{"title":"神圣的简单性,上帝的自由,以及模态崩溃的假定问题","authors":"D. Pedersen, Christopher Lilley","doi":"10.1163/15697312-bja10028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Proponents of the modal collapse argument claim that divine simplicity, traditionally conceived, contradicts other Christian commitments about divine freedom and grace by ultimately rendering all God’s acts, including creation and redemption, absolutely necessary. If true, the argument goes, theologians must abandon either God’s simplicity or God’s freedom. The aim of this dilemma is to force the abandonment of simplicity. However, we argue that the modal collapse argument is insufficient to generate this dilemma apart from additional premises—and that these tacit premises are the true locus of dispute.","PeriodicalId":53817,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Reformed Theology","volume":"168 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Divine Simplicity, God’s Freedom, and the Supposed Problem of Modal Collapse\",\"authors\":\"D. Pedersen, Christopher Lilley\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/15697312-bja10028\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Proponents of the modal collapse argument claim that divine simplicity, traditionally conceived, contradicts other Christian commitments about divine freedom and grace by ultimately rendering all God’s acts, including creation and redemption, absolutely necessary. If true, the argument goes, theologians must abandon either God’s simplicity or God’s freedom. The aim of this dilemma is to force the abandonment of simplicity. However, we argue that the modal collapse argument is insufficient to generate this dilemma apart from additional premises—and that these tacit premises are the true locus of dispute.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53817,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Reformed Theology\",\"volume\":\"168 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Reformed Theology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/15697312-bja10028\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"RELIGION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Reformed Theology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15697312-bja10028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
Divine Simplicity, God’s Freedom, and the Supposed Problem of Modal Collapse
Proponents of the modal collapse argument claim that divine simplicity, traditionally conceived, contradicts other Christian commitments about divine freedom and grace by ultimately rendering all God’s acts, including creation and redemption, absolutely necessary. If true, the argument goes, theologians must abandon either God’s simplicity or God’s freedom. The aim of this dilemma is to force the abandonment of simplicity. However, we argue that the modal collapse argument is insufficient to generate this dilemma apart from additional premises—and that these tacit premises are the true locus of dispute.