保险法的倒霉多管闲事者:一个反对保险利益要求的案例

IF 5.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Law Journal Pub Date : 2007-12-01 DOI:10.2307/20455799
Jacob Loshin
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引用次数: 8

摘要

这是我的行为。几个世纪以来,法律一直禁止人们为陌生人的生命或财产购买保险,因为这样的保险合同会激励投保人结束生命或摧毁财产,以获得保险赔付。因此,法律要求投保人对他们投保的人或财产具有“可保利益”,缺乏这种“可保利益”的合同被法院视为违反公共政策而宣告无效。本文对可保利益要求进行了经济分析,并认为该原则创造了不正当的激励机制,鼓励了该原则试图阻止的行为。除了在自身条件上失败之外,这一理论还会导致保险市场的不公平和低效率。本说明的结论是,法院防止订立关于陌生人生命或财产的保险合同的最佳办法,可能是首先避免使这种合同无效。
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Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case against the Insurable Interest Requirement
A B ST R ACT. For centuries, the law has prevented people from purchasing insurance on the life or property of strangers because such insurance contracts would give policyholders incentives to end the life or destroy the property in order to collect the insurance payout. The law thus requires that policyholders have an "insurable interest" in the person or property they insure, and contracts lacking such an "insurable interest" are invalidated by courts as against public policy. This Note presents an economic analysis of the insurable interest requirement, and argues that the doctrine creates perverse incentives that encourage the very practices the doctrine seeks to deter. In addition to failing on its own terms, the doctrine also invites unfairness and inefficiency in the insurance market. This Note concludes that the best way for courts to prevent insurance contracts on the life or property of strangers may be to refrain from invalidating such contracts in the first place.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
6.20%
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0
期刊介绍: The Yale Law Journal Online is the online companion to The Yale Law Journal. It replaces The Pocket Part, which was the first such companion to be published by a leading law review. YLJ Online will continue The Pocket Part"s mission of augmenting the scholarship printed in The Yale Law Journal by providing original Essays, legal commentaries, responses to articles printed in the Journal, podcast and iTunes University recordings of various pieces, and other works by both established and emerging academics and practitioners.
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