竞争何时会变成冲突?技术、地理和攻防平衡

IF 1.7 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Journal of Global Security Studies Pub Date : 2021-04-19 DOI:10.1093/JOGSS/OGAB007
D. Blagden
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在技术、地理和人为因素之间是否存在有意义的攻防平衡,这些因素实质上影响战争的可能性和严重性?从东亚危机不稳定的危险,到网络武器可能的先发制人优势,当代的关键政策辩论当然都充满了这一概念。与此同时,防御性现实主义理论提出了从外部姿势选择推断意图的可能性。然而,对于进攻性的现实主义者来说,这样的信号是一个注定要失败的希望,因为侵略者的动机是在将现有的军事技术用于进攻目的之前隐藏他们的敌对意图。本文认为,这两种观点都错误地描述了攻防平衡的因果作用。竞争可能是国际政治的普遍状况,但它只表现为军事冲突,在某些条件下被定义为“冷战”或最终的“热战”。具体来说,通过侵略推进政治目标的可行性取决于当前的军事技术,考虑到其地理背景,即进攻-防御计算。通过三个次理论案例——“水的阻止力量”、常规闪电战和核反击创新——文章表明,攻防平衡甚至在进攻现实主义中也会影响冲突的可能性和严重程度,特别是通过影响威慑前景。但这并不意味着,正如防御现实主义所假定的那样,国防优势的可区分性承诺了一条摆脱安全困境的途径。
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When Does Competition Become Conflict? Technology, Geography, and the Offense–Defense Balance
Is there a meaningful offense–defense balance of technological, geographical, and human factors that substantially affects war likelihood and severity? Key contemporary policy debates are certainly infused with the notion, from the dangers of crisis instability in East Asia to the possible first-move advantages of cyber weaponry. Defensive realist theory, meanwhile, raises the possibility of inferring intent from external posture choices. Yet for offensive realists, such signaling is a doomed hope, because of aggressors’ incentives to conceal their hostile intentions before turning extant military technology to offensive ends. This article suggests that both perspectives misstate the causal role of the offense–defense balance. Competition may be a general condition of international politics—but it only manifests itself as a military conflict, defined as “cold” or ultimately “hot” war, under certain conditions. Specifically, the feasibility of advancing political goals via aggression rests on prevailing military technology, taken in its geographical context—that is, offense–defense calculations. Via three sub-theoretical cases—the “stopping power of water,” conventional blitzkrieg, and nuclear counterforce innovation—the article shows that the offense–defense balance affects conflict likelihood and severity even within offensive realism, specifically by affecting deterrence prospects. But this does not mean, as defensive realism posits, that the distinguishability of defense dominance promises a route out of the security dilemma.
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来源期刊
Journal of Global Security Studies
Journal of Global Security Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
6.20%
发文量
34
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