousef Casewit\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/24685542-12340042\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nAbū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Maʿānī Asmāʾ Allāh al-Ḥusnā (“The Highest Aim in Explaining the Meanings of God’s Most Beautiful Names”) is more than just a commentary on the ninety-nine names of God. In setting out to expound on a virtue ethical theory of the divine names, the Maqṣad in effect amounts to a sustained theological meditation upon one of the most fundamental paradoxes of monotheism: how to locate and affirm both divine incomparability (tanzīh) and comparability (tashbīh). In order to avoid any semblance of theological immanentism, or “the affirmation of God’s comparability” (tashbīh), al-Ghazālī begins by positing that an unbridgeable chasm, or irreducible “disparity” (tafāwut), separates the Lord from the servant. This chasm accounts for a disconnect not only between God’s unqualified Essence and the human being, but also between the transcendent meanings (maʿānī) that reside in the Essence and our limited apprehension of those transcendent meanings in the mind. At the same time, he insists that this chasm does not annul the ethical relevance and ontological reality of the attributes (taʿṭīl). Rather, the latter are somehow comparable (tashbīh) and do serve as prototype for human ethical conduct. In addressing this apparent paradox, al-Ghazālī’s Maqṣad exudes a palpable theological anxiety. This article explores the ways in which he addresses this theological conundrum by grounding his treatise in Ashʿarī theology and Sufi ethics. It closely analyses his cautious use of diction, hyper-systematised exegetical methodology, and staunch commitment to a set of hermeneutical principles which serve to undergird his virtue ethical theory of the divine names. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
abir Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī ' s (d. 505/1111) al-Maqṣad al- asnā f ' s sharghama ' s ānī Asmā al-Ḥusnā(“解释上帝最美丽的名字的意义的最高目标”)不仅仅是对上帝的九十九个名字的评论。在开始阐述神圣名字的美德伦理理论时,Maqṣad实际上相当于对一神教最基本的悖论之一的持续神学冥想:如何定位和肯定神圣的不可比比性(tanz h)和可比性(tashb h)。为了避免任何神学内在主义的假象,或“对上帝的可比性的肯定”(tashb . h), al-Ghazālī首先假定一个不可逾越的鸿沟,或不可缩小的“差距”(tafāwut),将主与仆人分开。这种鸿沟不仅说明了上帝的无条件的本质与人之间的脱节,而且说明了存在于本质中的先验意义(ma ā ānī)与我们在头脑中对这些先验意义的有限理解之间的脱节。同时,他坚持认为这种鸿沟并没有取消属性的伦理相关性和本体论现实性(ta ā ṭīl)。相反,后者在某种程度上具有可比性(tashb ? h),并且确实充当了人类道德行为的原型。在解决这个明显的悖论时,al-Ghazālī的Maqṣad流露出一种明显的神学焦虑。这篇文章探讨了他如何解决这个神学难题,将他的论文根植于阿什·阿尔神学和苏菲伦理学。它密切分析了他对措辞的谨慎使用,超系统化的训诂方法,以及对一套解释学原则的坚定承诺,这些原则有助于巩固他关于神名的美德伦理理论。后世的评论家注意到al-Ghazālī的神学焦虑,并批评作品过度的内在主义(tashb ā h),过度的超验主义(tanc ā h)或过度的解释学系统化(takalluf)。
Al-Ghazālī’s Virtue Ethical Theory of the Divine Names: The Theological Underpinnings of the Doctrine of Takhalluq in al-Maqṣad al-Asnā
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Maqṣad al-Asnā fī Sharḥ Maʿānī Asmāʾ Allāh al-Ḥusnā (“The Highest Aim in Explaining the Meanings of God’s Most Beautiful Names”) is more than just a commentary on the ninety-nine names of God. In setting out to expound on a virtue ethical theory of the divine names, the Maqṣad in effect amounts to a sustained theological meditation upon one of the most fundamental paradoxes of monotheism: how to locate and affirm both divine incomparability (tanzīh) and comparability (tashbīh). In order to avoid any semblance of theological immanentism, or “the affirmation of God’s comparability” (tashbīh), al-Ghazālī begins by positing that an unbridgeable chasm, or irreducible “disparity” (tafāwut), separates the Lord from the servant. This chasm accounts for a disconnect not only between God’s unqualified Essence and the human being, but also between the transcendent meanings (maʿānī) that reside in the Essence and our limited apprehension of those transcendent meanings in the mind. At the same time, he insists that this chasm does not annul the ethical relevance and ontological reality of the attributes (taʿṭīl). Rather, the latter are somehow comparable (tashbīh) and do serve as prototype for human ethical conduct. In addressing this apparent paradox, al-Ghazālī’s Maqṣad exudes a palpable theological anxiety. This article explores the ways in which he addresses this theological conundrum by grounding his treatise in Ashʿarī theology and Sufi ethics. It closely analyses his cautious use of diction, hyper-systematised exegetical methodology, and staunch commitment to a set of hermeneutical principles which serve to undergird his virtue ethical theory of the divine names. Later generations of commentators picked up on al-Ghazālī’s theological anxiety, and critiqued the work for excessive immanentism (tashbīh), excessive transcendentalism (tanzīh), or excessive hermeneutical systematisation (takalluf).