Haonan Xie, Jian Xiong, Lin Gui, Bing Li, Jiang-an Li
{"title":"基于反向拍卖的用户协同缓存研究","authors":"Haonan Xie, Jian Xiong, Lin Gui, Bing Li, Jiang-an Li","doi":"10.1109/VTCFall.2019.8891441","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Caching is a very effective way to offload data traffic; and when users participate in the caching game, the costs are greatly reduced. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel scheme that user terminals (UTs) cooperatively cache popular services to the intelligent routing relay (IRR) side. We use reverse auction model to motivate UTs to collaborate and cache, since UTs are rational and selfish. In this model, IRR purchases popular services from UTs and assigns rewards to UTs. UTs use personal data traffic to obtain popular services and then cache them to the IRR side. In order to minimize UTs' waiting time while maximizing total social incomes, we use an online reverse auction strategy, first-come-first-served (FCFS) strategy to allocate winning services to UTs. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the FCFS strategy and show that the performances of FCFS are better than those of random allocation (RA) strategy in terms of incomes, completion rate and user waiting time. Experimental results further verify the authenticity, feasibility and the efficiency of the proposed scheme.","PeriodicalId":6713,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE 90th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Fall)","volume":"9 1","pages":"1-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On User Cooperative Caching by Reverse Auction\",\"authors\":\"Haonan Xie, Jian Xiong, Lin Gui, Bing Li, Jiang-an Li\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/VTCFall.2019.8891441\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Caching is a very effective way to offload data traffic; and when users participate in the caching game, the costs are greatly reduced. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel scheme that user terminals (UTs) cooperatively cache popular services to the intelligent routing relay (IRR) side. We use reverse auction model to motivate UTs to collaborate and cache, since UTs are rational and selfish. In this model, IRR purchases popular services from UTs and assigns rewards to UTs. UTs use personal data traffic to obtain popular services and then cache them to the IRR side. In order to minimize UTs' waiting time while maximizing total social incomes, we use an online reverse auction strategy, first-come-first-served (FCFS) strategy to allocate winning services to UTs. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the FCFS strategy and show that the performances of FCFS are better than those of random allocation (RA) strategy in terms of incomes, completion rate and user waiting time. Experimental results further verify the authenticity, feasibility and the efficiency of the proposed scheme.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6713,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE 90th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Fall)\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"1-5\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE 90th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Fall)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2019.8891441\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE 90th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Fall)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2019.8891441","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Caching is a very effective way to offload data traffic; and when users participate in the caching game, the costs are greatly reduced. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel scheme that user terminals (UTs) cooperatively cache popular services to the intelligent routing relay (IRR) side. We use reverse auction model to motivate UTs to collaborate and cache, since UTs are rational and selfish. In this model, IRR purchases popular services from UTs and assigns rewards to UTs. UTs use personal data traffic to obtain popular services and then cache them to the IRR side. In order to minimize UTs' waiting time while maximizing total social incomes, we use an online reverse auction strategy, first-come-first-served (FCFS) strategy to allocate winning services to UTs. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the FCFS strategy and show that the performances of FCFS are better than those of random allocation (RA) strategy in terms of incomes, completion rate and user waiting time. Experimental results further verify the authenticity, feasibility and the efficiency of the proposed scheme.