拒绝报复主义的实践:自由意志、惩罚和刑事司法

Gregg D. Caruso
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摘要

《拒绝报复主义:自由意志、惩罚和刑事司法》的双重目标是反对报复主义,并发展和捍卫一种可行的非报复主义替代方案,以解决犯罪行为,这种替代方案在道德上是可辩护的,在实践上是可行的。在书的前半部分,我提出了反对报复主义的六个不同的论点,其中最重要的一点是,行为人是否拥有证明其合理性所需的自由意志和道德责任尚不清楚。我还考虑了报复主义的一些替代理论,包括结果主义威慑理论、教育理论和交际理论,并认为它们都有自己的伦理问题。在本书的后半部分,我发展并捍卫了我的新颖的非报复性方法,我称之为公共卫生检疫模型。该模式借鉴了公共卫生框架,并优先考虑预防和社会正义。我认为,它不仅与报复主义形成鲜明对比,而且还提供了一种更人道、更全面、更有效的方法来处理犯罪行为,这种方法优于报复主义和其他主要的非报复主义选择。在此过程中,我还探讨了自由意志与刑法之间的关系;查明和记录犯罪行为的社会决定因素,并认为它们类似于健康的社会决定因素;提出若干具体的政策建议和处方,以实施预防犯罪的公共卫生办法;并为社会正义的能力方法辩护,认为它可以作为我的公共卫生框架的道德基础,也与我的自由意志怀疑论相一致——它坚持认为,我们是谁,我们做什么,最终是我们无法控制的因素的结果(无论是决定论,非决定论,还是运气),正因为如此,我们从不在基本的沙漠意义上承担道德责任。
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Précis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice
The dual aims of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice are to argue against retributivism and to develop and defend a viable non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behaviour that is both ethically defensible and practically workable. In the first half of the book, I develop six distinct arguments for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. I also consider a number of alternatives to retributivism, including consequentialist deterrence theories, educational theories and communicative theories, and argue that they have ethical problems of their own. In the second half of the book, I then develop and defend my novel non-retributive approach, which I call the public health-quarantine model. The model draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that it not only offers a stark contrast to retributivism, it also provides a more humane, holistic and effective approach to dealing with criminal behaviour, one that is superior to both retributivism and other leading non-retributive alternatives. Along the way, I also explore the relationship between free will and criminal law; identify and document the social determinants of criminal behaviour and argue that they are analogous to the social determinants of health; offer a number of specific policy proposals and prescriptions for implementing a public health approach to crime prevention; and defend a capabilities approach to social justice, arguing that it can serve as the moral foundation of my public health framework as well as being consistent with my free will skepticism – which maintains that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control (whether those be determinism, indeterminism, or luck), and because of this we are never morally responsible in the basic desert sense.
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期刊介绍: The Rivista di Filosofia del diritto (Journal of Legal Philosophy) publishes highly qualified scientific contributions on matters related to Philosophy and Theory of Law, Legal Sociology and related fields of research. Its publication is promoted by the Italian Association for Legal Philosophy (Italian Section of the Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie), being its Official journal. It is aimed also at promoting the encounter and exchange between Italian and foreign legal-philosophical traditions. Two issues per year will be published, and articles submitted will be reviewed under the best European standards of evaluation.
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