Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102497
Mathias Hoffmann, M. Kliem, M. Krause, Stéphane Moyen, Radek Šauer
{"title":"Rebalancing the Euro Area: Is Wage Adjustment in Germany the Answer?","authors":"Mathias Hoffmann, M. Kliem, M. Krause, Stéphane Moyen, Radek Šauer","doi":"10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102497","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78284186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Boissay, E. Kohlscheen, R. Moessner, Daniel M. Rees
The pandemic had a significant effect on labour markets. Working hours fell sharply almost everywhere, but the drivers of these declines varied greatly across countries, depending on whether policies to protect worker-firm relationships were in place. Labour markets have bounced back faster than after recent recessions, albeit unevenly. Even in countries where unemployment rates remain high, job vacancies have risen, including in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic. Frictions are most pronounced where policy responses did not protect worker-firm relationships. Wages are generally rising more slowly than before the pandemic. However, there is significant dispersion across sectors. Wages are rising fastest in sectors such as information & communications where the pandemic boosted demand, and also in high-contact sectors such as recreation where labour supply has receded. A generalised pickup in wage growth still seems unlikely, even though some countries and sectors have seen increases. However, a retreat in globalisation could make inflation more responsive to labour market pressures.
{"title":"Labour Markets and Inflation in the Wake of the Pandemic","authors":"F. Boissay, E. Kohlscheen, R. Moessner, Daniel M. Rees","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3951233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3951233","url":null,"abstract":"The pandemic had a significant effect on labour markets. Working hours fell sharply almost everywhere, but the drivers of these declines varied greatly across countries, depending on whether policies to protect worker-firm relationships were in place. Labour markets have bounced back faster than after recent recessions, albeit unevenly. Even in countries where unemployment rates remain high, job vacancies have risen, including in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic. Frictions are most pronounced where policy responses did not protect worker-firm relationships. Wages are generally rising more slowly than before the pandemic. However, there is significant dispersion across sectors. Wages are rising fastest in sectors such as information & communications where the pandemic boosted demand, and also in high-contact sectors such as recreation where labour supply has receded. A generalised pickup in wage growth still seems unlikely, even though some countries and sectors have seen increases. However, a retreat in globalisation could make inflation more responsive to labour market pressures.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87008933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effects of U.S. monetary policy on international mutual fund investment. We apply a novel variant of the shock identification procedure in Bu et al. (2021) to decompose observed U.S. monetary policy surprises into pure monetary policy shock and information shock components. We find that an increase in interest rates driven by a pure monetary policy shock leads to persistent outflows from EMs and to a lesser extent global and U.S. mutual funds. On the other hand, when rates increase following a positive information shock investors reallocate capital out of U.S. bonds and into (riskier) equity funds, both U.S. and abroad. We attribute these differences to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Pure monetary policy shocks tighten financial conditions, while information shocks lower the VIX. Finally, we explore regional heterogeneity in responses. Global EMs and Asia-focused funds suffer sharp outflows after tightening U.S. monetary policy shocks. Information shocks instead lead to large inflows to China-focused funds, reflecting the large economic ties between China and the U.S.
{"title":"The Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on International Mutual Fund Investment","authors":"G. Ciminelli, Jack Rogers, Wenbin Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3947260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947260","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of U.S. monetary policy on international mutual fund investment. We apply a novel variant of the shock identification procedure in Bu et al. (2021) to decompose observed U.S. monetary policy surprises into pure monetary policy shock and information shock components. We find that an increase in interest rates driven by a pure monetary policy shock leads to persistent outflows from EMs and to a lesser extent global and U.S. mutual funds. On the other hand, when rates increase following a positive information shock investors reallocate capital out of U.S. bonds and into (riskier) equity funds, both U.S. and abroad. We attribute these differences to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Pure monetary policy shocks tighten financial conditions, while information shocks lower the VIX. Finally, we explore regional heterogeneity in responses. Global EMs and Asia-focused funds suffer sharp outflows after tightening U.S. monetary policy shocks. Information shocks instead lead to large inflows to China-focused funds, reflecting the large economic ties between China and the U.S.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88223363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does the access to safe assets affect the fragility and lending behavior of financial intermediaries? We develop a global-game model of investor redemptions from money market funds that hold safe assets and fund risky corporate borrowers. Using the 2013 U.S. debt limit episode and the Federal Reserve's Overnight Reverse Repurchase (ONRRP) facility as our empirical laboratory, we provide evidence consistent with the model's implications. In particular, access to a safe asset---the ONRRP---attenuates investor redemption incentives and allows money market mutual funds to maintain their lending to corporate borrowers. Overall, our results suggest that the public provision of a safe asset reduces intermediary fragility and increases lending to the real economy.
{"title":"Safe Assets and Financial Fragility: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Toni Ahnert, M. Macchiavelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3460800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3460800","url":null,"abstract":"How does the access to safe assets affect the fragility and lending behavior of financial intermediaries? We develop a global-game model of investor redemptions from money market funds that hold safe assets and fund risky corporate borrowers. Using the 2013 U.S. debt limit episode and the Federal Reserve's Overnight Reverse Repurchase (ONRRP) facility as our empirical laboratory, we provide evidence consistent with the model's implications. In particular, access to a safe asset---the ONRRP---attenuates investor redemption incentives and allows money market mutual funds to maintain their lending to corporate borrowers. Overall, our results suggest that the public provision of a safe asset reduces intermediary fragility and increases lending to the real economy.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"176 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75522010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a televised address to the Nation on Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon announced the “temporary” suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. While the dollar had struggled throughout most of the 1960s within the parity established at Bretton Woods, Nixon’s announcement of the closing of the gold window greatly signified the end of the Bretton Woods system. We argue that the federal policies to supply money under the gold exchange standard prevalent before closing the gold window and the fiat currency regime that replaced the gold exchange standard after closing the gold window are substantially different. In this paper, we provide evidence of structural breaks in the M1 and M2 measures of money supply time series data due to the policy switch from the gold exchange standard to the fiat currency system.
{"title":"Explorations in Economic History: A Test of Structural Break in the US Money Supply Data","authors":"A. Amiraslany, H. Luitel, Gerry J. Mahar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3937705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3937705","url":null,"abstract":"In a televised address to the Nation on Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon announced the “temporary” suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. While the dollar had struggled throughout most of the 1960s within the parity established at Bretton Woods, Nixon’s announcement of the closing of the gold window greatly signified the end of the Bretton Woods system. We argue that the federal policies to supply money under the gold exchange standard prevalent before closing the gold window and the fiat currency regime that replaced the gold exchange standard after closing the gold window are substantially different. In this paper, we provide evidence of structural breaks in the M1 and M2 measures of money supply time series data due to the policy switch from the gold exchange standard to the fiat currency system.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75775750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F. Álvarez, Andreas Ferrara, E. Gautier, Hervé le Bihan, F. Lippi
In a broad class of sticky price models the non-neutrality of nominal shocks is encoded by a simple sufficient statistic: the ratio of the kurtosis of the size-distribution of price changes over the frequency of price changes. We test this theoretical prediction using data for a large number of firms representative of the French economy. We use the micro data to measure the cross sectional moments, including kurtosis and frequency, for about 120 PPI industries and 220 CPI categories. We use a Factor Augmented VAR to measure the sectoral responses to a monetary shock, as summarized by the cumulative impulse response of sectoral prices (CIRP), under three alternative identification schemes. The estimated CIRP correlates with the kurtosis and the frequency consistently with the prediction of the theory - i.e. they enter the relationship as a ratio. The analysis also shows that other moments not suggested by the theory, such as the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the size-distribution of price changes, are not correlated with the CIRP. Several robustness checks are explored.
{"title":"Empirical Investigation of a Sufficient Statistic for Monetary Shocks","authors":"F. Álvarez, Andreas Ferrara, E. Gautier, Hervé le Bihan, F. Lippi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3947115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3947115","url":null,"abstract":"In a broad class of sticky price models the non-neutrality of nominal shocks is encoded by a simple sufficient statistic: the ratio of the kurtosis of the size-distribution of price changes over the frequency of price changes. We test this theoretical prediction using data for a large number of firms representative of the French economy. We use the micro data to measure the cross sectional moments, including kurtosis and frequency, for about 120 PPI industries and 220 CPI categories. We use a Factor Augmented VAR to measure the sectoral responses to a monetary shock, as summarized by the cumulative impulse response of sectoral prices (CIRP), under three alternative identification schemes. The estimated CIRP correlates with the kurtosis and the frequency consistently with the prediction of the theory - i.e. they enter the relationship as a ratio. The analysis also shows that other moments not suggested by the theory, such as the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the size-distribution of price changes, are not correlated with the CIRP. Several robustness checks are explored.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85587437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a new index for the global mobile money industry – the Mobile Money Prevalence Index (MMPI). It is the first time a global index has been created with the purpose of measuring the prevalence of mobile money at country level. The MMPI considers a set of mobile money metrics in order to facilitate comparisons between markets, thereby enabling third parties to gauge whether engagement would lead to expected impact. The purpose of the index is to support decision making for public and private stakeholders alike.
{"title":"The Mobile Money Prevalence Index (MMPI): A Country-Level Indicator for Assessing the Adoption, Activity and Accessibility of Mobile Money","authors":"Simon K. Andersson-Manjang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3935919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3935919","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a new index for the global mobile money industry – the Mobile Money Prevalence Index (MMPI). It is the first time a global index has been created with the purpose of measuring the prevalence of mobile money at country level. The MMPI considers a set of mobile money metrics in order to facilitate comparisons between markets, thereby enabling third parties to gauge whether engagement would lead to expected impact. The purpose of the index is to support decision making for public and private stakeholders alike.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79467708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the implications of introducing an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) through commercial banks that differ in size. Banks of heterogeneous sizes offer different convenience properties to depositors, which the CBDC adopts. The large bank gives depositors a higher convenience value and hence possesses market power. The interest rate on CBDC puts a lower bound on banks’ deposit interest rates, which is particularly binding on the large bank. While a higher CBDC interest rate enhances monetary policy pass-through by raising deposit interest rates, it reduces the small bank's deposit market share and its lending volume. By contrast, a CBDC that delivers its own convenience value to users levels the playing field by shifting deposits and lending from the large bank to the small one, although it can enhance or reduce the transmission of monetary policy.
{"title":"On Interest-Bearing Central Bank Digital Currency with Heterogeneous Banks","authors":"Rodney J. Garratt, Haoxiang Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3802977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802977","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the implications of introducing an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) through commercial banks that differ in size. Banks of heterogeneous sizes offer different convenience properties to depositors, which the CBDC adopts. The large bank gives depositors a higher convenience value and hence possesses market power. The interest rate on CBDC puts a lower bound on banks’ deposit interest rates, which is particularly binding on the large bank. While a higher CBDC interest rate enhances monetary policy pass-through by raising deposit interest rates, it reduces the small bank's deposit market share and its lending volume. By contrast, a CBDC that delivers its own convenience value to users levels the playing field by shifting deposits and lending from the large bank to the small one, although it can enhance or reduce the transmission of monetary policy.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80723685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I critique the contemporary doctrine of central bank independence and its implicit correlate, the dogma that central banks can and must engage only in what I call credit modulation without engaging in what I call credit allocation. This thought-complex is wrong-headed as to both premise and conclusion. The premise is faulty in that macro-allocation in favor of productive as distinguished from merely speculative credit flows is no more difficult to manage, technically and politically, than is the distinction between modulation and allocation itself. The conclusion is faulty both for its grounding in a false premise and for its overlooking that sound modulation is impossible without sound allocation. This impossibility is in turn rooted in the nature of endogenous Wicksellian credit-money, which through the dynamics of what I call recursive collective action problems inevitably fuels inescapable bubbles and busts. Privately ordered production, I conclude, requires publicly ordered finance.
{"title":"Scissors Require Two Blades: Central Bank Independence with (Principled) Central Bank Allocation","authors":"R. Hockett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918988","url":null,"abstract":"I critique the contemporary doctrine of central bank independence and its implicit correlate, the dogma that central banks can and must engage only in what I call credit modulation without engaging in what I call credit allocation. This thought-complex is wrong-headed as to both premise and conclusion. The premise is faulty in that macro-allocation in favor of productive as distinguished from merely speculative credit flows is no more difficult to manage, technically and politically, than is the distinction between modulation and allocation itself. The conclusion is faulty both for its grounding in a false premise and for its overlooking that sound modulation is impossible without sound allocation. This impossibility is in turn rooted in the nature of endogenous Wicksellian credit-money, which through the dynamics of what I call recursive collective action problems inevitably fuels inescapable bubbles and busts. Privately ordered production, I conclude, requires publicly ordered finance.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73320638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Katrin Assenmacher, G. Glöckler, Sarah Holton, Peter Trautmann, Demosthenes Ioannou, Simon Mee, Klára Bakk-Simon, S. Bergbauer, M. Catenaro, Evangelos Charalampakis, Michael Ehrmann, G. Ferrero, Dimitris Georgarakos, P. Gertler, A. Giovannini, Roel Grandia, N. Hernborg, Niko Herrala, Danielle Kedan, G. Kenny, Tobias Linzert, Marta Manrique, R. Mestre, Emanuel Mönch, S. Nardelli, Nele Nomm, Lora Pavlova, Guido Schultefrankenfeld, M. Silgoner, Ifigeneia Skotida, Bernhard Winkler, M. Bitterlich, Eleni K. Argiri, Conception Alonso, Jennifer Byron, Filippo Arigoni, M. Deroose, Marius Gardt, Klodiana Istrefi, Olga Goldfayn-Frank, Jennie Hellström, Patrick Huertgen, Krista Kalnberzina, Georgi Kocharkov, Víctor Márquez, Corina Ruhe, Martin Šanta, Reet Reedik, Geert Sciot, Aliki Stylianou, Evan Taylor
This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.
{"title":"Clear, Consistent and Engaging: ECB Monetary Policy Communication in a Changing World","authors":"Katrin Assenmacher, G. Glöckler, Sarah Holton, Peter Trautmann, Demosthenes Ioannou, Simon Mee, Klára Bakk-Simon, S. Bergbauer, M. Catenaro, Evangelos Charalampakis, Michael Ehrmann, G. Ferrero, Dimitris Georgarakos, P. Gertler, A. Giovannini, Roel Grandia, N. Hernborg, Niko Herrala, Danielle Kedan, G. Kenny, Tobias Linzert, Marta Manrique, R. Mestre, Emanuel Mönch, S. Nardelli, Nele Nomm, Lora Pavlova, Guido Schultefrankenfeld, M. Silgoner, Ifigeneia Skotida, Bernhard Winkler, M. Bitterlich, Eleni K. Argiri, Conception Alonso, Jennifer Byron, Filippo Arigoni, M. Deroose, Marius Gardt, Klodiana Istrefi, Olga Goldfayn-Frank, Jennie Hellström, Patrick Huertgen, Krista Kalnberzina, Georgi Kocharkov, Víctor Márquez, Corina Ruhe, Martin Šanta, Reet Reedik, Geert Sciot, Aliki Stylianou, Evan Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928296","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the importance of central bank communication in ensuring the effectiveness of monetary policy and in underpinning the credibility, accountability and legitimacy of independent central banks. It documents how communication has become a monetary policy tool in itself; one example of this being forward guidance, given its impact on inflation expectations, economic behaviour and inflation. The paper explains why and how consistent, clear and effective communication to expert and non-expert audiences is essential in an environment of an ever-increasing need by central banks to reach these audiences. Central banks must also meet the demand for more understandable information about policies and tools, while at the same time overcoming the challenge posed by the wider public’s rational inattention. Since the European Central Bank was established, the communications landscape has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. This paper outlines how better communication, including greater engagement with the wider public, could help boost people’s understanding of and trust in the Eurosystem.","PeriodicalId":10548,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Monetary Policy eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80363129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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