掠夺性贷款的巨大影响

Kathleen C. Engel, P. McCoy
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引用次数: 25

摘要

传统上,政策制定者、社区和行业都认为《社区再投资法》(“CRA”)是一项积极的授权,要求银行和储蓄机构通过增加对中低收入社区的投资来做好事。当国会颁布CRA时,很难想象LMI社区最终会以滥用抵押贷款的形式获得过多的信贷。然而,到了20世纪90年代末,掠夺性抵押贷款——向易受骗的借款人提供高成本的剥削性贷款——在城市内部肆虐。我们要解决的问题是:鉴于掠夺性贷款的激增,CRA应该如何应对?CRA和联邦政府对受监管银行的补贴可能会对银行从事掠夺性贷款产生不良激励。出于这个原因,监管机构应该以遏制掠夺性贷款为目标来管理CRA。特别是,联邦银行监管机构应该使用CRA来制裁可能进一步掠夺性贷款的行为。对于未能满足特定贷款资格标准的银行和储蓄机构,监管机构应拒绝给予满意和未完成的CRA评级,这些标准旨在抵消发起或经纪次级抵押贷款时掠夺性贷款的影响。同样,如果银行或储蓄机构为次级放贷者提供融资——无论是通过信用证或流动资金贷款,还是通过购买次级抵押贷款或次级证券化的权益——而没有建立足够的尽职调查和监控措施来防止掠夺性贷款,那么CRA评级应该下降。相反,CRA应该用来奖励那些旨在减少掠夺性贷款的银行和储蓄机构的有益行为。例如,增加担保存款机构合法次级贷款的CRA信贷,可以为次级贷款市场注入急需的健康竞争。CRA信贷还应用于奖励银行和储蓄机构用合法贷款为掠夺性贷款再融资。为掠夺性贷款人的目标群体提供合法信贷而设计的特殊营销计划同样应该获得CRA信贷,为LMI借款人提供创新的承销指南也应该获得CRA信贷。最后,我们建议不要将CRA审查和评级扩展到非银行次级贷款机构,无论它们是否隶属于有保险的存款机构。
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THE CRA IMPLICATIONS OF PREDATORY LENDING
Traditionally, policymakers, communities, and industry have regarded the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") as a positive mandate for banks and thrifts to do good by increasing investment in low- and moderate-income ("LMI") neighborhoods. When Congress enacted CRA, it was inconceivable that LMI neighborhoods might eventually receive too much credit in the form of abusive mortgages. However, by the late 1990s, predatory mortgages- exploitative high-cost loans to gullible borrowers-were ravaging the inner cities.We address the question: given the surge in predatory lending, how should CRA respond? CRA and federal subsidies to regulated lenders can create perverse incentives for lenders to engage in predatory lending. For this reason, regulators should administer CRA with the goal of curbing predatory lending. In particular, federal bank regulators should use CRA to sanction behavior that could further predatory lending. Regulators should deny both satisfactory and outstanding CRA ratings to banks and thrifts that fail to satisfy specific loan eligibility criteria designed to counteract predatory lending when originating or brokering subprime mortgages. Similarly, CRA ratings should drop where banks or thrifts finance subprime lenders-either through letters of credit or working capital loans, or purchases of subprime mortgages or interests in subprime securitizations- without instituting adequate due diligence and monitoring safeguards against predatory lending.Conversely, CRA should be used to reward beneficial conduct by banks and thrifts that is designed to reduce predatory lending. For example, increased CRA credit for legitimate subprime lending by insured depository institutions could inject badly needed healthy competition into the subprime market. CRA credit should also be used to reward banks and thrifts for refinancing predatory loans with legitimate loans. Special marketing programs designed to offer legitimate credit to groups targeted by predatory lenders likewise deserve CRA credit, as do innovative underwriting guidelines for LMI borrowers. Finally, we advise against extending CRA examinations and ratings to non-bank subprime lenders, whether they are affiliated with insured depository institutions.
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