Addressing cases from Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, Togo, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe, this article discusses the global phenomenon of internet shutdowns (ISs) from the normative perspective of Just Securitization Theory (JST). It focuses on the conflict between arguments used to justify ISs and the negative impact of ISs regarding fundamental and human rights. This article develops strict criteria for when ISs might be legitimate as extraordinary security measures in emergency situations. Following JST, these criteria are based on citizens’ right to physical integrity, the expectation of reasonable success, proportionality, harm minimization, and specificity. I argue that it is not legitimate to use ISs to enact collective punishment, preemptive censorship, or hamper legitimate political protests. While denying the legitimacy of the vast majority of ISs on these grounds, I sketch four exceptional scenarios (“WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm”) in which ISs can be legitimate. JST also includes states’ duty to desecuritize once a threat has been neutralized. In this way, a balanced discussion of ISs as an exceptional measure from the perspective of JST contributes to the establishment of a customary positive human right to digital connectivity in the normal situation.
本文论述了喀麦隆、埃及、埃塞俄比亚、印度、印度尼西亚、伊朗、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦、西班牙、多哥、英国、美国和津巴布韦的案例，从公正安全化理论（JST）的规范角度讨论了互联网关闭（ISs）这一全球现象。文章重点讨论了为 ISs 开脱的论据与 ISs 对基本权利和人权的负面影响之间的冲突。本文制定了严格的标准，说明在紧急情况下，基础设施服务作为非常规安全措施何时可以合法。按照 JST，这些标准基于公民的人身安全权、合理成功的预期、相称性、伤害最小化和特定性。我认为，使用基础设施服务实施集体惩罚、先发制人的审查或阻碍合法的政治抗议是不合法的。在以这些理由否认绝大多数基础设施服务的合法性的同时，我勾勒了基础设施服务可以合法的四种例外情况（"WhatsApp私刑"、"2021年美国国会大厦"、"计算机病毒 "和 "虚假警报"）。JST 还包括国家在威胁被解除后的 "去证券化 "责任。这样，从 JST 的角度将 ISs 作为例外措施进行平衡讨论，有助于在正常情况下建立数字连接的习惯性积极人权。
{"title":"Digital Rights and the State of Exception. Internet Shutdowns from the Perspective of Just Securitization Theory","authors":"Johannes Thumfart","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Addressing cases from Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, Togo, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zimbabwe, this article discusses the global phenomenon of internet shutdowns (ISs) from the normative perspective of Just Securitization Theory (JST). It focuses on the conflict between arguments used to justify ISs and the negative impact of ISs regarding fundamental and human rights. This article develops strict criteria for when ISs might be legitimate as extraordinary security measures in emergency situations. Following JST, these criteria are based on citizens’ right to physical integrity, the expectation of reasonable success, proportionality, harm minimization, and specificity. I argue that it is not legitimate to use ISs to enact collective punishment, preemptive censorship, or hamper legitimate political protests. While denying the legitimacy of the vast majority of ISs on these grounds, I sketch four exceptional scenarios (“WhatsApp lynchings,” “US Capitol 2021,” “Computer virus,” and “False alarm”) in which ISs can be legitimate. JST also includes states’ duty to desecuritize once a threat has been neutralized. In this way, a balanced discussion of ISs as an exceptional measure from the perspective of JST contributes to the establishment of a customary positive human right to digital connectivity in the normal situation.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"26 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139444133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Genocide is a catastrophic event in international relations. States that experience genocide often have powerful external patrons that influence its likelihood. Yet, the external dynamics of genocide are often overlooked. This paper examines the constraining or enabling role of external patrons and what motivates their decisions. This research theorizes that patron states can permit or restrain genocide, depending on their interests in the client state. The study uses a qualitative comparative case analysis to focus on the role of patron military assistance, comparing genocide in Rwanda (1990–1994), and the role of France with the high-risk non-genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh (1991–1994) and Russian support to Armenia. I argue that patron actions can be understood through the prism of great or regional power competition and are generally determined by motivations conforming to a logic of realpolitik; the prospect of loss of influence significantly affects the likelihood of genocide. These processes can be observed through variations in patron military assistance and patterns of violence. A better understanding of these dynamics is critical to the study of international relations and international security, with policy implications for atrocity prevention in a period of intensifying great power competition.
{"title":"Geopolitics and Genocide: Patron Interests, Client Crises, and Realpolitik","authors":"Sascha Nanlohy","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Genocide is a catastrophic event in international relations. States that experience genocide often have powerful external patrons that influence its likelihood. Yet, the external dynamics of genocide are often overlooked. This paper examines the constraining or enabling role of external patrons and what motivates their decisions. This research theorizes that patron states can permit or restrain genocide, depending on their interests in the client state. The study uses a qualitative comparative case analysis to focus on the role of patron military assistance, comparing genocide in Rwanda (1990–1994), and the role of France with the high-risk non-genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh (1991–1994) and Russian support to Armenia. I argue that patron actions can be understood through the prism of great or regional power competition and are generally determined by motivations conforming to a logic of realpolitik; the prospect of loss of influence significantly affects the likelihood of genocide. These processes can be observed through variations in patron military assistance and patterns of violence. A better understanding of these dynamics is critical to the study of international relations and international security, with policy implications for atrocity prevention in a period of intensifying great power competition.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"22 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139441410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Australia is undergoing a process of substantial militarization. This article argues that one of the key forces underpinning Australia’s militarization is an emergent military–industrial–academic complex (MIAC), comprised of increasingly close relationships between universities, defense, and defense industry. The connections between the three have rapidly intensified since 2016 due to changes in defense industry policy, pessimism regarding the strategic environment, the ongoing malaise of the neoliberal university, and the motivations of key individuals. This article demonstrates that each of the three groups is actively seeking closer relationships with the other, driven by a patchwork of competing economic and strategic motivations, and powered by ideals of innovation and the entrepreneurial spirit. Each needs the other—for military advantage, for profits, and for survival. Australia’s emergent but rapidly expanding MIAC raises concerns about the pace, nature, and necessity of Australia’s militarization, the impact on the role of the university in society, and the hollowness of Australian strategic policy. Furthermore, it has substantial implications for strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s alliances, and the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) partnership.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Australian Militarism: On the Emergent Military–Industrial–Academic Complex","authors":"Sian Troath","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Australia is undergoing a process of substantial militarization. This article argues that one of the key forces underpinning Australia’s militarization is an emergent military–industrial–academic complex (MIAC), comprised of increasingly close relationships between universities, defense, and defense industry. The connections between the three have rapidly intensified since 2016 due to changes in defense industry policy, pessimism regarding the strategic environment, the ongoing malaise of the neoliberal university, and the motivations of key individuals. This article demonstrates that each of the three groups is actively seeking closer relationships with the other, driven by a patchwork of competing economic and strategic motivations, and powered by ideals of innovation and the entrepreneurial spirit. Each needs the other—for military advantage, for profits, and for survival. Australia’s emergent but rapidly expanding MIAC raises concerns about the pace, nature, and necessity of Australia’s militarization, the impact on the role of the university in society, and the hollowness of Australian strategic policy. Furthermore, it has substantial implications for strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s alliances, and the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) partnership.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136078800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The provision of development aid has become a favored counterinsurgency strategy, with governments reasoning that the delivery of needed services will improve civilians’ perceptions of the government, and consequently decrease civilian collaboration with insurgents. However, this reasoning relies on the critical assumption that civilians attribute projects to the government, and not to the very insurgents that the government seeks to defeat. In information poor environments like civil wars, it may be relatively easy for armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid by engaging in credit claiming. Drawing upon on a survey experiment in Afghanistan, I find that civilians who are told that the Taliban allowed a project in their village to occur are more likely to identify the Taliban as a facilitator of development projects, in spite of their own, real-life, experiences. While the effect size is modest, the finding points to the ability of armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid through purely rhetorical strategies, with implications for the viability of development aid as a counterinsurgency strategy.
{"title":"Can Insurgents Capture Aid through Credit Claiming? Evidence from Afghanistan","authors":"Jori Breslawski","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The provision of development aid has become a favored counterinsurgency strategy, with governments reasoning that the delivery of needed services will improve civilians’ perceptions of the government, and consequently decrease civilian collaboration with insurgents. However, this reasoning relies on the critical assumption that civilians attribute projects to the government, and not to the very insurgents that the government seeks to defeat. In information poor environments like civil wars, it may be relatively easy for armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid by engaging in credit claiming. Drawing upon on a survey experiment in Afghanistan, I find that civilians who are told that the Taliban allowed a project in their village to occur are more likely to identify the Taliban as a facilitator of development projects, in spite of their own, real-life, experiences. While the effect size is modest, the finding points to the ability of armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid through purely rhetorical strategies, with implications for the viability of development aid as a counterinsurgency strategy.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136183672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A common belief is that sanctions will deprive targets of the resources they need to engage in offensive behaviors. This suggests that sanctions on active and passive supporters of terrorism should reduce violence. This study examines the argument that sanctions can weaken state support for terrorism and reduce terrorist violence. We argue that while sanctions may deprive active or passive supporters of resources, these market imperfections may create commitment problems by weakening these states’ ability to maintain the balance of power with their rivals. As a result, state supporters and their terrorists may escalate violence to solidify gains against their rivals. We test this hypothesis quantitatively using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions and the Global Terrorism datasets, and qualitatively using an examination of Pakistani support for the Haqqani Network.
{"title":"Economic Sanctions and the Escalation of Terrorism","authors":"Navin A Bapat, Menevis Cilizoglu","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A common belief is that sanctions will deprive targets of the resources they need to engage in offensive behaviors. This suggests that sanctions on active and passive supporters of terrorism should reduce violence. This study examines the argument that sanctions can weaken state support for terrorism and reduce terrorist violence. We argue that while sanctions may deprive active or passive supporters of resources, these market imperfections may create commitment problems by weakening these states’ ability to maintain the balance of power with their rivals. As a result, state supporters and their terrorists may escalate violence to solidify gains against their rivals. We test this hypothesis quantitatively using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions and the Global Terrorism datasets, and qualitatively using an examination of Pakistani support for the Haqqani Network.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136017415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Historically, offensive cyber operations (OCOs) have been considered a practice that states could carry out covertly, away from the public eye, with both perpetrators and defenders having incentives to remain silent. Over the past few years, however, perpetrators and defenders have publicly acknowledged their involvement in OCOs. How common is this strategic choice among states? What are its characteristics? In this research note I show that this is not a binary choice, and that there is variance in the strategies available to either side. I then examine what state behavior patterns can be identified by using compiled data of OCOs between 1996 and 2019. I show that this phenomenon of giving up secrecy is occurring and point out on states’ characteristics and probabilities of choosing each strategy. Initial findings show significant use of public strategies by perpetrators (20 percent) and more so by defenders (50 percent), and that democracies tend toward public credit claiming and attribution, while less democratic countries tend toward public denial. As governments increasingly engage in OCOs, the implications of this research note are of interest to scholars and practitioners alike.
{"title":"Public Secrets: The Dynamics of Publicity and Secrecy in Offensive Cyber Operations","authors":"Gil Baram","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Historically, offensive cyber operations (OCOs) have been considered a practice that states could carry out covertly, away from the public eye, with both perpetrators and defenders having incentives to remain silent. Over the past few years, however, perpetrators and defenders have publicly acknowledged their involvement in OCOs. How common is this strategic choice among states? What are its characteristics? In this research note I show that this is not a binary choice, and that there is variance in the strategies available to either side. I then examine what state behavior patterns can be identified by using compiled data of OCOs between 1996 and 2019. I show that this phenomenon of giving up secrecy is occurring and point out on states’ characteristics and probabilities of choosing each strategy. Initial findings show significant use of public strategies by perpetrators (20 percent) and more so by defenders (50 percent), and that democracies tend toward public credit claiming and attribution, while less democratic countries tend toward public denial. As governments increasingly engage in OCOs, the implications of this research note are of interest to scholars and practitioners alike.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135914891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we explore how concerns about entrapment influence mass attitudes about armed support for an alliance partner. We focus on two separate dimensions of entrapment: allied crisis instigation and the risk of direct entanglement in a nuclear conflict. Our empirical analysis is based on US experimental survey data, collected in 2021. Our data analysis reveals two main findings. First, people are less likely to endorse military action in support of another country if that state is perceived as the instigator of a given military crisis. However, we find that allied crisis instigation only reduces individual-level support for certain types of military operations (cruise missile and nuclear strikes) but not others. Furthermore, even where significant, the substantive effect of our experimental vignette is fairly limited. This implies that US voters are not particularly sensitive to the potential for offensive entrapment in the US–South Korean alliance. Second, we find that nuclear deterrence threats from international rivals sap public support for military action. However, this is only true (1) for conventional military attacks and (2) if the US President does not provide a substantive justification for military intervention. As soon as leaders offer a detailed rationale for military action, the negative effect of foreign nuclear threats on support for the use of force disappears.
{"title":"Conditional Assistance: Entrapment Concerns and Individual-Level Support for US Alliance Partners","authors":"Florian Justwan, Jeffrey D Berejikian","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we explore how concerns about entrapment influence mass attitudes about armed support for an alliance partner. We focus on two separate dimensions of entrapment: allied crisis instigation and the risk of direct entanglement in a nuclear conflict. Our empirical analysis is based on US experimental survey data, collected in 2021. Our data analysis reveals two main findings. First, people are less likely to endorse military action in support of another country if that state is perceived as the instigator of a given military crisis. However, we find that allied crisis instigation only reduces individual-level support for certain types of military operations (cruise missile and nuclear strikes) but not others. Furthermore, even where significant, the substantive effect of our experimental vignette is fairly limited. This implies that US voters are not particularly sensitive to the potential for offensive entrapment in the US–South Korean alliance. Second, we find that nuclear deterrence threats from international rivals sap public support for military action. However, this is only true (1) for conventional military attacks and (2) if the US President does not provide a substantive justification for military intervention. As soon as leaders offer a detailed rationale for military action, the negative effect of foreign nuclear threats on support for the use of force disappears.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136017337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For two decades, a large body of security practitioners and scholars axiomatically expected “future war” to be ambiguous and hybrid, based on recent cases. The scale and overt form of the Russia–Ukraine war, which begun on February 22, 2022, demonstrates the limits of this orthodoxy. This article asks why informed opinion fell prey to such false expectations. It argues that as well as the pathologies of fashion in military-academic circles, there was an intellectual failure. Those who confidently expected war to remain in the shadows did not take seriously enough war’s political nature, and the possibility that it will intensify as political stakes rise. Either they assumed apolitically that war’s form was determined by the tools of globalization, or that the politics would be of the status quo, whereby the stability of the unipolar era would endure. Paying lip service to Carl von Clausewitz, in fact, they were unwittingly channeling Francis Fukuyama. To demonstrate this failure, I examine three representative texts of the genre and unpack their assumptions, by David Richards, Antoine Bousquet, and Sean McFate.
{"title":"Out of the Shadows: Ukraine and the Shock of Non-Hybrid War","authors":"P. Porter","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 For two decades, a large body of security practitioners and scholars axiomatically expected “future war” to be ambiguous and hybrid, based on recent cases. The scale and overt form of the Russia–Ukraine war, which begun on February 22, 2022, demonstrates the limits of this orthodoxy. This article asks why informed opinion fell prey to such false expectations. It argues that as well as the pathologies of fashion in military-academic circles, there was an intellectual failure. Those who confidently expected war to remain in the shadows did not take seriously enough war’s political nature, and the possibility that it will intensify as political stakes rise. Either they assumed apolitically that war’s form was determined by the tools of globalization, or that the politics would be of the status quo, whereby the stability of the unipolar era would endure. Paying lip service to Carl von Clausewitz, in fact, they were unwittingly channeling Francis Fukuyama. To demonstrate this failure, I examine three representative texts of the genre and unpack their assumptions, by David Richards, Antoine Bousquet, and Sean McFate.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81867358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs’ relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.
{"title":"Governance Interrupted: Rebel Governance and Pro-Government Militias","authors":"Minnie M. Joo, Santiago Sosa","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs’ relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90551995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emerging research has suggested that the COVID-19 pandemic has generally favored rebel organizations—rather than states—in situations of intrastate conflict. This article challenges this perspective by analyzing the pandemic's impact on three dimensions of rebel activity—armed activity, popular support and recruitment, and rebel governance. It does so by using illustrative evidence from long-running insurgencies in Northeast India, characterized by long-term rebel weakness and minimal, if any, territorial control. The article finds that during the early, acute phase of the pandemic in 2020, state-imposed lockdowns, rebels’ own restrictions, and disruptions to supply chains constrained most dimensions of rebel activity. The easing of restrictions in 2021 revealed complex and multidimensional impacts on different armed groups, which often hinged on pre-existing positions such as armed group strength, strategy, relations with the state, and operational circumstances. These experiences of low-level insurgencies lacking territorial control add important qualifiers to the notion that rebels are inherently best placed to capitalize on stochastic shocks such as pandemics. Beyond the case of Northeast India, these findings make a number of contributions to the analysis of counterinsurgency and rebel governance.
{"title":"The Impact of COVID-19 on Insurgency and Rebel Governance: Lessons from India's Northeast","authors":"E. Newman, J. Saikia, A. Waterman","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Emerging research has suggested that the COVID-19 pandemic has generally favored rebel organizations—rather than states—in situations of intrastate conflict. This article challenges this perspective by analyzing the pandemic's impact on three dimensions of rebel activity—armed activity, popular support and recruitment, and rebel governance. It does so by using illustrative evidence from long-running insurgencies in Northeast India, characterized by long-term rebel weakness and minimal, if any, territorial control. The article finds that during the early, acute phase of the pandemic in 2020, state-imposed lockdowns, rebels’ own restrictions, and disruptions to supply chains constrained most dimensions of rebel activity. The easing of restrictions in 2021 revealed complex and multidimensional impacts on different armed groups, which often hinged on pre-existing positions such as armed group strength, strategy, relations with the state, and operational circumstances. These experiences of low-level insurgencies lacking territorial control add important qualifiers to the notion that rebels are inherently best placed to capitalize on stochastic shocks such as pandemics. Beyond the case of Northeast India, these findings make a number of contributions to the analysis of counterinsurgency and rebel governance.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87991728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：