拆解债券持有人权利

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-10-21 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3473212
Yesha Yadav
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引用次数: 1

摘要

债务回购每年的交易总额超过1000亿美元,允许公司从投资者手中回购债券,在此过程中改写交易条件并剥夺债权人的控制权。本文表明,在债券回购的背景下,监管对债券持有人的系统性保护不足。它有三点。首先,债券持有人面临信息不对称,这使得发行人能够以低廉的价格回购债权人的债权。监管机构对发行人披露交易信息的要求几乎可以忽略不计。由于缺乏信托保护,债券持有人的利益很容易被发行人为了促进股东和管理者的利益而消灭。其次,回购削弱了债权人的控制权。除了信息不对称,债券持有人还面临协调成本和评估回购条款和债券持有人控制权变化的紧迫期限。由于这些成本,发行者可以系统性地压低控制权的价格。如果鼓动的收益低于信息收集、协调和行动的成本,债券持有人不会采取行动。通过策略性地将回购定价压低至接近这些交易成本的水平,发行者就可以将支付的回购价格与本应支付给债券持有人的交易价格之间的差额收入囊中。第三,债务回购可以让一部分债权人(尤其是银行)从债券持有人那里榨取价值。通过促使发行人以低廉的价格回购债券,银行(通常通过贷款与更多的个人接触)可以增加其偿还的机会。他们还可以通过压制债券持有人的声音,在发行人的内部治理中获得更大的发言权。最后,本文提出了两项建议,以加强对债券持有人的保护,主张加强披露和合同修复,以保障索赔的价值。这些建议有助于维护投资者的福利,并保护他们对债务资本配置的长期信心。
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Dismantling Bondholder Rights
Totaling in excess of $100 billion dollars in transactions annually, debt buybacks allow a company to repurchase bonds from investors, rewriting bargains and stripping away creditor control rights in the process. This Article shows that regulation systematically under-protects bondholders in the context of debt buybacks. It makes three points. First, bondholders confront information asymmetries that enable issuers to buy back creditor claims cheaply. Regulation imposes near negligible requirements on issuers to disclose information about the transaction. Lacking fiduciary protection, bondholder interests are vulnerable to being extinguished by issuers in the interests of promoting those of shareholders and managers. Second, buybacks diminish the power of creditor control rights. Alongside information asymmetries, bondholders confront coordination costs and tight deadlines within which to evaluate the terms of a buyback and changes to bondholder control rights. Owing to these costs, issuers can systematically underprice control rights. Bondholders will not act where the gains of agitation will be less than the cost of information gathering, coordination, and action. By strategically underpricing a buyback by an amount approximating these transaction costs, an issuer can pocket the difference between the price paid for the claim and that which should have been paid to bondholders for their bargain. Third, debt buybacks can allow one set of creditors (notably, banks) to extract value from bondholders. By pushing an issuer to buy back bond claims cheaply, banks (usually with greater individual exposure through loans) can increase their chances of being repaid. They can also acquire a more powerful voice in the issuer’s internal governance by muting that of bondholders. In concluding, this Article offers two proposals to bolster bondholder protection, advocating for greater disclosure and contractual fixes to safeguard the value of claims. These proposals help to preserve the welfare of investors and protect their longer-term confidence in debt capital allocation.
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