公共利益集体诉讼

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Georgetown Law Journal Pub Date : 2015-02-27 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2565988
D. Marcus
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引用次数: 1

摘要

公益律师经常以集体诉讼的形式对政府被告提起大规模诉讼,要求获得禁令救济。直到最近,他们的集体证明动议通常都会成功,使原告能够获得全面的补救措施,这需要对政府的政策和做法进行根本性的改革。然而,近年来,规范公共利益集体诉讼的法律发生了巨大变化,反复出现的理论问题分裂了联邦法院。如果反对集体认证的新趋势继续下去,集体诉讼原则将很快成为成功起诉的一个巨大障碍——可能是一个障碍——这种诉讼在过去50年里给监狱、寄养系统和其他政府机构和服务部门带来了无数的变化。任何摆脱当前混乱的途径都必须解决一个基本但被忽视的问题。为什么大规模的公益案件总是以集体诉讼的形式进行?答案涉及到集体诉讼法与其他旨在限制诉讼资格和救济范围的理论之间的相互作用,而这种相互作用并未得到充分认识。集体诉讼程序使公共利益原告能够在实体法中维护与广泛、系统救济相一致的政策,而不要求法院篡夺其他部门的权力或作出不恰当的裁决。没有集体诉讼证明,这些政策将处于休眠状态,因为其他学说将不必要地破坏诉讼。这种“平衡”功能可以对法院在这个公共利益集体诉讼的新时代努力回答的理论问题作出回应。如果集体诉讼程序以与其功能相一致的方式发展,大规模公益诉讼仍将是实现结构改革的可行手段。
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The Public Interest Class Action
Public interest lawyers often bring large-scale cases against government defendants for injunctive relief as class actions. Until recently, their class certification motions routinely succeeded, enabling plaintiffs to obtain sweeping remedies that have required fundamental reforms to government policies and practices. In recent years, however, the law regulating the public interest class action has changed dramatically, with recurring doctrinal problems splitting the federal courts. Should a nascent trend against class certification continue, class action doctrine will soon present a formidable obstacle – possibly a barrier – to the successful prosecution of a sort of litigation that has produced innumerable changes to prisons, foster care systems, and other government agencies and services over the last fifty years. Any path out of the present confusion must address a basic but neglected question. Why do large-scale public interest cases so regularly proceed as class actions? The answer involves an under-appreciated interaction between the law of class actions and other doctrines devised to limit standing and the scope of remedies. Class action procedure enables public interest plaintiffs to vindicate policies in the substantive law consistent with broad, systemic remedies without asking courts to usurp power from other branches or adjudicate ineptly Without class certification, these policies would lie dormant, as the other doctrines would unnecessarily derail litigation. This “counterweight” function can generate responses to the doctrinal problems that courts have struggled to answer in this new era for the public interest class action. If class action procedure evolves in a manner consistent with its function, large-scale public interest litigation will remain a viable means for the achievement of structural reform.
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CiteScore
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自引率
5.00%
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期刊介绍: The Georgetown Law Journal is headquartered at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. and has since its inception published more than 500 issues, as well as the widely-used Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (ARCP). The Journal is currently, and always has been, run by law students.
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