美联储在2020年的公司债券市场

Robert N. McCauley
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引用次数: 3

摘要

美联储(fed)在2020年春季对私人证券市场的干预,将其2008年的策略从购买高质量短期票据扩展到了购买债券,并转而购买垃圾债券。2020年3月,美联储再次向一级交易商提供最后的贷款,接受私人证券作为抵押品,并在最后关头承销和购买商业票据。鉴于非金融企业对公司债券的依赖,当美联储将最后手段的承销和购买扩大到公司债券时,一些人并不感到意外。然而,今年4月,美联储宣布将购买垃圾债券交易所交易基金(etf),这与以往的做法不同:它没有为信贷扩张设定最低质量标准。美联储宣布的对公司债券市场的干预甚至在购买开始之前就取得了成功。它提高了公司债券的价格,缩小了交易价差和基金估值价差,扭转了投资者的挤兑,并鼓励创纪录的公司债券发行。消息公布后,ETF价格大幅上涨,将市场“公告牌”从卖出转为买入,随后在广泛的美元信贷市场上,基础债券价格、价差和资金流均有所改善。本文提出了两个政策问题。首先,美联储是否可以减少购买垃圾债券与此前减少受监管银行参与杠杆贷款的努力之间的冲突?美联储本可以只购买垃圾债券基金,这些基金所持有的低质量债券比重较小,这些债券是由私人股本交易杠杆化的公司发行的。第二,国会是否应该授权美联储在公司债券领域进行公开市场操作?这种授权可以避免使用紧急贷款权力购买公司债券的法律尴尬,并可能使美联储在这个重要市场上发展业务能力。当央行购买私人证券时,任何市场(包括新兴市场)都会出现类似的角色冲突和法律权力问题。
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The Fed in the Corporate Bond Market in 2020
The Federal Reserve interventions in private securities markets in the spring of 2020 extended its 2008 playbook from buying high quality short-term paper to bonds, and departed from it by buying junk bonds. In March 2020, the Fed reprised its last-resort lending to primary dealers, accepting private securities as collateral, and its last-resort underwriting and buying of commercial paper. Given the reliance of non-financial firms on corporate bonds, some were not surprised when the Fed then extended last-resort underwriting and buying to corporate bonds. In April, however, the Fed departed from its playbook with its announcement that it would buy junk bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs): it set no minimum quality criterion for its credit extension.

The Fed’s announced intervention in corporate bond markets succeeded before the buying even started. It raised prices of corporate bonds, narrowed both trading and fund valuation spreads, reversed investor runs and encouraged record-setting corporate bond issuance. ETF prices jumped on announcement, flipping a flashing market “billboard” from sell to buy, and underlying bond prices, spreads and flows subsequently improved across a broad range of dollar credit markets.

This paper raises two policy questions. First, could the Fed have reduced the conflict between buying junk bonds and its previous efforts to reduce supervised banks’ involvement in leveraged loans? The Fed could have bought only junk bond funds holding a smaller weight of the lowest quality bonds issued by firms that private equity deals had leveraged up. Second, should the Congress authorize the Fed to do open market operations in corporate bonds? Such authority could avoid the legal awkwardness of using emergency lending powers to buy corporate bonds and could allow the Fed to develop operational capacity in this important market. Similar issues of role conflict and legal powers arise in any market, including emerging markets, when the central bank buys private securities.
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